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This dissertation adopts as its starting point the beliefs 
that moral truths can be known and that political philosophy 
is a branch of ethics. 
The author identifies three variants of libertarianism on 
the basis of their different treatments of the right to 
private property, which all three consider to be the 
cornerstone of political libertarianism. The author evaluates 
the arguments of Robert Nozick, Murray Rothbard, John Hospers 
and Ayn Rand for the moral foundations of libertarianism and 
finds them to be methodologically inadequate. None is able to 
furnish libertarianism with the moral foundations it requires. 
Following the example of Jan Narveson in his recent defence of 
the libertarian idea, the author adopts as the correct 
metaphysic of morality the method of hypothetical contract. 
The contractarian method is capable of determining both the 
nature and the extent of moral obligation. From application of 
the method of hypothetical contract the author concurs with 
the above-mentioned authors that morality is a system of 
rights and duties, i.e deontological in character, and that 
persons are indeed bearers of moral, non-conventional rights. 
One of these rights is the negative right to equal social 
liberty. The author differs, however, in finding that 
contractarianism favours also a positive right to basic, 
standard welfare. Recognition of this latter right commits the 
author to a form of moderate or Lockean libertarianism that 
endorses the in-principle justice of coercive redistribution 
to meet persons' basic welfare. Consequently, the orthodox 
libertarianism advocated by Nozick, Rothbard, Hospers, Rand 
and Narveson which recognises only negative moral rights is 
rejected by the author. 
All of the libertarians cited accept in one form or another 
John Locke's labour theory of appropriation. However, the 
author eschews the standard reading of Locke they are wedded 
to. The standard reading premisses the labour theory on a 
person's ownership of himself. This reading is rejected on the 
grounds that the idea of self-ownership is insufficiently 
determinate to act as a sure basis for establishing property 
rights in things one has mixed one's labour with. A 
reconstructed defence of the moral right to private property 
through labouring which avoids this difficulty is given. That 
defence is premissed not on self-ownership but on the right to 
equal social liberty. Save for the requirement to meet basic 
welfare there are no limits to the extent of acquisition. 
The author argues that, despite his avowals to the 
contrary, Nozick in fact endorses a positive right to welfare, 
and that this positive right is one that is co-extensive with 
the right to basic welfare established by the method of 
hypothetical contract. Two arguments are given. The first 
argument draws on Nozick's Lockean proviso that an act of 
appropraition not worsen the position of others. The second is 
based upon the application to an envisaged society of 
libe~tarian-rights bearers of Nozick's clause that permits the 
violation of rights in order to avoid catastrophic moral 
horror. This latter argument the author believes to be 
successful against any libertarianism that is wedded to 
absolute property rights. Redistribution to meet the demands 
of basic welfare necessitates taxation. Taxation is to be 
levied proportionately and not progressively, and is to be 
coupled with a system of private social insurance. 
None of the three variants of libertarianism identified, 
and which the author maintains sustain redistribution as a 
matter of justice, is ostensibly committed to redistribution 
more extensive than required to meet persons' basic welfare~ 
Ernest Loevinsohn's argument to the effect that libertarians 
are - by the very principle they defend as libertarians -
committed to more far-reaching welfare and redistribution is 
examined and rejected. Because Loevinsohn's argument is 
directed against a consequentialist defence of libertarianism 
and not a deontological version it is misplaced. Furthermore, 
it fails to establish the conclusion Loevinsohn supposes it 
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does. Also rejected are the avowedly non-libertarian arguments 
in favour of an equal or more equal distribution of wealth 
advanced by John Rawls and Bernard Williams. The author 
concludes that no greater equality is required in the name of 
justice than is achieved by observance of the positive right 
to welfare. 
The author examines the anarchist libertarian contention, 
defended by Rothbard, that the state's monopoly of coercion is 
not necessary for the protection of persons' libertarian 
rights. The anarchist libertarian believes that protection, 
including protection of the right to welfare, can be provided 
on the competitve market, where no-one has nor claims to have 
a monopoly on enforcement. The author shows that the anarchist 
case is not without plausibility. In the light of this, 
Nozick's derivation of the minimal state with a monopoly on 
coercive enforcement from the failure of a market in 
protection services is decidedly moot. Even if the minimal 
state is indeed derived the author contends that Nozick's 
principle of the compensation of prohibited enforcers of 
rights may create free-riders whose existence might lead, via 
an invisible-hand process, to the dissolution of the minimal 
state. 
Graham Andrew Williams 
14 February 1992 
4 Highstead Place 
1 Highstead Road 
Rondebosch 
Cape Town, 7700 




'Property is theft' declared Pierre-Joseph Proudhon - and 
nevertheless cuffed a pickpocket for attempting to relieve him 
of his wallet. Moreover, Proudhon was wrong: theft presupposes 
property and cannot be identical with it. Suppose, however, 
Proudhon to have said, 'Property is a right, and it is a right 
a person has as a result either of his appropriating from 
nature or by process of just transfer traceable, ultimately, 
to someone who had so appropriated.' Would Proudhon have been 
wrong? Political libertarians answer not, and in answering 
thus are not to be thought culpable of gross intellectual 
error. So at any rate I shall argue in this dissertation. 
This dissertation defends the distinctive libertarian claim 
that a person has a moral, non-conventional private property 
right in those naturally situated, i.e. unowned, resources he 
mixes his labour with. This is a strong claim: it says that 
resources can be unilaterally acquired, i.e. without requiring 
the consent of others, including the consent of those who 
would be adversely affected by his acquisition, and that once 
acquired the owner is at liberty to enjoy them as he will, if 
needs be to the exclusion of others. If the claim is to be 
defensible the libertarian will have to show two things. One, 
that persons have moral rights. And two, the success of the 
project to justify moral rights granted, that the right to 
resources one has mixed one's labour with is one of them. 
It has not gone unnoticed that Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 
Robert Nozick's seminal contribution to the politics of 
libertarianism, is without foundation.l Nozick maintains that 
persons have natural rights, and that one of the natural 
1 Nagel, 'Libertarianisll Without Foundations' ,p.l93; Ryan, 'Yours, Kine, and ours: Property Rights and Individual Liberty', 
pp.335-6; Waldron, The Right to Private Property,p.4; Narveson, The Libertarian Idea,p.xii; Rothbard, The Etbics of 
Li.berty,p.246. 
1 
rights they have is that to private property. Nowhere does 
Nozick present a positive argument for natural rights, nor eo 
ipso for the natural right to private property, and admits as 
much, conceding that much of what he says 'rests upon or uses 
general features' a theory of individual rights would have 
were it worked out. 2 Locke too has no satisfactory secular 
argument for natural rights. He tends to treat the question of 
whether persons have them or not as decided self-evidently in 
favour of their having them. 3 Murray Rothbard does no better, 
unabashedly citing as the well-spring of libertarianism an 
axiom of non-aggression.4 The critics who complain that 
libertarianism is without foundation are, then, correct. 
The vision of property rights libertarians are wedded to as 
presented above is perforce imprecise. It represents, in its 
imprecision, the attempt to distil the very minimum of common 
ground upon which the distinct libertarian identity is forged: 
one that, internal differences apart, the libertarian 
theorists with whom I am most concerned are agreed on. 5 
Disagreement arises over the interpretation of just transfer, 
a disagreement which has its origins in opposing views about 
the nature of rights, including that to property, or in 
dissension as to what rights persons are deemed to have. 
There are three distinct positions. The first and the most 
uncompromising is what I term the orthodox libertarian 
position, the other two are non-orthodox positions the 
hallmark of both such that they are best captured, in 
contradistinction to orthodox libertarianism, by the 
appellation 'Lockean' libertarianism. orthodox libertarianism 
is defined by three theses: (1) that persons have moral 
rights; (2) that one moral right persons have is that to 
property justly acquired; and (3) that the moral right to 
private property is based on either appropriation from nature 
2 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,p.xiv. 
3 Locke, Second Treatise,p.lJ4. 
4 Rothbard, For a Nev Li.bercy,p.S. 
5 Barrv thinks Friednan's Caoitalisl and Freedom a libertarian tract: on Classical Liberalism and Li.bertarianis~ , p.J. 
Rothbard is adanant Friedn~ is no libertarian at all: For a Nev Li.berty,p.JlO. 
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through labouring or process of just transfer, where just 
transfer, traceable ultimately to appropriation from nature, 
is transfer effected non-coercively or voluntarily, i.e. with 
the freely given consent of the property rights bearer. To 
have a right is to have an enforceable claim, and property is 
a right, in this sense, to some use or benefit of a thing. 
Orthodox libertarians are more austere Lockeans than Locke. 
They accept the spirit of his labour theory of appropriation 
whilst discarding the letter of the 'enough and as good 
remaining' proviso regulating appropriation, and the two 
limits of term to property Locke believed enjoined by natural 
law, namely the spoilage proviso and the duty of charity. 
Because the libertarianism defended in this dissertation 
upholds something akin to Locke's duty of charity, to term it 
Lockean is apposite. 
Orthodox libertarians maintain (3) is exhaustive. The only 
just transfer is a voluntary, non-coercive transfer. The first 
of the two Lockean libertarian positions differs from that of 
the orthodox owing to its differing understanding of the 
nature of rights. Unlike orthodox libertarianism - which 
treats rights, property rights included, as moral absolutes 
never overridable for reasons of general welfare or utility 
but only alienable by the unforced consent of the rights 
bearer - this Lockean position adopts the view that all rights 
are prima facie and not absolute. In principle then, property 
rights can be overridden and this means that, again in 
principle, property is open to transfer that does not satisfy 
the non-coercive condition of thesis (3) above. Whilst in 
agreement with orthodox libertarians over what rights persons 
have, this version of Lockean libertarianism allows in 
principle for teleological considerations to be sometimes 
defeasing of rights. Exactly why this is deserving of the 
epithet 'Lockean' will become clear when the juncture at which 
teleology takes over from rights is explicated in the case of 
the right to property. 
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The second variant of Lockean libertarianism differs from 
this and from orthodox libertarianism over the issue of what 
rights persons have. Where the orthodox libertarian endorses 
the absolute rights to property in one's own body and 
previously unowned resources transformed by one's labour, and 
recognises no other property rights, this Lockean 
libertarianism recognises a positive right to property. When 
appropriation from nature is not possible and when not engaged 
in the nexus of voluntary exchange and transfer a person may 
claim as his right a share drawn from the surplus of others. 
Included within the ambit of just transfer is the coercive 
redistribution of property in order to fulfil this right. 
Instead of considerations of general welfare defeasing rights, 
this version has the positive right to welfare alter whatever 
distribution has been effected in accordance with 
appropriation and voluntary transfer and thus trigger 
redistribution. The outside limit to fulfilling this right is 
that there be a net decrease in the number of claims to 
welfare to be fulfilled. If redistributing property to you 
will cause me to in turn claim as my rightful due a 
redistributive share, which but for transfer to you I would 
not, then redistributing from me to you is not required by 
justice in transfer. 
The orthodox libertarians - John Hospers, Ayn Rand, Jan 
Narveson and Rothbard - maintain that no person's legitimately 
acquired property may be used, consumed or in any other way 
alienated by any person other than the rightful owner for any 
reason, where the owner does not freely consent. As Rand puts 
it, individual rights are 'not to be alienated by majority 
vote or minority plotting'. 6 Exclusive control is exclusive in 
the strongest sense. For orthodox libertarians the 
justification of property is complete quite independently of 
any pattern distribution assumes. If I justly have everything 
and you none, so be it. Hence their rejection of the 
'consensus' view, that the standing or situation of others 
6 Rand, Capitalis•: The UnknCNn Ideal,p.l38. 
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enters into the determination of ownership. 7 Property r ights 
are therefore absolute or indefeasible.s Responsiveness to 
needs, say, would not be required of libertarian rights 
bearers on this view. Nozick is not wholly allied with the 
orthodox camp. Nozick hesitates to reject tout court the 
consensus view and instead allows for the violating of 
property rights when moral catastrophe, great and present 
danger, threatens unless such rights are violated. 9 
Consequently, to classify Nozick as orthodox on a strict 
reading of that term, the reading that has 'exclusive' read 
'exclusive - come what may', is a mistake. His is ostensibly 
a libertarianism of the first Lockean kind. In fact, when the 
conditions under which property rights may be violated are 
specified Nozick's is effectively, but for different reasons, 
a libertarianism of the second Lockean variety. Furthermore, 
I argue that his proviso on appropriation, i.e. that no-one be 
made worse off by it, yields the same conclusion. In Nozick's 
case there are two ways to skin this particular cat. 
All libertarians accept that mixing their labour with 
unowned resources grants persons a property right in what they 
have thus appropriated •10 More than anything the theory 
propounded and defended in this dissertation is libertarian 
because of this, the labour theory of appropriation. The 
classic formulation of this is, of course, Locke's. 11 Titling 
it a theory is perhaps too flattering, for the labour theory 
of appropriation has been criticised for failing to 
satisfactorily explain why labouring should grant title. 
Calling it a theory is possibly misleading too if it suggests 
a monotypic account . 12 The former complaint is the more 
1 Ryan, Property and Political Theory,p.177. 
8 Rothbard, For a Nett Liberty, p. 77; The Ethics of Liberty, p. 59; Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 96-7; Capi talis1: The 
UnknCNn Ideal,p.26. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea,pp.100-101. 
9 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,p.30. 
10 Waldron says Nozick rejects Locke's argument co1pletely: The Right to Private Property,p.256. I concur with O'Neill (and 
most readers), pace Waldron, that despite his ambivalence Nozick's principle of just acquisition is Lockean: 'Nozick's 
Entitlesents',p.311. 
11 Locke, Second Treatise,pp.l33-46. 
12 Becker identifies at least three distinct arguments: 'The Labor Theory of Property Acquisition' ,pp.653-5. 
5 
serious, touching as it does upon the glaring lacuna at the 
heart of libertarianism, to wit, the absence of foundations. 
For reasons that will become apparent, in the absence of a 
cogent defence of libertarian rights any argument to bridge 
the gap between labouring and entitlement cannot but prove 
'perennially elusive' .13 
Libertarians are wont to talk of persons having rights and 
of the rights they have as being natural rights. Natural 
rights are formally defined as those rights one has in virtue 
of one's nature. As such they are universal, i.e. held by all 
qua sharers of the identified nature. In addition, the 
traditional conception of natural rights holds them to be 
paramount, which is to say higher than or superior to those 
rights bestowed by custom or convention or law, and that they 
are knowable by persons. This is the conception of natural 
rights Locke embraces and libertarians following him. 
Libertarians' tendency to follow Locke leads them to make the 
same mistake Locke makes. That mistake, in short, is to treat 
the assertion that persons have natural rights as known to be 
true and to then employ this knowledge in support of 
libertarianism - without ever furnishing anything like an 
argument to show that persons do indeed have such rights. If 
persons have natural rights in virtue of being persons then 
these rights are both universal and paramount. This is to say 
no more than that natural rights are, by definition, this sort 
of right. Talk of non-universal, non-paramount natural rights 
held by all persons would be conceptual confusion. 14 The bone 
of contention, though, is not the logic of natural rights talk 
but the epistemological claim that we can know - indeed that 
we do know - persons have natural rights. The whole 
libertarian enterprise appears radically question-begging. 
Locke thought the right to original property, that property 
a person has a title to through first appropriation from 
13 O'Neill, 'Nozick's Entitlements',p.314. 
14 Some natural rights may be non-universal, i.e. not held by all persons: see Lelos, 'The Concept of Natural Right' , 
pp.137-8. 
6 
nature, was epistemologically unproblematic because deducible 
from something akin to a self-evident truth. His supposed 
truth is, however, not self-evident, and furthermore suggests 
that Locke is guilty of confusing owning with using. The 
confusion arises with his taking men to have a natural right-
based property in their person. It involves Locke's illicitly 
slipping from a descriptive concept of person to a normative 
one. The substantive normative judgement of self-ownership as 
opposed to mere self-use, self-control or self-direction is 
not easily drawn from a descriptive wielding of the concept of 
a person. 15 Rothbard falls, most explicitly, into the same 
confusion. 16 Rights in one's body are presumed and then pressed 
into service in justifying rights in things. We are back once 
more with the familiar complaint: the lack of foundations for 
rights in general, and for the right to property in 
particular. In rather slavishly embracing Locke on natural 
rights libertarians do themselves a grave disservice. They 
cannot just help themselves to talk of natural rights and 
expect others to follow them as they short-sightedly follow 
Locke. They do themselves a greater disservice by not looking 
beyond the Second Treatise and the natural rights tradition of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it embodies. That 
tradition cannot deliver the goods the libertarian wants and 
needs, and is open to easy and decisive refutation. 
Not only are natural rights, and perhaps especially the 
right to property through appropriation, not self-evident, 
some critics object, in a Benthamite 'nonsense upon stilts' 
fashion, to the very propriety of invoking them at all. The 
failure of libertarians to articulate their adherence to 
natural rights is, so this line of reasoning goes, assured. 
Any attempt to base a political philosophy on spurious 
entities cannot but fail. Talk of natural rights fails to 
refer and hence is fictional. Alasdair Macintyre presses 
exactly this objection, dismissing natural rights as 
IS See Locke's account in his An Essay Concerning Huaan Understanding,p.171. 
16 Rothbard, P<Yter and !larket,p.l76; The Ethics of Liberty,p.31. 
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fictitious and not to be confused with those rights 'conferred 
by positive law or custom', saying that 'The best reason for 
asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed 
of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess 
for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason 
which we possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: 
every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there 
are such rights has failed.'u The nub of Macintyre's objection 
is epistemological, and so targeted against the third of the 
precepts thought to be constitutive of natural rights: those 
who invoke natural rights cannot give good reason - and they 
cannot rather than have not - why we should believe that 
persons have natural rights. On the traditional view, that to 
claim that right R is a natural right is ipso facto to claim 
that all clear-minded persons will or do see or perceive that 
right R is a right held by all persons, 1B Macintyre's objection 
is decisive. Too many clear-minded people just do not perceive 
natural rights where they are purported to be perceptible. And 
because the only criterion admitted of in demonstrating the 
existence of natural rights is that they be perceived the 
traditionalist can move no farther in defence of his theory. 
To his credit Narveson looks elsewhere to make libertarianism 
tenable. 19 By turning to contractarianism Narveson embraces the 
only viable grounding for libertarianism (and I think moral-
political philosophy in general).w 
In what follows I will illustrate the manner by which two 
libertarians have begged the rights question. It is I believe 
a salutary exercise. Of libertarianism, Rothbard writes that 
'The crucial axiom of that creed is: no man or group of men 
have the right to aggress against the person or property of 
11 Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 67. 
18 Lloyd-Thomas calls this, for hiD questionable, I.ockean view the 'perceived' natural rights view because it claims that 
rational persons will 'see' the connexion between the possession of a certain characteristic which implies that a person 
has a right and his having the right: In Defence of Liberalis1,p.S. 
19 Narveson, The Libertarian Idea,pp.131-84. 
20 LaFollette takes libertarianism to require an individual's consent to the restriction of his liberty, a condition he 
thinks it does not meet: 'Why Libertarianism Is Mistaken' ,p.l97. If hypothetical consent be admitted, then a 
contractarian basis for libertarianism would meet this condition. 
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anyone else. ' 21 Though called an axiom the right to be free 
from aggression is not itself foundational. What lies beneath 
is 'the basic axiom of the "right to self-ownership".'22 
In positing the axiom of the right to self-ownership how can 
Rothbard defend himself against Macintyre's sceptical charge 
that there is no such right as this, and that to believe there 
is is nothing but an arational at best, otherwise irrational, 
~. article of faith on a par with belief in the existence of 
unicorns? Or against the less positivistic charge that though 
there may be such rights how does Rothbard know that there 
are? Unfortunately, Rothbard goes no distance to show he is 
not arational or irrational in cleaving to the right of self-
ownership, and neither does his chosen methodology equip him 
to face down the second charge. 
Rothbard largely avoids formal argument and instead seems 
to rely more on an attempt to refute, or make sufficiently 
unattractive so as to be untenable, rival moral theories 
competing for the same logical space, thereby, so he seems to 
think, leaving a rights-based libertarianism as the only 
candidate for reasonable assent. His positive programme of 
grounding the axiom in a doctrine of natural law is 
unsatisfactory. It is an exercise in exposition. 23 Once set 
out his procedure of elimination is open to two telling 
objections: one, that it begs the question against the rival 
theories, and two, that not even successful elimination can 
vindicate Rothbard's preferred deontology. Showing his chosen 
opponents are in error is not to show he is not. Besides, 
substituting iteration for argument is intellectually 
disingenuous. Beware! Lest one straw man slips in to occupy 
the place of a knocked-down other. 
'If the central axiom of the libertarian creed is non-
aggression against anyone's person and property, how', 
Rothbard asks, 'is this axiom arrived at? What is its 
2! Rothbard, For a New Liberty,p.S. other orthodox libertarians likewise put freedom from aggression as the foundation stone 
of libertarianis1. See Hospers, Libertarianisl,pp.4-5; Rand, The Virtue of Selfisbness,p.32. 
22 Rothbard, For a New Liberty, p. 26. 
23 Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty,pp.l-24. 
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groundwork or support?' 24 By eliminating what he takes to be 
the two rival justifications for the axiom, namely emotivist 
libertarianism and libertarianism advocated on the grounds of 
utility, Rothbard supposes the natural law justification is 
left the victor in the field. (It seems not to have occurred 
to him there might be reason to reject the axiom other than 
the inadequacies of i ts emotivist and utilitarian bases.) The 
former we learn is non-rational and thus beyond the realm of 
moral discourse. Apart from missing the mark with the 
rationality stipulation, emotivism fails not because one 
cannot get others to leave off aggressing, for obviously one 
can, but because it is not an explanation of moral discourse 
or language at all. Emotivism is a theory of sentiment, taste 
and propaganda masquerading as normative. 
Utilitarian libertarianism is dismissed on two grounds. 
First, the rejection of the consequences of action x as 
morally undesirable raises the question 'May there not be 
something about an act itself which, in its very nature, can 
be considered good or evil?'. 25 In his headlong endeavour to 
emasculate utilitarianism Rothbard most assuredly begs the 
question. A utilitarian need only reiterate that all that 
counts morally are the consequences of action, and that there 
simply is nothing intrinsic to any act that determines whether 
it is good or evil. Rothbard's second criticism of utility as 
the touchstone of morality, namely that it fails to provide 
'an absolute and consistent yardstick to apply to the varied 
concrete situations of the real world',~ is equally 
misdirected. Utilitarianism makes no virtue of consistency in 
the way Rothbard has in mind: the same act can be right in one 
situation and wrong in another. Is it right to return borrowed 
goods, and to give directions? Usually, yes. Is it right to 
return a weapon to a deranged friend or tell a prospective 
murderer the whereabouts of an innocent fugitive? The 
24 b'd I 1 .,p.23. 25 . 
Ibid.,p.24. 
26 b'd I 1 .,p.24. 
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utilitarian is not bound to answer affirmatively. Turning now 
to the more positive enterprise of establishing the non-
aggression axiom, Rothbard holds that natural rights are 
embedded in natural law, where natural law is the insight we 
have into man's specific nature and his environment such that 
'each individual person must, in order to act, choose his own 
ends and employ his own means in order to attain them .... 
Since men can think, feel, evaluate, and act only as 
individuals, it becomes vitally necessary for each man's 
survival and prosperity that he be free to learn, choose, 
develop his faculties, and act upon his knowledge and 
values.' 27 To interfere with this process 'violates the natural 
law of man's needs'. Proceeding from the more basic axiom of 
self-ownership via the right to perform free from aggression 
those activities needed for survival and prosperity, Rothbard 
maintains a person has a right to all unowned resources he 
mixes his labour with, the implication being, presumably, that 
to interfere with his control of these resources is equivalent 
to a violation of a person's right to bodily integrity because 
the resources are a part of the person, have become body, as 
it were, 'a veritable extension of his own personality'. 3 The 
problem with all of this, as has been seen, is that the right 
of self-ownership, to control one's body free from coercive 
interference, adds nothing to th~ axiom of non-aggression. 
Explaining an axiom in terms of another that has no 
independent justification of its own is pointless. Foundations 
remain elusive. 
Rothbard writes that men 'can only survive and flourish by 
grappling with the earth .... Man, in other words, must own not 
only his own person, but also material objects for his control 
and use. ' 29 First, the sense of must here is not a moral one, 
and its invocation signals confusing owning with using or 
controlling. Secondly, whilst it is true that we have to 
27 Rothbard, For a New Liberty,p.26. 
28 b'd I 1 • ,p.30. 
29 b'd I 1 .,p.30. 
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grapple with resources to get by this is not at all the 
argument Rothbard needs for either axiom to prove aggression a 
violation of the indefeasible right to unlimited property. I t 
cannot explain why resources laboured upon come under the 
protective cover accorded a person's body, nor why persons' 
bodies have this cover. Even were the foundation of the r i ght 
of self-ownership to be the necessity of such ownership for 
the ends cited, the most it could establish would be a r i ght 
to what we need to survive and flourish. It is hard to see how 
this should legitimate absolute rights and unlimited 
acquisition, i.e. to things that cannot plausibly be taken, on 
even the most expansive of construals, to be pre-requisites to 
flourishing, let alone survival. A fancy imported sports car, 
for example. Rothbard's task is hopeless. He cannot get to 
where he wants to go using the method he has chosen to go by. 
For all that he says about natural law, Rothbard is an 
intuitionist, and intuition is no way to arbitrate in 
questions of moral-political philosophy. 30 Rand and Hospers, 
putting non-aggression at the core of libertarianism, fare no 
better. 
Nozick's libertarianism has come under fire for its lack of 
foundation. Nozick begins his defence of libertarianism with 
the bare assertion that individuals have rights, and these 
rights delimit morally sacrosanct ground around their bearers, 
placing constraints on the range of action open to others. 
'Individuals have rights', opens Nozick, 'and there are things 
no person or group may do to them (without violating their 
rights).' 31 One of these rights is that to property justly 
acquired. Nozick lifts the labour theory of appropriation from 
the Second Treatise. One of the three suggestions of a defence 
of libertarian rights I can discern in his book is fallacious 
anyway. Nozick appears to make a retroactive or backward-
legitimating case for the right to property: from the worked-
out impl ications of the rights back to those rights. (The 
JO Rothbard levels the charge of intuitionism against Nozick: Tbe Ethics of Liberty,p.246. 
31 Nozick, Anarchy 1 State 1 and Utopia, p. ix. 
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rights are shored-up by being allied with intuitions many 
undoubtedly share, but which are as yet only intuitions.32) If 
we find the entitlement theory of justice and the depiction of 
the minimal state attractive then we are liable to concede to 
Nozick the rights they are premissed on. We are in danger of 
committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent, of being 
psychologically seduced, as it were, into believing Nozick has 
rested libertarianism on secure foundations when he has done 
no such thing. Nozick's omission has not gone unnoticed. 
Martin Gardner points out that Nozick's entitlement theory 
'rests on a whopping metaphysical posit: that the right to 
acquire and keep money and property is one of the most 
inviolable of all human rights.,)) 'Nothing is easier', 
continues Gardner (echoing Macintyre), 'than to make contrary 
posits about human rights.' 34 Bernard Williams notes how Nozick 
proceeds and criticises him accordingly, saying: 'In 
particular, he has tried - using, obviously, much ingenuity in 
the attempt - to get to his destination while avoiding any 
general discussion of a notion central to his views: 
property. ' 35 
Nozick is not to be construed as forwarding a rule-
utilitarian justification of the rights he posits, no matter 
that his book manifests a retroactive argument. Though the 
best consequences may result from adherence to deontological 
rules - and libertarians defend capitalist political economy 
in this way36 - the reasons Nozick will have us abide by rights 
are not utilitarian, rule or otherwise, but outrightly 
deontological in nature. outcomes might be identical across a 
rule-utilitarian and deontological ethic. However, the 
ordering is different and makes a difference. With libertarian 
rights we have this situation: respect these rights, and if 
the best possible consequences, along some or other dimension, 
32 For instance, the distinctness of persons as 10rally basic: ibid.,p.33. 
33 Gardner, The libys of a Philosophical Scrivener,p.l30. 
34 b'd I 1 . ,p.131. 
35 Williams, 'The Minimal State',p.32. 
36 Rand, Capitalist: Tbe Unknown Ideal,p.20; Rothbard, For a New Liberty,p.41. 
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follow, then all to the good. It is quite otherwise with rule-
utilitarianism which would tolerate the abandonment of r ights 
in favour of other rules which lead to the best possible 
consequences. Frequently, what the deontologist says it is 
right (wrong) to do the rule-utilitarian says it is good (bad) 
to do. Occasionally there will be a parting of ways. Sometimes 
what the deontologist says it is wrong (right) to do the rule-
utilitarian says it is good (bad) to do. If it is a generally 
beneficial rule that admirals with insufficient dead men to 
their credit be shot as an encouragement to others why should 
the rule-utilitarian not adopt it? A rule of this sort may 
very well instil the desired martial spirit. Whilst the 
results of respecting r ights may be co-extensive with the 
outcome of adopting rule-utilitarianism, where and why they 
part ways is of the greatest importance. When they part and 
utility and rights conflict the ordering matters. 
To stress the point once more: if we fail to intuit or 
perceive self-evident truths where Rothbard and Locke do, or 
refuse to presume rights for exegetical purposes with Nozick , 
they cannot hope to convince us. We need to know why persons 
own themselves in a normative sense, and why mixing labour 
J01ns, again in a normative sense, resources and the self. To 
merely assert that 'In a free society, any piece of nature 
that has never been used is unowned and is subject to a man's 
ownership through his first use or mixing of his labor with 
this resource' , 37 begs these important questions. Mere 
assertion is not enough. And libertarians have done little 
more than assert. Until shown otherwise we should treat 
assertions to the effect that persons have rights, especially 
the right to property through appropriation from nature, as at 
best provisionally true. This is either on the grounds that 
persons cannot be shown to have such rights in the way 
libertarians think, or because moral truths cannot be 
determined by process of strange powers of apprehension. 
37 Rothbard, Man, Econory, and State,p.147. 
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Rothbard and Nozick fall foul of the first (and possibly the 
second) charge, and Locke the second. 38 
A man's ability to appropriate is limited in an obvious, 
weak way by his inability to mix his labour with all he may 
wish to. A man cannot do the labour of ten men or be in two 
places simultaneously. 39 Locke, however, imposes stronger, 
prescriptive restrictions to appropriation and holding. There 
are two provisos. One applies to appropriation - the 
notoriously disputed enough and as good remaining proviso -
and the other to holding property, the spoilage proviso. The 
duty of charity is different again, though it is effectively a 
limit to holding, to the continued exercise of exclusion. 
A man has a just title in a previously unowned resource 
(Locke has land primarily in mind) where his appropriation of 
it leaves enough and as good remaining for others. 40 The 
traditional interpretation of this proviso holds it to be a 
necessary condition for appropriation. Only if this proviso is 
met then 'As much as any one can make use of to any advantage 
of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a 
property in. ' 41 Considering the provisos together, it 
transpires a holding is just only if appropriating it left 
enough and as good remaining and that what is appropriated 
does not perish uselessly. 42 
On the traditional interpretation the enough and as good 
proviso imposes a blanket bar to all appropriation. 43 This is 
sufficient reason to reject this interpretation. 44 If it were 
not the provisos are anyway prone to charges of 
impracticableness. Locke does not furnish any suggestions as 
to how they might be observed in practice. Should a man 
mistakenly cultivate and produce more than can be kept from 
spoiling owing to ignorance, miscalculation and the like, he 
38 Locke, Second Treatise,p.l33. Locke's powers are 'natural reason' and 'revelation'. 
39 Proxies can compensate for these limitations: Locke, Second Treatise,p.135. 
40 b'd I 1 .,p.l34. 
41 b'd I 1 .,p.l36. 
42 b'd I 1 .,p.l44. 
43 See Thomson, 'Property Acquisition',p.666; Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty,p.240. 
44 As does Waldron, 'Enough and as Good Left for Others'. 
15 
has violated the law of nature in failing to abide by the 
proviso. Would anyone who punished the transgressor really be 
acting within his rights as Locke asserts?45 Could he in good 
faith take possession of what was already appropriated?46 A 
hunter kills a deer for meat, hide, etc., but cannot use all 
the animal before it begins to putrefy (whatever all might 
meaningfully be said to include). A hunter kills a deer not 
knowing he leaves only nine deer as good as remaining in the 
woods for a further ten hunters, who will not violate any 
provisos as it happens. Must the tenth hunt other animals? 
Maybe the known availability of similar animals, a moose 
perhaps, legitimates the initial kill? Or can the tenth hunter 
justly punish the others? All of them? The first hunter? Only 
the ninth? The last Mohican pursuing the last red squirrel 
cannot leave enough and as good remaining, and he eats the 
squirrel. Are turnips as good as squirrels? In the futuristic 
film Soylent Green Charlton Heston steals the last steak in 
New York. Does he violate a proviso? Does he rather punish a 
proviso-violator, or both? 
An intentionality clause might be a way round these proviso 
difficulties. What Lockean agents intentionally do is what 
matters. Something like the following: 'I can foresee that my 
appropriating (non-spoilable) resource r will leave you 
without enough and as good. Because this is an unintended 
consequence of my intentionally appropriating r I may 
legitimately appropriate rand you may not punish me.' Locke 
does not need to make use of it. Neither does he need to take 
the course that the appropriation and use of more land than 
leaves enough and as good for others betters the position of 
those left without, for by his labour the appropriator 
increases, not lessens, the common stock.47 Of this Locke is 
sure, citing the relative prosperity of an English day-
labourer over 'a king of a large and fruitful territory' in 
45 Locke, Second Treatise,pp.l24-5. 
46 b'd I 1 .,p.l40. 
47 b'd I 1 .,p.l39. 
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America. 48 Neither the communal ownership of land nor an 
aliquot part for all is required. If there is not enough and 
as good land there is enough and as good, better even, of a 
living for them. 49 Why need Locke not turn to either or both of 
these to circumvent his proviso difficulties? Because the 
enough and as good proviso is redundant in the light of the 
right men have to charity, 'to so much out of another's plenty 
as will keep him from extreme want where he has no means to 
subsist otherwise.'~ As seen, orthodox libertarians do not 
acknowledge any limits: no provisos constraining 
appropriation, no rights constraining holding. For reasons to 
do with avoiding horribly deleterious consequences, Nozick 
opts for a weaker version of the proviso, and one that is not 
unproblematic in the context of his theory. If it is to be 
successful it has to show that under a regime of exclusive 
private ownership none will go completely without. Whilst the 
distribution of property exclusively in private hands may be 
optimally productive and lead to the creation of plenty, there 
are bound to be circumstances when abundance is subverted, not 
least when the Four Horsemen ride through. Will those unable 
to work in this regime be fed, lodged and clad as well as 
Locke's New World king? Locke can answer 'Yes' unequivocally 
for the right to charity guarantees it. Nozick cannot for 
ostensibly he has no such guarantee. 
Locke's famous labour theory of appropriation was a response 
to two objections of Robert Filmer's to Hugo Grotius. If 
property is a right and everything was originally held in 
common, how, asks Filmer, could a men lose their right to the 
common stock - as they must have done in a regime where what 
was common is now private - without freely alienating it? 
Secondly, how could consent - unanimous consent even - reached 
at one time be binding later on those not party to the 
agreement? Locke's purpose was to thread a justification of 
48 b'd I 1 .,p.l41. 
49 This is the course taken by MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualisl,pp.211-13. 
50 Locke, First Treatise,p.34. Locke repeats this in his Second Treatise,pp.l23-4. This is the Locke of the TWo Treatises. 
Locke the Co11issioner for Trade is a different creature. See Cranston, John Locke: A Biography,pp.424-5. 
17 
private property between these two poles, to show 'how men 
might come to have a property in several parts of that which 
God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express 
compact of all the commoners. ,51 
Locke's discussion of property opens with his reiterating 
the original commonality of resources. Reason and revelation 
inform us that the earth is given to mankind in common. 52 This 
is not a condition of joint ownership but of no-ownership, the 
absence of any exclusive claims. 53 To the secularist this is to 
say that resources in their natural condition are unowned. The 
way is open to show how the common could be parcelled into 
mine and thine. We have no choice but to engage with the 
natural world through labour for the penury of our condition 
necessitates it and our wants force it. 54 Even in a land of 
milk and honey a man must labour to draw milk and collect 
honey. Two themes, then, are run side by side: that resources 
in their natural condition are unowned and that man has to 
labour with resources if he is to survive and improve his lot. 
When coupled with the (presumed) natural right of self-
ownership the ingredients needed for a secularist construction 
of Locke's labour theory of appropriation are all present. 
Locke commences with self-ownership, and from it argues, in 
a deceptively simple manner, that a man gains rightful 
possession of those resources he mixes his labour with, for i n 
labouring he has joined them to his body, which he has an 
'unquestionable' property in. 55 'Though the earth and all 
inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but 
himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we 
may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of 
the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath 
51 Locke, Second Treatise, p .13 4. 
52 b'd I 1 • ,p.l33. 
53 Ryan, Property and Political Tbeory,pp.29-30. 
54 Locke, Second Treatise,pp.l36&138; see also Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It?,pp.39-40; Rothbard, The Ethics of 
Liberty 1 P• JQ • 
55 Locke, Second Treatise,p.l34. 
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mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property.'56 In syllogistic form 
the bare schema is this: a man owns his labour; naturally 
situated objects are unowned; therefore, in labouring on 
unowned objects a man joins them with what he owns, removing 
them from their unowned condition. ~ 
The labour theory is controversial on a number of grounds. 
There are many who would justly query the supposedly 
unquestionable, self-evidently true first premiss, that each 
has a (prior) property in his person. Why do persons have a 
right of self-ownership? Were the truth of the premiss 
conceded the argument is all the same too quick in 
establishing the strong proto-libertarian conclusion it 
purports to. Though frequently invoked by libertarians, ~ the 
right of self-ownership does not serve them unequivocally. 59 
Why does the syllogism not conclude that the labour a man 
mixes is lost to the common? Why is mixing what I own with 
what I do not a way of gaining ownership rather than a way of 
losing what I own?60 The syllogism presumes that something that 
has joined to it what is mine becomes mine. And does this 
presumption support the strongly counter-intuitive implication 
that a person owns a lake because he pours back water he has 
drawn from it? 
Herbert Spencer levels a burden of proof objection against 
the proponent of the labour theory of appropriation. Pointing 
to the conceptual gulf between labouring and gaining title, 
Spencer asks (from the mouth of the cosmopolite to some 
backwoodsman): '"Still you have not shown why such a process 
makes the portion of earth you have so modified yours. What is 
it that you have done? You have turned over the soil to a few 
inches in depth with a spade or a plough; you have scattered 
over this prepared surface a few seeds; and you have gathered 
56 'd Ibl • I p.134. 
57 For Rothbard's version of the syllogism see his 'Justice and Property Rights',p.l09. 
58 For instance by Mack, 'Self-ownership and the Right of Property'. 
59 See Cohen, 'Self-ownership, World-ownership, and Equality'. 
60 Nozick I Anarchy I state I and Utopia I pp .17 4-5. 
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the fruits which the sun, rain, and air, helped the soil to 
produce. Just tell me, if you please, by what magic have these 
acts made you sole owner of that vast mass of matter, having 
for its base the surface of your estate, and for its apex the 
centre of the globe? all of which it appears you would 
monopolise to yourself and your descendents for ever." ' 61 
Spencer's challenge deserves an answer. 
To found their philosophy libertarians need to look 
elsewhere. Narveson turns to contractarianism to fill this 
lack. Contractarianism is, I believe, the correct approach to 
adopt. Not only can contractarianism provide compelling 
answers to the question 'Why should I be moral?', but it can 
yield substantive moral principles. I disagree with Narveson 
over the matter of which substantive rules are generated. In 
the second chapter I defend a contractarian argument for two 
foundational or basic moral rights: to liberty and to welfare. 
Narveson denies there is a right to welfare because he denies 
that there are any positive rights. Because they are 
foundational moral rights they share with natural rights the 
features of universality and paramountcy. And they are rights 
persons know they have, not because they someway perceive this 
but because they are rational. Moral rights are knowable not 
by any peculiar faculty of intuition or apprehension but in 
the same way any other conclusion of practical reasoning is 
known. And there is nothing fictitious or witch-like about the 
conclusions of practical reasoning. Contractarianism is not 
susceptible to epistemological problems of this kind, and 
against its derivation of moral rights Macintyre's 
positivistic argument cannot get purchase. 
For libertarianism to be viable it needs rational 
foundation and an argument for the labour theory of 
appropriation. Two steps must be taken. The first into a 
morality of rights and duties that would provide the right 
sort of underpinning for libertarianism, and the second from 
this to a morality· of private, exclusive rights of ownership 
61 Spencer, social Statics,p.ll?. 
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of things. The first foundational rule establishes a robust 
regime of rights-based liberty which is tapped to justify 
appropriation through labouring, and so meet Spencer's 
challenge. 
The project of the second chapter, then, is to furnish 
libertarianism with the foundation it requires if the idea 
that there are moral rights, including to property, is to be 
credible. As a possible foundation of libertarianism the 
Kantian notion of persons-as-ends is examined and an argument 
that a libertarian could accept is constructed. In the final 
analysis though, the argument founders on the posit of 
intrinsic value. Taking the step into a morality of rights and 
duties by positing intrinsic value casts grave doubt on the 
whole enterprise. Persons may contract to behave as though 
persons were ends-in-themselves, but that is a different 
approach altogether. Contractarianism is capable of generating 
moral rights. As a background informing the hypothetical 
contract I defend four features universal to the human 
condition, which together with the fact that persons are 
rational utility maximisers, are jointly sufficient to 
determine the essential nature of the rules and motivate the 
'signing' of the contract. At this most fundamental level 
there are only two rules utility maximising parties would 
contract to: the one a rule of equal social liberty and the 
other the rule enjoining welfarism. The principal of equal 
social liberty is co-extensive with the orthodox libertarian 
non-aggression axiom and the Nozickean view of rights as side 
constraints, and establishes a moral right to liberty. 
Contractarianism provides the foundation for Lockean 
libertarianism of the second kind. The moral right to liberty 
serves as the jumping-off point for a defence of a derivative 
right to property in those unowned resources persons mix their 
labour with. 
The task of the third chapter is to render the labour 
theory of appropriation as cogent as possible, if not outright 
compelling, by showing how the theory is plausibly the basis 
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for persons establishing a right to private property. It sets 
itself the task of meeting Spencer's challenge, i.e. to 
bridging the gap between labour and entitlement. Without such 
an argument libertarianism is radically incomplete. All 
libertarians believe that labouring on an unowned resource 
grants the labourer a title to that resource, as they have to 
if their entitlement theory is to work and if the substantive 
conclusions they draw regarding the justified activities of 
the state are to be warranted. What is more, such an argument 
is far from redundant. For example, if international waters 
are today's equivalent of the seventeenth-century commons then 
he who catches the fish in them owns them. can I not own the 
water frozen in an iceberg if I take it in tow? 
The undertaking is contentious. The principle of equal 
social liberty is the basis for demonstrating how labouring is 
a method of extending a person's moral right to liberty or 
freedom of action into or over things in the natural world to 
include them. Locke's insight that property is an extension of 
the morally safeguarded self is, it is maintained, 
fundamentally sound. The connexion is forged by the 
assimilation of resources into purposeful activity. The right 
to liberty and the labour theory of appropriation together 
show why mixing labour with unowned resources grants the 
labourer a property in them. The rendition of the theory 
justifies unlimited maximum appropriation and holding. There 
are no upper limits as to how much may be appropriated but 
there is limit of term. 
The defeasibility conditions of the right to property form 
the subject of the fourth chapter. orthodox libertarians hold 
that there are no limits of term at all on the holding of 
property. The indigent are reliant on charity. Where they 
wholly discount the consensus view, Nozick largely ignores it. 
He imposes two constraints, one a proviso to appropriation and 
the other on term. The former is his weak reading of Locke's 
enough and as good proviso, which stipulates that an 
appropriation is just providing it does not worsen the 
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position of others. The second is the injunction to avoid 
catastrophic moral horror, which allows for teleology to take 
over from deontology in order to avert catastrophic moral 
horror. Nozick does not say when this is to happen, only that 
it does at some moment. Rendering his moral catastrophe clause 
precise leads to the conclusion that Nozick is, appearances to 
the contrary notwithstanding, a Lockean libertarian. Nozick 
I criticise to the effect that whilst he knows he is not 
orthodox he is Lockean and thinks he is not. Making workable 
sense of the moral catastrophe clause in the context of a 
libertarian rights-governed society where all tangible 
property is privately owned but where some are completely 
without, has the clause justify coercive redistribution for 
reasons quite parallel to Locke. Application of Nozick's 
proviso, under the same conditions, to the case of a person 
excluded from the nexus of exchange and transfer ~ustifies the 
same conclusion. The law of nature, Locke tells us, obliges 
every man, when his own preservation is not at issue, 'as much 
as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind' . 62 His proviso and 
the reading of moral catastrophe I give show the same to be 
true of Nozick. The remainder of the fourth chapter is devoted 
to some of the normative implications of Lockean welfarism, 
namely the kind of welfare state to be adopted, the standard 
of contributory justice and the scope of coercion legitimated 
by redistribution as a tenet of just transfer. 
Chapter V signals a move away from developing Lockean 
libertarianism and turns to the issue of substantive equality 
as an article of distributive justice and deflects some 
familiar contentions from egalitarian quarters against 
entitlement theories. An invisible-hand, libertarian rights-
preserving derivation of equality of outcome is possible, 
however unlikely. In view of this slight likelihood, 
'trumping' arguments for equality overriding an historically 
created distribution have to be advanced. I consider and 
reject the argument that it is inconsistent, and hence 
62 Locke, Secooo 1'reatise,pp.l23-4. 
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irrational, to treat equally deserving cases unequally before 
examining John Rawls's argument for greater egalitarianism. 
The argument from the amoral natural distribution of 
endowments fails Rawls because it proves too much. It shows 
that considerations of desert are double-edged swords: such 
considerations cannot undermine entitlement theories without 
also undermining Rawls's preferred distribution. Another 
argument, drawing on Rawls's anti-utilitarianism, defends the 
distribution effected in accordance with the labour theory of 
appropriation and justice in transfer, redistribution 
included, against the more egalitarian distribution the 
difference principle warrants. The thrust of this argument is 
that the considerations favouring the difference principle, in 
combination with the principle of justice across generations, 
might - empirically might - favour instead a system of natural 
liberty as the system which benefits most the least well-off 
group. Such a system is more aligned to the unfettered markets 
libertarians favour than it is to the redistributive equality 
advocated by Rawls. 
Afterwards, a paper by Ernest Loevinsohn is critically 
evaluated. Loevinsohn thinks that far-reaching redistribution 
can be justified on libertarian grounds. He says that the 
liberty to use and consume goods is to be maximised by placing 
them in the hands of those who would otherwise not be free to 
use and consume them because barred by property rights. This 
he believes libertarians - because they are champions of 
liberty - are committed to. I think Loevinsohn is wrong on a 
number of grounds. First, no libertarian is, nor has to be, 
committed to liberty in the way he says. Secondly, the notion 
of the maximisation of liberty (as opposed to the minimisation 
of interference with liberty) is obscure. My primary 
objection is that his consequentialist argument fails against 
a deontological libertarian. He is barking up the wrong tree. 
What is more, the property rights view he likens to 
libertarianism may not unreasonably be held to be the view his 
own argument, though ostensibly directed against it, in fact 
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vindicates. As in the objection to Rawls's difference 
principle when combined with the principle of justice across 
generations, this is an empirical matter, as befits 
utilitarian arguments. It is not obvious that the calculations 
do or will favour the wholesale redistribution of goods as 
Loevinsohn maintains. 
The sixth chapter returns to mainstream libertarianism and 
centres on the debate between the anarchist wing of 
libertarianism, as represented by Rothbard, and the minimal 
statism of Nozick and the other orthodox libertarians. Both 
sides are agreed that persons' rights require protection, i.e. 
that coercion to this end is necessary, and justified. They 
differ on two grounds: on the morality of the state providing 
protection and on the question of the most efficient provision 
of this good. The first part of Anarchy, State, and Utopia is 
directed - against the anarchist - at showing that the state 
and the state's enforcement of rights is morally legitimate, 
and that only a state can provide the kind of good that 
protection is. Rothbard pursues the libertarian's commitment 
to the free market to its logical conclusion by maintaining 
that the protection of persons' rights, currently performed 
monopolistically by the state, should be provided by firms 
operating within the competitive market. He thinks the state 
both immoral in terms of orthodox libertarian rights and the 
less efficient provider. 
Nozick's derivation of the minimal state proceeds on 
default of the anarchist scenario. I suggest that Nozick is 
too quick in concluding it does default and I make a case for 
the anarchist in this respect. This task is complicated by 
having to include the enforcement of the positive right to 
welfare in a society where there is no single rights-enforcing 
body, a problem not faced by a minimal statist. My second 
concern is with the derivation and stability of the minimal 
state. Assuming the default to occur, neither the movement to 
the minimal state nor its future stability is as assured as 
Nozick thinks. Not only is the derivation not just in all its 
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stages, as Nozick says it must be if the state is to be 
legitimate, but the mechanism by which the derivation is made, 
namely the principle of the compensation of risky private 
enforcers of rights, leaves the minimal state liable to 
possible dissolution. 
The argument for its possible dissolution turns on the 
principle of compensation. Specifically, this principle may 
generate free-riders who choose to have the dominant 
protection association or state prohibit their private 
enforcement of their rights and receive the compensation (in 
the form of protection) the state is obliged to give. A demand 
for independence (anarchism) is created. Sufficient demand 
undermines the financial viability of the state and leads it 
into dissolution. The dissolution of the minimal state, given 




FREEDOM FROM CONTRACT; WELFARE TOO 
A free man need not be moral, but a moral man has to be 
free. A world without free men is a world without morality. 
A point made by Rousseau, who remarks that 'to remove all 
liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his 
acts'. 1 The thrust of Rousseau's remark, that morality 
presupposes freedom, 2 is not unfamiliar. If a state of affairs 
is to be just or unjust it must be the result of the actions 
of free men. 3 The connexion between freedom and morality is 
ordinarily thought so intimate that the only alternative to 
'free and moral' is 'not free so not moral'. 4 I shall not 
argue the case that morality requires freedom for it is too 
large an undertaking. Nor shall I argue for the following 
outline of the conception of morality I think correct. This 
conception is, however, informed by the rights I believe 
persons have and the nature of those rights. The two questions 
'Why should we be moral?' and 'What are we to do (or not do) 
to be moral?' are answered. 
To step into a morality of rights and duties is to assume 
duties in order to gain rights. If a man is to rationally take 
that step he will have to stand to benefit more through 
gaining rights than he loses by assuming duties. Herein lies 
the clue to answering the first question: virtue is not its 
own reward, though the virtuous man is rewarded. As to what 
one is to do, or not do, in order to behave morally - besides, 
trivially, respecting rights and fulfilling duties - this can 
1 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 8. 
2 The converse does not hold. It is possible that there be a world of non-moral agents. A world populated by recluses would 
be one such. 
3 Miller 11aintains that a state of affairs not the product of hum action though changeable by it can be unjust: Social 
Justice,p.l8. I disagree. 
4 One of the 11ore famous expressions of this point is Clarence Darrow's: 'I am firmly convinced that a 11an has no more to do 
with his own conduct than a wooden Indian. A wooden Indian has a little advantage for he does not even think he is free'. 
From a debate with G.B. Foster, reprinted in Little Blue Book, No.1286. 
27 
only be answered once the notion of virtue's rewards is 
explicated. Let it be noted, though, that the touchstone of 
morality and of being moral is that it requires we sometimes 
do what we do not want to do, i.e. it demands duty over 
inclination when inclination tempts us in the direction of the 
dereliction of duty. 
A person who has a right to perform action x is free to x 
and none may justly prevent him. A person who has a right to x 
is free to not x, and none may justly compel him. Those 
against whom he has this right have a duty not to interfere 
with his right to x or to not x. Rights demarcate the bounds 
of the permissible; duties the extent of the obligatory. That 
I have a right to x means I am free to x. That I have a duty 
to x means I am not free to not x. Duties are enforceable. 
A man may waive the right he has to x, or release another from 
the obligation the other has to fulfil the man's right to x. 
Rights are infringed when the correlative duty is not 
fulfilled. The unjustifiable infringement of a right is its 
violation. To justifiably infringe a right is to override it. 
Rights that can be overridden are defeasible; rights that 
cannot be overridden are absolute or indefeasible. What is not 
prohibited is permissible: a person has a right to do it. What 
is prohibited it is obligatory to not do: a person has a duty 
to not do it. Furthermore, our obligations are enforceable 
against us. 5 The moral person, then, resists inclination when 
it conflicts with his obligations and fulfils his duty. The 
goodness or badness of persons is reducible to their being 
disposed to resist inclination and perform those actions 
constitutive of their duty, or being disposed not to perform 
them, respectively. Mother Teresa is good and Pol Pot is bad 
because Mother Teresa is disposed to do right actions and Pol 
Pot to do wrong ones. 
5 We might say that a duty justifies enforcing action. Or we can derive the enforceability of duties frail the logical fact 
that a 11an 'has a right to whatever 11ay be necessary to prevent infringe11ents of his right': Narveson, 'Pacifis11: A 
Philosophical Analysis',p.72. Failure to fulfil one's duty infringes solleone's right. 
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~hat is permissible is, from the moral point of view, 
discretionary, to be done or not done ad libitum, as 
inclination prompts. Of the actions we may permissibly perform 
but are not obliged to a tripartite division is comprehensive. 
(Comprehensive for the purposes of moral-political philosophy 
that is. Someone concerned with the freedom of the will would 
categorise differently.) Some of what we do affects others for 
good, some affects them for ill, and some of what we do 
completely passes them by and does not affect them at all. My 
bathtime rendition of America the Beautiful passed everyone 
by. Its public airing affected all who heard it for the worse. 
My paying Pavarotti to sing it would have enchanted listeners 
one and all. When a person acts so as to benefit others and 
his action involves considerable sacrifice then he performs an 
act of supererogation. A person only does wrong by being 
derelict, and hence to not perform otherwise permissible 
actions that would benefit others is no transgression of duty, 
whether this requires but little of them or not. Strictly 
speaking, an act of supererogation is no more right than any 
other discretionary action, but is one which is deserving of 
praise and commendation. Giving up my seat in the last 
lifeboat leaving the Titanic is supererogatory. It is not 
required of me that I give you the time of day, and if I do I 
do not perform an act of supererogation. Beyond the duty to 
fulfil one's obligations one cannot - promissorial 
arrangements to one side - be bound to develop these virtues, 
be that kind of person, etc. Virtues are to be approved of and 
vices disapproved of, and there are good reasons for this. All 
round, things are best for it. All the same, virtue is 
discretionary. Vices are not moral wrongs, but may play a 
causal role in the generation of them. Vices fall into the 
realm of usually disvalued traits of character. Room has to be 
made for the person who is not nice but is moral, and his 
counterpart the nice but immoral person. Scrooge is not nice 
(compassionate, generous) but neither is he immoral. Nice but 
immoral persons are, admittedly, harder to find. No-one has 
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ventured so bold as to say that the virtuous man always does 
the ; virtuous act. 
Denying that inculcation of the virtues is the business of 
the moral enterprise entails denying that morality is 
concerned with a human telos, a norm of good or flouris h ing. 
Fostering good and promoting flourishing are beyond the 
province of morality. They are discretionary, non-enforceable 
values. Communities may be multiply realised. Some will prefer 
community with contemplative Christians, others community with 
hard-living atheists. 
Finally, along with the denial of a human telos is the 
denial of objective value. This has far-reaching ramifications 
as to how the institution of morality in the broadest sense i s 
to be conceived, brought out more emphatically later when I 
turn to the task of providing libertarianism with foundations. 
Care has to be taken with objective in such a context, but I 
will have it understood as the rather tame thesis that there 
is no property p intrinsic to any thing or state of affairs 
that makes it valuable, such that all things that are valuabl e 
or are to be valued possess p, and are valuable because of p. 
Value is not 'out there' in the world. There are only the 
valuings that agents make and act upon. We talk of values as 
though they were objective, and our encounter with broad 
uniformity in morals undoubtedly reinforces the false belief 
that they are. 6 To understand morality we should look not to 
the created world but to the nature of persons as agents, for 
it is only because we are agents - agents of the particular 
kind we are - that we are moral. Consider the case of Princip. 
'Princip ... was standing disconsolately on the pavement 
about to go home when an open car, with Franz Ferdinand in it , 
stopped right in front of him. The driver had taken a wrong 
turn and was now about to back. Princip stepped on to the 
running-board, killed Franz Ferdinand with one shot and, 
mistakenly, the Archduke's wife with the other - he had hoped 
6 To deny objective value is to put forward an 'error theory' of morals: Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,p. 35. 
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to kill the governor of Bosnia.' 7 Princip assassinated the 
Archduke as he purposed to, and the Archduke's wife as he had 
not. What conditions must have prevailed for Princip to be 
able to do this, for anyone to be able to effect his purpose? 
To effect my purposes I have to act. To act I have to move my 
body appropriately. 8 The freedom I have to move my body we may 
call my natural freedom. The necessity of routing our actions 
into the world through movement of our bodies makes our 
freedom (of bodily movement) of the first importance to us. 
Unlike God we need to move our bodies in order to effect 
changes in the world beyond our skins, and are dependent on 
the causal laws governing the physical world to effect our 
intentions. This much is a philosophical commonplace, though a 
very important one. Our natural freedom extends as far as we 
have a dispositional ability or power to do as we will. A 
paraplegic is not naturally free, because not able, to dance 
the rumba. 'Your money or your life!', barks the highwayman-
and you are free to choose. 'Wag your ears or die!', is not a 
choice situation. A man is free to do wrong in this, the 
broadest sense of free. We can suffer drastic diminution of 
our natural freedom. I could be paralysed in a motor accident 
and cease to be able to do much that I currently am able to. 
Whether or not we can come to do things not previously in our 
power, and so extend the boundary of our natural freedom, is 
doubtful. As we are talking here of new bodily movements per 
se (and not new admixtures of them, say in learning to ride a 
bicycle) if we can the extension is but slight. 
Natural freedom is necessary but not sufficient. Not 
everything we try to do or accomplish comes to pass. This is 
an everyday commonplace. As Thomas Carlyle remarked, 'Between 
vague wavering Capability and fixed indubitable Performance, 
what a difference!' 9 Not only must we be dispositionally able 
to perform a bodily movement, that it be in our action 
7 Taylor, Europe: Grandeur and Decline,p.l86. 
8 Davidson says that all we ever do is move our bodies and that the rest is up to nature: 'Agency' ,p.59. 
9 Carlyle, Sartor Resartus,p.l24. 
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repertoire, but we must be free from constraint too. Purposes 
can be frustrated by external physical circumstances. Though 
dispositionally able to move his arm, which raises the 
revolver that shoots the Archduke, Princip cannot move his arm 
if it is broken, for example. On the other hand, some purposes 
are frustrated because prevented by the actions of others. 
Though he is not paralysed Princip cannot raise his arm if an 
Austro-Hungarian patriot holds it down, and Princip cannot 
assassinate the Archduke if knocked down by a trolley-bus on 
his way to his designated vantage point. In the former example 
Princip is intentionally prevented from shooting the Archduke 
by the intervention of the patriot, and in the latter he is 
prevented by the intentional action of the driver who 
unwittingly intervenes. Interference is not the same as 
intervention, though what was intended as interference may 
turn out as intervention, and vice versa. Intervention stops a 
person doing what he wants by either preventing him from doing 
it or by doing it for him, whilst interference, by contrast, 
hinders or helps, but falls short of preventing or securing 
the goal. Tying you down prevents you; tying one hand behind 
your back hinders you. Giving you what you want secures it for 
you; giving you half the cost of what you want helps you get 
it. 
Non-intervention is a necessary condition of action because 
intervention entails, in the weak sense of entails governed by 
the connective of material equivalence, the non-performance of 
that action. I will make this an analytic truth. If the 
Austro-Hungarian patriot intervenes it means that Princip is 
prevented from assassinating the Archduke. Analytically, 
interference cannot prevent. It is self-contradictory to say 
'He intervened in my doing x though I did x all the same', but 
not to say 'He interfered with my doing x though I did x all 
the same'. Agents can intervene and interfere with one 
another's actions, and they may do this intentionally or 
unintentionally, the difference being marked by the 
intentionally-prevented and prevented-by-intentions 
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distinction. I shall use henceforth the weaker 'interfere' and 
not 'intervene', and mean by it the unjustified, deliberate 
hindering of a person. 
Two illustrations will make this distinction clear. I am at 
a cocktail party which I am enjoying very much, but somehow I 
never manage to get a drink. Other people's actions somehow 
together blindly conspire to thwart my best endeavours to lay 
my hands on a drink. For instance, as the waiter begins to 
make his way to me the drinks on his tray are deftly removed 
by my fellow partygoers. Obviously I am not alone in wanting a 
drink or two. Like incidents occur throughout the evening 
which is in consequence frustratingly dry. Lady Luck is 
against me. There is no conspiracy, merely an outcome well-
accounted for in terms of one. The second case is much the 
same as above. I am at a party and want a drink but, as in the 
previous case, never get one. However, the reason why not is 
quite different. There is a peculiar-looking man attired in a 
brown suit who deliberately thwarts my best endeavours to 
imbibe. He never lays a finger on me but all the same I never 
get a drink because of him. Try as I might he is always one 
step ahead of me, and the evening is disappointingly dry. 
What the first case provides is an outcome brought about by 
purposive. actions of others where that outcome was no part of 
anyone's intention in acting as they did. They wanted to drink 
just as I did only they were more successful. My drinklessness 
was the unforeseen and unintended consequence of their 
foreseen and intended drinking. The invisible hand at work. 
The man in the brown suit on the other hand is the direct, 
non-accidental cause of my drinklessness: he plays out the 
role of hidden hand. 
If interferences are properly the concern of moral-
political philosophy so too must interventions be. And 
interferences are. Certainly this is true of libertarianism, 
concerned very much as it is with personal liberty, and likely 
true of any morality grounded in rights and duties. If 
libertarianism is the political philosophy of rights-based 
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freedom par excellence, we need - as previously appreciated -
reason to accept that theory a nd its placing the individual so 
definitively centre-stage. What reasons do we have? 
Despite the critics' complaint that his is a libertarianism 
without foundation, Nozick does hint at how it might be 
founded. Apart from the dubious retroactive argument touched 
on in the preceding chapter two strands of possible 
argumentation are discernible. One is suggested when Nozick 
writes that side constraints 'reflect the underlying Kantian 
principle that indi victuals are ends' , 10 and their being ends 
imposes a libertarian constraint prohibiting aggression. 11 
There is some textual evidence to suggest that Rand, by no 
means sympathetic to Kant, is similarly alignect. 12 The other 
strand (and I think that it is different) is one that starts 
with the distinctness of persons. 13 Again, Rand says something 
suggestive of this possible line of argument when writing that 
man's life means 'the single, specific, irreplaceable lives of 
individual men'. 14 Where the first says that persons have 
intrinsic value the second draws on the fact that a person's 
life, how his life goes, matters to him, but eschews, or at 
least need not make, the posit of intrinsic value. Not only do 
I think them distinct because of this, but I think that the 
latter is the key to making sense of the former. 
One criterion for ascertaining whether a person has been, 
or will be, used as a means in disregard of his value is if 
his rights have been, or will be, violated. This is the thrust 
of Nozick's view that rights impose side constraints to 
action. Any action x is permissible providing no-one's rights 
are violated in doing x. Any state of affairs s is just 
providing no-one's rights were violated in moving to s. 15 This 
will not do. Libertarian rights are being presumed in 
10 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,pp.30-1. 
11 b'd I 1 .,p.33. 
12 Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness,p.27. For Rand's hostility to Kant see her Philosophy: Who Needs It?,pp.100-13. 
13 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,pp.33-4. Hart takes this to be Nozick's argument: 'Between Utility and Rights' , 
pp.82-3. 
14 Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness,p.S3; Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal,p.23. 
15 Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia,pp.150-3. 
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explication of the side constraints. It may be a logical 
feature of rights that they impose side constraints but it is 
not a logical feature of rights that the side constraints they 
impose are the panoply of libertarian ones. To reduce 'using 
persons as resources' to 'violating side constraint c' might 
be formally acceptable. To then cash out 'violating side 
constraint c' as, substantively, 'violating a person's 
property right in self and things', or something similar, is 
going to need argumentation. Identifying side constraints with 
libertarian rights is sleight of hand. Another line will have 
to be · pursued. 
The first Nozick-Rand way of founding libertarianism would 
be through a wielding of the theme of persons-as-ends, as 
ultimate and primitive repositories or loci of intrinsic 
value. It is Kant who famously implores us to act only in such 
ways that we treat humanity never solely as a means but always 
at the same time as ends, 16 and libertarians echo Kant. Nozick 
knowingly invokes the Kantian principle of never using persons 
solely a s means, and elsewhere asserts that a right is a basis 
for demanding or enforcing compliance towards one's 'basic 
moral characteristic(s)' ,17 which are intrinsically valuable. 18 
Adopting the persons-as-ends dictum in support of 
libertarianism might go something like this: persons are ends 
in themselves, they have intrinsic value; it is morally wrong 
to treat persons in ways incompatible with respect for their 
being ends in themselves; as ends in themselves persons are to 
be free to act as they choose providing only they always act 
in ways compatible with respect for intrinsic value; to 
deliberately constrain a person's intrinsic value-respecting 
actions is to aggress against them; therefore, no-one may 
aggress against any person on pain of moral wrongdoing. 
Whether the argument in the above form works need not 
concern us (I hazard it only as a conjecture). Validity to one 
16 Kant , Groundwork of tbe Hetapbysic of Horals,p.96. 
17 Nozick , Pbilosopbical Explanations, p. 451. 
lS Ibid. ,p. 730. 
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side, there are a number of telling objections to it, the last 
of them to my mind decisive. First is the objection, levelled 
by John Exdell, that the Kantian imperative does not clearly 
entail the right to own land and natural resources, as 
libertarians would want it to. As G.A. Cohen thinks of the 
precept of self-ownership, so Exdell does of the Kantian 
imperative: it does not unambiguously exclusively favour the 
libertarian's conclusion. Land and natural resources may not 
be unowned prior to appropriation because society or mankind 
may have a moral right to them, so the right not to be used as 
a means does not entail a right to property in them. 19 
Secondly, even if it is true of the Kantian imperative that 
'upon reflection most of us would count it among our firmly 
held convictions',w we want to know if we should. That we do 
count it amongst our convictions reports a piece of sociology. 
We want to know if its inclusion in our belief system is 
defensible. The imperative is not self-evidently true, and 
Kant's own vindication of it is threatened with circularity. 21 
But the decisive objection is against the presumption of 
intrinsic value. Simply, value is not in the realist's world 
of mind-independent properties. Value is not an intrinsic 
property of actions, things or states of affairs, and to 
suppose it is is metaphysical extravagance, making the world 
ontologically far stranger than it is and needs to be to 
adequately account for morality. Anyone who rejects intrinsic 
value cannot accept the argument in this form. 
The second possible argument suggested by Nozick and Rand, 
given below, is also intended in the spirit of conjecture. The 
distinctness of persons argument does not make the posit of 
intrinsic value. It says that to use others solely as means 
fails to treat them as individuals with their own lives to 
enact. This I think can be developed so as to underpin the 
persons-as-ends dictum, repudiating as an error the positing 
19 Exdell, 'Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property Rights'. 
20 b'd I 1 .,p.l42. 
21 See Haezrahi, 'The Concept of Man as End-in-Himself',p.297. 
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of intrinsic value but explicating that we have reason to act 
as though persons possessed intrinsic value. Persons do not 
possess intrinsic value and we know they do not, yet we are 
constrained to behave in ways co-extensive with their 
(counterfactually) having it. In this it presages the 
contractarian argument. 
The distinctness of persons construction begins with the 
fact that, from the point of view of the person whose life it 
is, how his life goes is of especial importance to him. A 
person who has any preferences at all cannot be unconcerned as 
to how his life goes; there is no logical room for the driving 
of a wedge between a man and his (first and second order) 
preferences after which one could say 'Here is the man and 
here are his preferences, and the man cares not for them'. How 
someone's life goes is judged by him in terms of the 
preferences he is able to satisfy or have satisfied. 22 
As a generalisation about persons this is true. I am not 
you, your preferences are not mine, the death of me is not the 
death of you. We all naturally have this first-person 
perspective on the world, the view from somewhere. Whatever my 
preferences the mere having of them prompts me to seek their 
satisfaction. My preferences matter to me in a way that yours 
do not, though yours matter to you in the same way mine matter 
to me. Whilst necessarily concerned with how my life goes I am 
but contingently concerned, if I am at all, with you and how 
your life goes. I care how my life goes if I have any 
preferences at all; I care about you only if I have 
preferences that make reference to you as the intentional 
object of them. So much is philosophical anthropology. Further 
excursion into which reveals another equally significant 
difference, this time over how you stand to me as the or an 
intentional object of a preference of mine. 
Persons are a central part of our lives and how we enact 
them. They are so intimately connected with preferences we 
22 Lollasky pursues a sillilar line, contending that the value-preserving interchangeability of producers of illpersonal value 
founders on the rock of personal projects: 'Personal Projects as the Foundation for Basic Rights'. 
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have - if not constitutive of them - that how their lives go 
affects how ours fare. Call this concern for others, with the 
way their life goes for them. Often our concern in others is 
substitutable, i.e. it fixes on substitutable properties they 
exemplify or roles they fulfil. Call this concern with others. 
Providing these properties or roles are preserved through 
substitution of person the way our life goes is unchanged. We 
are not concerned with their first-person perspective at all, 
nor with the content of it. It does not matter who in 
particular exemplifies the property or fulfils the role 
provided only that someone does. It does not matter who picks 
up the regimental colours though it matters that the colours 
are retrieved. Who, precisely, is to be the first man on the 
moon is not important as long as someone lands before the 
Russians. When we are looking to the occupier of some or other 
designated role or function, as here, our concerns are 
instrumental and not about the preference-bearing person who 
occupies the role. We do not take into account how he sees it 
from the inside, how his being substituted is not indifferent 
to him. 
The fat man in the bright swimwear lying prone on the beach 
is my landmark, and I use him to fix my position. As a ship 
uses a lighthouse I use the fat man. But I use the fat man in 
a morally acceptable manner. Even though I treat him as a 
means I still do not fail to treat him as though he were an 
end in himself. The Kantian imperative enjoins us to act so 
that we never treat persons merely as means but always at the 
same time as ends. 
Using a person solely as a means is to treat him as an 
instrument for the satisfaction of a preference of mine, in a 
manner that encroaches non-consensually on his first-person 
perspective; in making my life go well from the inside I cause 
his to fare ill from his perspective. I value you 
instrumentally in so far as I value you only for your use-
value in accomplishing my purposes, and I use you solely as a 
means in so far as I override your living your life in order 
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to enact mine. A premiss to the effect that no-one is to enact 
his life by causing others to not enact theirs is missing, and 
required. Without it the argument is incomplete. 
To my mind the signal advantage of this argument lies in 
making sense of the Kantian imperative without positing 
intrinsic value. For that reason alone it represents a good 
start. The question of course is why we ought never to treat 
others solely as a means. Why should the fact that my life 
will go better only if I make yours go worse constrain me? An 
answer to this question will have led us into a morality of 
rights and duties. It is to this that I now turn. 
I will propose a contractarian argument in favour of a 
principal of equal social freedom or liberty. It is an 
argument for a principal co-extensive with the (unargued for) 
orthodox libertarian axiom of non-aggression. More than that, 
the principle establishes a functional equivalent to the more 
basic axiom of self-ownership which underpins the non-
aggression axiom. The contract to the principle is not for 
civil obedience or political authority but for morality. 
I will not argue separately the case that contractarianism is 
the correct or most plausible metaphysic of morality, but will 
argue, from the assumption that it is, to a particular, 
reasonably precise contractual outcome. Contractarianism 
explains in an acceptably naturalistic this-worldly manner why 
there is an institution of morality at all, why there is this 
corpus of rules rather than that, and why we should be moral. 
Morality is for man, not man for morality. Anything more leads 
into metaphysical extravagancy, romantic speculation or 
intolerable relativism. The contractual outcome has two 
components, the principle of equal social liberty being one, 
and the duty persons have to meet one another's fundamental 
needs the other. 
Contractarian theories suppose that every rational person, 
were he to hypothesise himself into the pre-moral condition, 
would agree to hold himself duty-bound to certain rules 
constraining his behaviour because observing these rules would 
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be in his individual long-term best interest. Persons' 
interests are best served by their recognising constraints to 
indulging their inclinations, i.e. self-interest is overruled 
by morality, and being moral is in each person's interest. 
This is not self-contradictory because interest is used in two 
different ways, the former refers to our long-term o r 
enlightened interest, and the latter to our short-term 
interest. The hypothetical contract is a device for 
determining what rules we ought to abide by and hence also for 
the present examination of the rules we actually have. 
Contractarianism stands to extant moral corpuses as an acid 
test. Juxtaposed against man's pre-moral condition 
contractarianism accounts for why we want morality and its 
essential form. Contractarian methodology suppos es we 
constrain ourselves in the pursuit of our own advantage and 
that we do better for embracing moral rules, the duties 
incumbent on us as parties to the contract. Contractarianism 
has to show that it is rational to perform one's covenant even 
when performance is not directly to one's benefit, provided 
that it is to one's benefit to be disposed to perform. It is 
better that a man wants to want to do his duty than that he 
only want to do it; temptation is more easily resisted. 'The 
theory we need', says Narveson, 'is contractarianism. The 
general idea of this theory is that the principles of morality 
are (or should be) those principles for directing everyone's 
conduct which it is reasonable for everyone to accept. They 
are the rules that everyone has good reason for wanting 
everyone to act on, and thus to internalize in himself or 
herself, and thus to reinforce in the case of everyone. ' 23 What 
the rules are to be is primarily a function of what the 
initial condition to be remedied is taken to be. 
Perhaps the most developed account of contractarian 
morality to date is David Gauthier's. In his Morals by 
Agreement Gauthier writes that his enquiry to show that moral 
duties are rationally grounded leads 'to the rational basis 
23 Narveson, The Libertarian Idea,p.l31. 
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for a morality, not of absolute standards, but of agreed 
constraints',~ and that morality can be generated from the 
non-moral premisses of rational choice. 25 Initially, a person 
draws no distinction between what he may and what he may not 
do. How, then, does a person recognise a moral dimension to 
choice if morality is not initially present? 'Morals by 
agreement offer a contractarian rationale for distinguishing 
what one may and may not do. Moral principles are introduced 
as the objects of fully voluntary ex ante agreement among 
rational persons .... As rational persons understanding the 
structure of their interaction, they recognize a place for 
mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their 
affairs.' U The rules we observe, the rules we constrain 
ourselves by and can be held to, constitute - at the most 
fundamental level - our morality. They constitute our morality 
because they are the rules we would on rational reflection 
adopt as binding. 
Rational contractors are individuals bearing preferences 
(values) and who apply reasoning in their endeavours to 
satisfy them. 'Preferences' is the generic term for the 
desires, whims, fancies, goals, projects, affinities and the 
like of agents: in short, the ends at which persons direct 
their actions, their purpose in acting. They range from the 
everyday, mundane wanting an ice-cream to the bizarre desire 
to enter The Guinness Book of Records as the fastest jeep-
eater in the world to the more rarefied project of 
saintliness. 
Preferences are inherently action prompting: to have a 
preference is to be moved to seek its satisfaction. Rational 
contractors are preference-bearing individuals, moved to 
satisfy the preferences they bear. Expected utility is the 
measure of the strength of preferences, and the stronger or 
higher ranked the preference the greater the utility expected 
24 Gauthier, Morals by Agreeaent,p.2. 
25 Ibid.,p.4: Narveson, Tbe Libertarian Idea,p.l66. 
26 Gauthier, Morals by Agreeaent, p. 9. 
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from its satisfaction. If my preference is for push-pin over 
poetry in choosing between them I maximise my utility by 
opting for push-pin. Persons rank-order or weight their 
preferences, i.e. they have a subjective utility structure, in 
which each preference has a place relative to the others. 
Preferences can enter and leave the structure as well as 
change their relative position within it, and accordingly the 
preferences a person has and their place in his utility 
structure indicate in which direction his utility lies at that 
time. Prompted as we are to act on our preferences, we choose 
rationally when we choose to maximise expected utility. 
Rational contractors are individual utility maxi misers . 
Persons are rational if they seek to maximise their expected 
utility, in whatever dimension this assumes, and choose the 
believed most efficient means to this end. Rationality as 
purely instrumental mirrors value subjectivism, and thus the 
posit of intrinsic value is eschewed. This is the 
psychological profile, as it were, of the parties to the 
contract, the kind of contractors they are. 
As to the preferences persons may have, no l i mit to their 
content is presupposed. Obviously, prior to the agreement to 
be moral there can be no normative stipulations the content of 
preferences must meet. Of course, standardly, because human 
beings are alike in many fundamental respects we should expect 
a broad convergence at one level. Sophisticated New Yorkers 
and noble savages alike are moral in fundamentally the same 
ways because they are fundamentally alike as persons. These 
might be classified as preferences for the traditional 
economic goods of food, shelter and clothing, but might be 
taken to include the intangibles of love, friendship and the 
like. Beyond that, all sorts of things can be the objects of 
persons' preferences: wealth (Marx), glory (Hobbes), hedon 
(Bentham), sex with mother·(Freud) and sundry others; a pet 
gerbil, yellow plaid trousers, you name it. You name it and 
there is bound to be s omeone, somewhere, who currently has it, 
high or low, in his utility structure. They can even include 
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preferences for non-existent objects; to own the Holy Grail, 
for example. It does not matter what they include, nor how 
broad the range of preferences are at the shared level. All 
that matters is that preferences are always someone's, and 
their bearer therefore has a vested interest, in terms of 
utility, in satisfying them. 
Contractarianism neither requires nor entails that persons 
are selfish. Utility is not the same as welfare. Utility is 
the satisfaction of interests of the self whilst welfare, on 
the other hand, is the satisfaction of self-centred 
preferences, interests in the self. 27 My preferences are mine 
but they need not be about me. Some will be preferences that 
r efer to the utility of others, for example Captain Oates 
departing the Scott-expedition tent. It was indeed the act of 
a brave man and an English gentleman: it was ground-floor 
altruism on the part of Oates in that what moved him was a 
concern for his fellows. The model of rationality deployed 
here is a model of human choice and action per se and not of 
'bourgeois' choice and action. It is as true of Mother Teresa 
as it is of Pol Pot as it is of Donald Trump. 
The contractarian case for a principle of equal social 
liberty needs a background against which the rationale for and 
the success of the contract is juxtaposed. The success of the 
contract is a matter of the parties to it being better off by 
contracting than by remaining in the pre-moral condition, and 
better off in terms of their (subjective) utility structures. 
The rationale for the contract is prospective parties 
envisaging their being better off. This background is the 
hypothesised pre-moral condition. What that condition would be 
is, arguably, best captured by a counterfactual thought-
experiment. Imagine that all moral constraint on behaviour is 
lost overnight. Tomorrow, the state of nature. That state, the 
pre-moral condition revisited, is the state where 
instrumentally rational utility maximisers are free to pursue 
their advantage without restraint. It is the condition wherein 
27 b'd I 1 .,p.7. 
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natural and social freedom are undifferentiated. This state 
for any and every individual is going to be better, 
indifferent to, or worse than the duty-constrained condit i on. 
If persons are broadly equal in their natural powers and 
abilities, as Hobbes says they are, then we will take it that 
this state is worse i n terms of subjective utilities, and for 
the sorts of reasons Hobbes gives. 
The contract takes place against a background of relevant 
facts about all men and their environment. Hobbes's is perhaps 
the most famous of the depictions of the human condition, no 
doubt because it is the most uncompromising. Whether it is 
deserving of the appellation 'war' does not really matter. 
What has to be shown, and all that has to be shown, is that 
things go better for self-restraint. A more recent listing of 
the features universal to the human condition is given by 
Herbert Hart in what he calls the 'minimum content of Natural 
Law', where 'the facts mentioned afford a reason why, given 
survival as an aim, law and morals should include a specific 
content.' 28 Unless these facts are acknowledged in law and/or 
morality, says Hart, the purpose of associating for survival 
would not be advanced. Hart's five features are: men are 
mutually vulnerable physically; men are approximately equal in 
their a bilities to help and harm one another; men possess only 
limited altruism; resources are limited; and men have only a 
limited understanding and strength of will . 29 
Hume cites four 'inconveniences' which justice remedies: 
selfishness, limited generosity and the easy change and 
scarcity of external objects. 30 I would add Hart's equality of 
ability to help and harm, on which Hume is silent. Anyone 
decidedly superior in his ability to harm or avoid being 
harmed in turn has less if any reason to constrain himself. An 
incredibly strong and near-invincible machine that was a free 
agent (a bionic man say) would not need to submit to morality 
28 Hart, The Concept of I.av,p.l89 . 
29 b'd I 1 . ,p.l90-3. 
30 HU!Ie, A Treatise of Human Nature ,p.494. 
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for its own good. Hobbes was right to include the general 
equality of ability in his account. '[T]he difference between 
man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can 
thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may 
not pretend, as well as he. , 31 Goliath thought he was 
different; David gave the lie to this. 32 Hart's second feature 
is an entailment of the first. To the extent that we are 
mutually vulnerable we are equally capable of harming one 
another. Both Hart and Hume a g ree on confined generosity. The 
fifth of Hart's features is man's limited understanding and 
strength of will, which could be included under mutual 
vulnerability. Hume's citing the easy change of goods is 
obvious, and central. That leaves scarcity. 
I would not include scarcity. Easy change is all that is 
required. Scarcity does not cause conflict, but it can make a 
bad thing worse. The problem of scarcity has loomed large in 
the history of political philosophy though its significance, 
I am inclined to think, is overrated. Adolf Grunebaum writes: 
'It is only because goods of the world are scarce that 
ownership rules are necessary. Were goods as superabundant as 
the water in Locke's river, there would be no need to justify 
any form of ownership at all.' 33 That this is mistaken is 
easily shown. If goods require effort to acquire and are of 
easy change - as most are - then rules of ownership have a 
role, even granted superabundance. There is a mighty river, 
broad and deep and most potable. Drawing a goatskin of water 
from this superabundant river leaves more than enough and as 
good remaining. Only this river wends its majestic way at the 
bottom of a grand canyon, and the people live at the top. 
Collecting water is a straightforward but arduous task. Once 
drawn it is of easy change: carrying off your goatskin when 
you are not looking is an easy task. Here a rule or rules that 
31 Hobbes, I.eviathan,p.SO. 
32 Hobbes's Sovereign is decidedly 'different'. Should we not expect it then to claill benefits it says others llay not? 
33 GrunebaUil, 'OWnership is Theft',p.551. 
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assign ownership have a place. (And what more natural rule 
than one that gives to the collector the collected?) 
My initial background against which the contract is 
juxtaposed, then, includes the mutual ability to help and 
harm, limited generosity, the easy change of external goods, 
and of course the presence of persons endowed with 
instrumental rationality concerned to maximise their utility. 
These conditions give rise to conflict and problems of co-
operation. These background conditions do not underdetermine 
the contract. 
Hobbes famously said of the pre-moral condition that it was 
a state of war of every man against every man, of a life 
'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short', a condition in 
which there could be neither justice nor injustice. 'To this 
war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; 
that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, 
justice and injustice have there no place. ' 34 And from this, 
said Hobbes, it follows that every man has a right to 
everything. 35 In the condition of war persons recognise no 
limitations on what they may or may not do. It is hard to see 
how, pre-morally, this can be otherwise. Hobbes puts this 
nicely when he holds that 'The desires, and other passions of 
man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that 
proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids 
them: which till laws be made they cannot know. ' 36 Persons are 
at liberty to do anything at all that they wish and have the 
power, the natural freedom, to perform or bring about. One can 
see why Hobbes saw it as a state of war. For instance, I am in 
a hurry to cross this narrow bridge and you, old man, are in 
my way, so I throw you off to facilitate my passage. Persons 
have no value beyond their usefulness. In the parlance of the 
distinctness of persons argument there is no reason why, if 
you do not contingently stand to my preferences such that I am 
34 Hobbes, Leviathan,p.83. 
35 Ibid. ,p.85. 
36 b'd I 1 • ,p.83. 
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concerned for you, I should not make my life go better by 
making yours go worse. Because each has a right to as much as 
he can by force and guile get and keep there is no security 
either of person or possession. You, or 'your' straw-filled 
clothes, will make a first-rate scarecrow if lashed to a post 
in the middle of 'my' field. Each is at the mercy of the 
vicissitudes of others. We are all prone to be thrown off the 
bridge, as it were, because we are in one another's way, by 
design or by chance. Furthermore, the fruits of co-operation 
are denied man in his natural condition. No-one is prepared to 
enter into co-operative ventures without assurance of a return 
for his time and trouble. In the parlance of game theory no-
one is prepared to be 'suckered'. In short, in the pre-moral 
state people have things they do not want, namely the ills of 
conflict, and lack things t hey do want, specifically the 
fruits of co-operation. Whatever their utility structure, they 
suffer some disutilities without compensating gain and forego 
the satisfaction of many preferences for want of co-operation. 
What of the person - the fanatic - whose only or greatest 
preference is for interfering and who cannot see any point to 
constraining his behaviour? Ex hypothesi, it seems his 
preferences are not served by being moral. The problem posed 
by the fanatic is possibly vanishingly small. Considering that 
he values his liberty and acknowledges resources as a pre-
condition of his liberty to pursue his utility, the fanatic is 
but an aberrant preference away from contracting. The lure of 
morality is present even to him. 
Men wish to avoid the ills that beset them in the pre-moral 
condition and progress to a better one where the goods that 
are tenuously available are made more securely available, and 
the goods not otherwise attainable at all become common. For 
Hobbes, the goods tenuously available in the state of nature 
are, he says, 'everything', for 'the weakest has strength 
enough to kill the strongest'.n Regarding those goods 
otherwise not available at all, Hobbes's list is predictably 
37 b'd I 1 • ,p.BO. 
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extensive. '[N]o culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use 
of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious 
building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things 
as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; 
no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society.' 38 
Conflict and co-operation both present opportunities which 
the parties to them have an interest in resolving, and 
resolving in their favour. For each case of conflict there is 
an optimal outcome for each party, namely that he win. But 
there is no guarantee that the winner at time t 1 will win at 
t 2 , t 3 ••• tn. A regime of conflict is too costly to 
contemplate for persons equally well-endowed with natural 
powers. They can at best hope to win half the conflicts they 
become embroiled in, and pay the cost of foregone co-
operation. As an aside, let me say that I do not think it 
usually rational to win conflicts by eliminating one's 
adversary. This would be an unreasonably high price for the 
victor to pay. Were A to rid his world of B then A would leave 
the state of war with B, but he would not by that enter the 
state of peace with its attendant goods. That requires co-
operation and now A has no-one, or one person less, to co-
operate with. 
As with conflict, so too with co-operation. There is an 
optimal outcome for each party, namely that he receive 
assistance without meeting the costs. Self-regarding creatures 
do not assist one another willy-nilly. There has to be 
something in it for them, in terms of their utility structure. 
I may gain your co-operation by offering a consideration. The 
problem is one of assuring fidelity to the co-operative 
enterprise once that structure is engaged. The party seeking 
assistance has to offer something to induce it, and this 
represents a disutility - a cost - to them. Now, why should 
I pay once you have assisted me, or you assist me once I have 
paid? Here is the familiar (game theoretical) rub: two self-
interested persons each know this is how the other reasons; 
38 b'd I 1 .,p.82. 
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neither is prepared to pay before being assisted o r assist in 
anticipation of payment, for fear the paid or the assisted 
party default, i.e. sucker him. They fail to co-operate and so 
forego a mutual increase in utility. 
In isolated, one-off cases defaulting on payment may be the 
rational course. When engaged in recurring or iterated 
situations it is not. Defection pays only in the short run. In 
the long run a person does better pursuing his enlightened 
interest through reciprocal co-operation. 39 Co-operation is a 
hedge against the future. 'Your corn is ripe today; mine will 
be so to-morrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I shou'd 
labour with you to-day, and that you shou'd aid me to-morrow. 
I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for 
me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; 
and shou'd I labour with you upon my own account, in 
expectation of a return, I know I shou'd be disappointed, and 
that I shou'd in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then 
I leave you to labour alone: You treat me in the same manner. 
The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want 
of mutual confidence and security .... Hence I learn to do a 
service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; 
because I forsee, that he will return my service, in 
expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to 
maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or 
with others. And accordingly, after I have serv'd him, and he 
is in possession of the advantage arising from my action, he 
is induc'd to perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences 
of his refusal. ,40 
Terminating conflict and making co-operation possible are 
what persons contract for. By contracting all stand to gain 
more utility-wise than they do by not contracting and staying 
with the status quo ante. When push comes to shove in the pre-
moral condition mutual constraint becomes attractive. 
Contracting secures more of what they do want and less of what 
39 See Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation. 
40 Huue , A Treatise of Human Nature,pp.520-1. 
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they do not want. Through co-operation it is possible that 
most, perhaps all, get all they want. What is it rational 
utility-maximisers contract to do or refrain from doing, and 
to what rules do they submit themselves to as of duty? 
Rational contractors agree to abide by certain rules that are 
advantageous to all, in terms of subjective utilities 
(preference-satisfaction), and so dispose themselves to abide 
by the rules even when it is to their short-term advantage to 
opt for expediency over duty. 
So what rules do rational contractors agree should 
constrain them? What are the best-case scenarios for any 
utility-maximising individual? The best-case scenario is - as 
Gauthier points out - a condition of natural harmony in which 
everyone could fulfil themselves without constraint. This is 
neither possible nor, thinks Gauthier, desirable. 41 The next 
best is where others are happy slaves to one's preferences, 
are in one's power or under one's control. Where everyone 
reasons similarly there are only masters and no slaves and a 
contract on this basis is impossible. Would-be contractors 
will have to settle for less than their ideal outcome. 
As much as Hobbes's depiction of the state of nature is 
familiar so too is his solution. Men yield up their equal 
right to everything in exchange for peace. Men are to 'lay 
down this right to all things; and be contented with so much 
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against 
himself.' 42 I believe that this is about as much as rational 
agents would be prepared to concede to one another. (I say 
'about' owing to the yet to be addressed second component of 
the contractual outcome.) It is about the best they could do 
for themselves. They step into a morality of rights and duties 
to better themselves over the pre-moral condition. This is the 
baseline for measuring the success of the contract. What 
counts as bettering themselves is cashed-out in terms of their 
subjective preferences, which differ from time to time and 
41 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement ,p.l9. 
42 Hobbes, Leviathan,p.85 (emphasis removed). 
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from person to person. Rational contractors would only submi t 
to rules that promoted preferences, whatever they might be. 
The rules of morality will have to be rules acceptable to 
everyone because they have p references per se. 
Everyone contracts to t he rule which I will call Quieta Non 
Movere: Leave Well Alone. Rational contractors would agree to 
forego the pre-moral liberty to do unto others as they please. 
The rule Leave Well Alone states a principle of equal social 
liberty requiring everyone to desist from deliberately 
interfering with others doing as they purpose, providing of 
course that they in turn meet the requirement. 
The principle of equal social liberty means every person is 
free to pursue his utility providing he does not purposefully 
interfere with the liberty of others to pursue theirs. It does 
not entail that a man may not use or consume resources on the 
grounds that others wish to use or consume them, and his doing 
so will leave them unfree to. That is far too strong. If I 
could not satisfy my preference p because my using r to or in 
satisfying p would leave r unavailable to others for the 
satisfaction of preferences they have, then no-one could use 
any resources, nor even go any place using some continuum of 
space at a time without fear of trespassing on someone's 
liberty. No-one could board a train knowing passengers farther 
down the line would be left unfree to board due to lack of 
space. Only in highly artificial environments of the Crusoe 
kind could this rendering of the rule be anything but a 
principle prescribing inaction. The principle of equal social 
liberty does not aim to ensure that persons never get in one 
another's way but that when they do it is incidental and not 
essential. The principle draws the distinction illustrated by 
the two cocktail-party scenarios. It recognises the central 
difference between not being free because of circumstances 
produced unintentionally on the one hand, which it judges to 
be permissible, and not being free due to interference· or 
deliberate hindrance on the other, which it decrees to be 
impermissible and hence wrong. 
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Each is to pursue his utility free from the predations of 
his fellows. If the end at which your actions are directed has 
been removed by someone else not as the consequence of 
interference, or has removed itself (the hare has run away), 
or never existed (your preference is for hunting snarks), then 
your freedom is not curtailed. Being left well alone is being 
left free to do, not free to succeed. It is not a rule of 
equal preference satisfaction. 
Why this rule? The rationale for surrendering some natural 
freedom is to gain peace and the myriad advantages thereof, 
and of avoiding war with its consequent losses, wherein each 
has a Hobbesean right to as much as he can get and keep. To 
this end contractors have to surrender this right. No-one 
would surrender more than is necessary and sufficient to end 
war and make co-operation possible. The more he surrenders the 
more of his preferences he foregoes. Each wants to concede as 
little as he needs to in order to leave the pre-moral 
condition and open himself to co-operative ventures. Conceding 
more than is necessary is to wantonly surrender a greater part 
of his utility than is required for the end he has. Rational 
contractors do not want to surrender any more of their natural 
liberty than the next person for that would put them at a 
relative disadvantage. If the contractors are naturally equal 
in their powers they will not have to. The contract is an 
equal contract: no-one is giving up more, or less, than anyone 
else because all are equal in their powers. 
conceding more than this threatens to leave some utility 
maximisers less well off than they otherwise need to be. The 
pre-moral condition is worse for all rational utility 
maximisers. The principle of equal social liberty represents 
almost the necessary and sufficient condition that all can 
contract to. It leaves all free to pursue their preferences 
whatever they may be. Anything more than this, i.e. any rule 
mentioning some preferences not universally shared or 
mentioning some persons' preferences, would be to favour some 
preferences over others. Those or those whose preferences are 
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not picked out would be paying a higher price in terms of 
their utility to enter morality than those who are 
individuated or whose preferences are. Assent would not be 
forthcoming. This may seem hard on those unequal in their 
ability to pursue the satisfaction of their preferences, e.g. 
the handicapped. Yet the contract represents a bettering even 
for them - and a substantial bettering at that - over the pre-
moral condition. As with all parties to the contract, they 
gain as much as they can without recourse to the invalidating 
device of especial group or preference individuation. Indeed, 
a case could be made for saying that the naturally unequal 
gain more. Pre-morally, they are naturally disadvantaged 
relative to the able majority. Contracting remedies this 
disadvantage by constraining the more able to treat the less 
capable as they do one another. 
Agreeing to and abiding by the principle removes everyone 
from the state of war. As soon as the principle is observed 
the state of war is left behind, for that state is precisely 
the state in which no-one refrains from using persons as, when 
and where their instrumental rationality leads them. The 
principle secures for us freedom to pursue and enjoy (most of) 
our preferences. True, we lose out in that we are no longer 
free to throw one another off the bridge - but then we had 
only a fifty-fifty chance of throwing instead of being thrown. 
The gains certainly exceed the losses for nearly all rank-
orderings of preferences. Fanatics are the exception. The half 
of being secure is psychological, believing that one's utility 
structure, whatever its configuration, is on a par with 
everyone else's. Secondly, the principle gives us access to 
the fruits of co-operation that were not open previously. 
Before the contract one could get 'co-operation' through 
force, i.e. by riding roughshod over the preferences of 
others. The problem was one could also be oneself coerced into 
'co-operating'. Given equality in powers, for any encounter 
with a person where one of the parties is looking for 'co-
operation' the chances are only fifty-fifty that he will be 
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successful in getting it. Apart from this, non-voluntary 'co-
operation' threatens us with conflict. The only way of 
eliciting genuine voluntary co-operation, I have said, is by 
appealing to the utility structure of others. We have to get 
them to want to benefit us by agreeing to benefit them in 
return. Equal social liberty leaves each and every person free 
to make and accept those exchanges he wishes to according to 
his own lights. 
It is most rational, then, to retain as much liberty as is 
co-extensive with each other's liberty. 'Do not incur any 
duties, you may not want to keep them', would be the policy to 
pursue. It is each's best-case scenario. Unfortunately, it 
cannot get one out of the state of nature. 'Incur duties you 
need to in order to end war and gain co-operation, but renege 
on your agreements wherever and whenever you can', is the 
second-best scenario. This policy is not without its risks. 
Malefactors get found out and lose trust. A reputation for 
being moral is costly to fake. 43 The next best step after this 
- and the first able to elicit universal assent - is the 
policy 'Do not incur any more duties than you have to in order 
to be at peace and gain the prospect of co-operation, you may 
not want to keep them.' That way one can surrender more of 
one's freedom, at the time and place and for the duration of 
one's choosing, outside the contractual outcome. I can 
socially bind myself by entering into any number of various 
kinds of promissory relations. 
Rational contractors choose the rule Quieta Non Movere 
because it is the antithesis of the ubiquitous interference 
that is the hallmark of the state of war. The solution to such 
a state where everyone is under threat of continual 
interference is the state where no-one interferes, rather than 
that all do. Between these poles, interfering to bring about 
or prevent from being brought about certain actions, states of 
affairs, etc., is a middle-way position, and on the face of it 
not an unattractive one. The problem is whose preferences are 
43 Frank, Passions Within Reason,pp.99-102. 
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to be overridden? And who decides whose preferences are to be 
overridden, and when? In the absence of contracted-to rules 
answering these questions such interference is prima facie 
ruled out. A middle-way contractual upshot is unlikely amongst 
parties with different, and when shared differentially 
ordered, utility structures. It is not rational to consent to 
a rule stipulating only certain individuals or some group or 
class may interfere if one or one's group is not named. 
If subjectivism about values is true it might be thought 
that we have to embrace only a negative principle of liberty. 
Anything more would be to choose some preferences or values 
above others - against the requirement of neutrality across 
preferences. And the question again is: in the absence of 
(near) unanimous agreement who chooses, and why them? 
Furthermore, any rule that required persons to assist others 
in specified ways would be unacceptable to rational 
contractors on the grounds that it would entail relinquishing 
pursuing their utility in order to assist others in satisfying 
their preferences - the happy accident that all prefer this 
aside. Certainly, this has intuitive plausibility. It is, 
though, not judicious enough for it ignores the logic of the 
contractarian argument, which I take to legitimate the right 
to liberty and a positive right to welfare. The logic of that 
argument works like this: just as liberty as freedom from 
interference is necessary for the satisfaction of preferences 
because necessary for action per se, so too are resources 
necessary for the satisfaction of preferences because 
necessary for action. Not in the sense that all preferences 
are directed to the moving, altering, transforming, etc., of 
resources - not all are, for instance my growing a moustache -
but necessary in the sense that they are a pre-condition for 
being able to pursue any preferences at all. In short, as 
freedom is a pre-condition for the pursuit of preferences so 
are those resources that enable one to be a free, utility-
maximising agent, for any preferences one has. I touched on 
this earlier when I said that even the fanatic values his 
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continued ability to act on his expected utility. Put another 
way~ what does it benefit a man to gain his freedom only to 
lose his life? Any man who values his freedom will answer 
'Nothing', and due to this contractual assent to a positive 
right to resources for standard, basic welfare is not to be 
thought implausible. 
Given the psychological profile of the contrac~ing parties, 
the background against which they contract and the symmetrical 
logic of the contract, persons would be rational to agree to 
this component. Much of what favours the principle of equal 
social liberty I believe favours this second welfarist 
component, and so I will dwell on its justification only 
fleetingly. Besides, in the fourth chapter the same 
substantive conclus i on is arrived at in the context of a 
critique of Nozick, though the reasons are quite different. 
The critique of Nozick turns on a construction of his moral 
catastrophe clause. My preferred justification would be in 
terms of the contract though I am happy enough with the 
consequentialist argument for it. This is not meant as a 
fudge. That argument is my safety net so to speak: if the 
contractarian justification is unsatisfactory I can fall back 
on the consequentialist argument. 
The commitment to welfarism is a reflection of the fact 
that, being rational utility maximisers persons are not going 
to 'sign' any contract that constrains them in recognising 
equal liberty for all when they appreciate that, in acting as 
they are socially free to, others may use and consume all 
resources in the process. In so recognising the equal liberty 
of everyone (and everyone else my equal liberty in exchange) 
I might be inadvertently signing away my life. In both party 
examples I was left frustratingly drinkless. Now I am left 
life-threateningly resourceless. Envisaging this possibility 
might give pause to my contracting to Leave Well Alone. All 
might have given up their right to everything for a liberty to 
nothing. At least pre-morally all had a de facto fifty-fifty 
chance of wresting some of these needed resources from whoever 
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held them. Arguably, it is rational to want a contract that 
does not allow for the dire eventuality of going wholly 
without when others have plenty. Everyone wants life and 
liberty. Only then is the pursuit of happiness open to them. 
Meeting the fundamental needs of others is going to cut 
into the pre-moral pursuit of my preferences, but so too is 
abiding by the principle of equal social liberty, leaving me 
unfree to throw you off the bridge, for instance. Abiding by 
the principle is rational. If I am right then contracting to 
welfarism is rational too. And it is rational for all utility 
maximisers whatever their utility structures because it 
appeals only to formal features that hold of all persons and 
not to some kinds of preferences but not others. 44 To abide by 
the rules that work to the advantage of all - Goliath's and 
David's, Charles Atlas's and all us eight-and-a-half-stone 
weaklings alike - just is to behave morally, no matter that 
one's abiding by the rules, except in rare instances, is not 
the result of any rational deliberation. Morality does not 
fall from the heavens inscribed immutably in stone; neither 
does it emanate from something as metaphysically outlandish as 
a Good Will; and nor is it the product of the promptings of a 
philosophically suspect faculty of intuition. Morality is more 
pedestrian - though not any less efficacious for it - than 
this. 
If all agree to refrain from interfering with others' 
pursuit of their utility then they are duty-bound to refrain. 
They have stepped into a morality of rights and duties. If 
each is duty-bound to not interfere then on the strong, and 
strict correlativity thesis (the thesis that says if A has a 
duty to B then B has a right against A) each has a right to be 
free from interference. Why the strong correlativity thesis 
applies and not the weak one (that if A has a right against B 
then B has duty to A) might seem a matter of small importance. 
Where there is an egg there has to be a chicken to have laid 
44 See in connection the objection that Rawls's thin theory of the good is not thin enough, raised by Sandel, Liberalism and 
the Lilits of Justice,p.27 and pressed by Schaefer, Justice or Tyranny?,pp.31&38. 
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it, and it is of small concern if the chicken or the egg came 
first. The kind of correlativity, though, is of the first 
importance. Unlike its weak relation, the strong correlativity 
thesis recognises no duties where there are not rights. It 
says that where there is an egg (duty) there is a chicken 
(right), and makes no place for eggs (duties) not laid by 
chickens (rights). Accordingly, the strong correlativity 
thesis disavows duties of benevolence and charity, fo r 
example. When developing the welfarist component I assume 
strong correlativity because, first, I think it the correct 
view: the only duties a man has are those he agrees to 
shoulder, and in shouldering them others have rights re his 
fulfilling his duties. Rand would approve: 'No man can have a 
right to impose an unchosen obligation, an unrewarded duty or 
an involuntary servitude on another man.' 45 And secondly, 
because the claim to resources it underwrites can then go 
through as either a right to resources entailing a correlative 
duty to provide them or as a duty to provide resources 
begetting a correlative right to their provision. 
I have tried in this chapter to make the case for a moral 
basis for libertarianism. What I have said is not itself 
libertarian. Many theorists who do not consider themselves 
libertarians would happily hold to a principle of equal social 
liberty and a positive right to the provision of welfare. All 
the same, it is the basis for the step into libertarianism. It 
is the jumping-off point for a defence of a strong regime of 
property rights founded on appropriation from nature. The 
first step into a morality of rights and duties has been 
taken, the task ahead is to take the second step into a 
morality of private property rights. The challenge to 
libertarianism from the critics who point to the lack of 
foundations has been addressed. Contractarianism can provide 
them. The remaining challenge, that to taking the second step , 
is Spencer's. 
45 Rand, The Virtue of Seltishness,p.96. 
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III 
PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
I drive an old Volkswagen Beetle. To date no-one has 
contested my ownership of it, and were someone to do so I have 
the documentation to prove that it is mine. I came to own one 
of motoring's classic cars by a process of just transfer. 
Judged by weight my car is mostly steel, and steel is mainly 
iron. And iron is a naturally occurring substance. By a 
process of just transter I now own, in Beetle form, a few 
hundredweight of a naturally occurring resource. The dealer 
from whom I purchased the car owned that iron before me, and 
at some time before him the iron was the property of 
Volkswagen. Ultimately, the iron in my car must have been 
owned, qua natural substance, by someone for the first time. 
Someone must have had an original title to that iron. All 
property 'eventually traces its existence (as property) to 
appropriations of previously unowned goods'. 1 Libertarians, 
all following Locke in embracing appropriation through 
labouring, cast original title in the central role. If it is 
known that A originally appropriated resource r and justly 
transferred it to B, who in turn justly transferred it to C, 
then r is C's. If r is possessed by z then we know z has r 
illegitimately. Similarly, if c has r from B, and B from A, 
and we know A unjustly had r (he stole it from Z, say) then we 
know that Cis not entitled tor (Z is). 2 The actual history 
of ownership is of paramount importance. 
Too important some may think. The vagaries of history can 
have an impoverished peasant living alongside the Sultan of 
Brunei. Good fortune for the Sultan (who is royalty as well as 
wealthy) but what of other political values - desert, say? The 
1 SchDidtz, 'When is Original Appropriation Required?' ,p.504. 
2 Nozick, Anarcby, State, and Utopia,p.151. All libertarians think a transfer unjust if one of the parties to it has 
no right to what is transferred. Orthodox libertarians impose the additional constraint that the transfer be free or 
voluntary. 
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Sultan does not deserve his good fortune any more than his 
peasant neighbour deserves to be indigent. Not wishing to be 
drawn on such matters any more than I will be in defending 
Lockean libertarianism, a sympathetic though sceptical party 
might maintain that the principle of just initial 
appropriation definitive of contemporary libertarianism's 
stance on property is today a dead letter. That we need to 
know the history of property from initial appropriation to the 
present day to know if current holdings are just dooms us to 
wholesale ignorance. The actual history of ownership is 
irrevocably lost to us. More than that, the flux of fortune 
gives us reason to think the current distribution more likely 
unjust than just. 
I have two counter-claims to make against this observation, 
and a general protest to lodge. Before them let me say that I 
do not deny that our ignorance of the history of property -
where we are ignorant3 - is a problem for libertarianism, and 
not one to be underestimated. To believe that all holdings 
here and now are unjust is as false as it is to think them all 
just. Failing any more creditable practical alternative 
something akin to a statute of limitations on transfers may be 
the best that can be done. 4 The protest is only this: for good 
theoretical reasons, and if only for theoretical reasons, an 
account of original appropriation is in order. 
The first counter-claim is that our ignorance of the 
history of property is not universal. Some or all of the 
property some persons hold is, by the lights of the 
libertarians' historical theory, without a doubt theirs, and 
we are in a position to know this. The second and more 
important counter-claim is that not all naturally situated 
resources or objects are even now owned. Many are there for 
the appropriating: tracts of Antarctica; undiscovered 
reservoirs of oil and deposits of minerals; fish in 
3 See Lepage, TomorrO!f, Capitalisl,pp.45-60 for a history of the develop11ent of property in lledieval Europe, the upshot 
of which is that 'Personal property was not first perpetrated by a privileged class through extortion or plunder': 
ibid,p.46. 
4 Rothbard addresses this issue in his 'Justice and Property Rights' ,pp.l15-21. 
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international waters; water in the atmosphere. Who is to own 
an iceberg ·towed to Los Angeles? These are all kinds of 
tangible property not different in kind from Locke's apples 
and turfs. More significant is intangible property, as 
exemplified in 'patents, copyrights, trademarks, commom-law 
trade secrets, and the vastly important domain of financial 
assets such as stocks and bonds.'5 Intangible property is the 
product of mental labour. Who is to own a work of fiction? 
That the only way to appropriate is through mixing labour, and 
that this is sufficient for original ownership, is not 
obviously absurd. Or so it seems to me and has to others. To 
believe this is to believe that a utilitarian justification of 
property, though desirable, is not necessary, and that the 
labour theory cuts through other possible justifications, such 
as first possession, equal division and division by lot. 
A foundational right is a right a person has qua 
hypothetical contractor. Any right directly generated by the 
contractarian method, or entailed by a rule directly generated 
by that method, is foundational. It is a right persons have 
qua rational contractors. A derivative right is a right 
generated by persons engaging in specific actions or 
transactions that are the grounds of those rights, where those 
actions or transactions do not violate any foundational 
rights. I need not return to you as promised the money I 
borrowed if you had stolen it. I should instead return it to 
the rightful owner . . Where all have the enforceable right to 
equal social liberty . and welfare, not everyone has the right 
to drive my Beetle; only those who have transacted with me to 
drive it may do so. 
Whilst acknowledging in the introductory chapter that 
meeting Lockean rights alters any distributional matrix 
effected in their absence, the distribution is changed to the 
point where satisfying a positive right to welfare through 
redistribution is offset by no overall decrease in the number 
5 Child, 'The Moral Basis of Intangible Property' ,p.587. 
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of ~he same rights satisfied. Still, this does not affect the 
issue of both the right to equal social liberty and to welfare 
being equally foundational. What differentiates them is their 
being different kinds of rights, particularly that the right 
to welfare, as a positive right, lays claim to finite 
resources. 
Furthermore, from the principle of equal social liberty but 
not from the right to welfare, numerous other rights can be 
derived. Rational contractors are duty-bound to abide by the 
principle and the right to welfare, and each has the right 
that all do so abide. Whatever I cannot do to you without 
dereliction of the duty I have to respect your liberty and 
right to welfare you have the right that I not do. The right 
to welfare is violated when someone refuses to redistribute, 
or refuses to allow redistribution to meet a bona fide claim. 
The stipulation that persons be left well alone has more 
ramifications. Specifically, it generates as entailments other 
foundational rights. What cannot another do to me without 
violating my right to liberty? I cannot be killed, so I have 
the right to life. This right is not the same as that to 
welfare because the two rights require for their fulfilment 
different things of us. When in conditions of great scarcity, 
that the positive right to welfare cannot be fulfilled does 
not mean that the negative right to life can be violated. That 
you are starving to death does not justify my killing you. 
I cannot be confined, so I have the right to free movement. 
Nor can I be silenced, so I have the right to speak freely. 
The right to free movement and speech entail freedom of 
religion and association. 6 More pertinently, the liberty the 
principle secures for me means that I cannot be prevented from 
de facto mixing my labour with resources. If I want to move 
this stone three metres to the right then I am free to. This 
freedom is the first pillar in the argument for the labour 
theory of appropriation. Without the freedom to act on 
resources the labour theory is a non-starter. And if I am to 
6 For a more complete list see Spencer, The Principle of Ethics Vol.II,pp.64-147. 
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have this freedom resources must be naturally 'unowned': no-
one must have a moral claim against me that I refrain from 
acting on them. This claim may be pressed in either or both of 
two ways. The tenet that resources are naturally unowned may 
be challenged, or it may be maintained that, though unowned, 
acting on these resources will involve violating someone's 
right of equal freedom. One person can only act on resources 
to the de facto exclusion of others. My moving the stone three 
metres to the right excludes your moving it to the left, and 
this violates your right to social freedom. 
Neither objection is exactly compelling. That acting on 
resources excludes others is true, but it proves too much. It 
would put a total bar to action. We would all have no option 
but to sit still and starve. Anyway, the principle of equal 
social liberty is restricted to precluding only unjustified, 
deliberate interference and the majority of actions are not 
interferences, at least not deliberate interferences. The 
principle distinguishes between, and judges differently, 
states of affairs caused as the unforeseen and unintended 
consequence of deliberate action and those foreseen and 
brought about intentionally. 
The challenge to the no-ownership condition is no more 
forceful. Do pre-existing moral claims prevent me from 
unilaterally appropriating? Alan Gibbard supposes everyone has 
equal rights to use all things. 7 Should we accept this 
supposition? I think not, unless Gibbard is taken - as he is 
not to be - as reaffirming Hobbes's right to everything. Pre-
morally there are no moral claims at all, and if the moral 
claim preventing unilateral appropriation is not the product 
of the contract it is no moral claim at all. The first 
obstacle to developing the labour theory of appropriation and 
meeting Spencer's challenge is surmounted. 
Tangible property is derived from natural resources, and if 
the former is ownable so too is the latter, ownable ultimately 
qua natural resources. Persons can come into property by 
7 Gibbard, 'Natural Property Rights',p. 78. 
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mixing their labour with naturally situated resources, that is 
resources in their unowned condition. This is not circular. 
'Unowned' is defined by the absence of moral claims and not 
the absence of mingled labour. Mixing labour is the way rights 
are cast in or over unowned resources. The labour theory of 
appropriation is definitionally restricted to justifying 
property acquired in this way. What Locke and the libertarians 
who follow him do is use labouring to bridge the divide 
between proper ty as mere possession and property as justified 
possession. As has been seen with the Lockean syllogism, a man 
mixes his self-owned labour with naturally situated objects 
and thereby annexes them to his person, and their annexation 
by labour signals their removal from the unowned condition. 
The labour theory of appropriation is not unproblematic. Some 
of the difficulties were mentioned in the opening chapter. The 
task for libertarianism is to meet Spencer's challenge, to 
show how the fact that a person mixes his labour with a 
resource gives him a right in it. 
Rolf Sartorius rejects the need for libertarians to provide 
an account as to how labouring grounds title. His reason is 
that 'the notion seems to be superfluous, for Locke's theory 
assumes that one's ownership of one's labour is established by 
one's being in possession of, and thus in ownership of, 
oneself. If possession is sufficient to establish self-
ownership, why shouldn't it be sufficient to establish 
ownership of external things as well?' 8 
Two problems arise for Sartorius and any who would follow 
him. Firstly, it brings one straight up against Crawford 
MacPherson's distinction between property as mere possession 
and property as justified institution. Libertarians want their 
defence of private property rights read as the defence of a 
justified institution, and this Sartorius would appear to 
disallow, for he cannot help himself to pre- and post-
justification senses of possess. Secondly, his rejection of 
the need for an argument bridging labour and entitlement 
8 Sartorius, 'Persons and Property' ,p.204. 
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repeats the mistake made by Rothbard, and perhaps Locke, 
namely confusing ruling or controlling with owning. Evidently, 
they are not the same. Generals and traffic police control but 
they can hardly be said to own the soldiers in the armies or 
the vehicles on the road. 
Resources and naturally situated objects and manufactured 
items are possessible independently of any justificatory 
theory that sanctions this or that distribution. In the times 
of robber barons property was distributed in a way that no 
theory of distribution legitimated. The barons had as a 
consequence of their robbing, and the peasants had not for 
they wer e robbed. Thus it is - and undoubtedly has been by the 
lights of libertarianism's distributive theory - that a person 
may have no claim to something he possesses, may have a duty 
not to possess that something, yet nonetheless possess it. 
Possession, it might be said, is a physical relation, whereas 
ownership is a normative relation. Ergo, possession is not the 
same as ownership. Witness the case of the robber barons. We 
can shift back and forth between justified and unjustified 
senses of possess just as we do with kill, i.e. between murder 
and killing in self-defence. For instance, if I steal your car 
I certainly possess it. I might say, smugly, 'I stole it and 
now it is mine.' You may retort: 'It is not yours because you 
stole it.' Both statements are true (at least neither is 
false), though in different senses. There is an equivocation 
over 'possess' and its cognates here. It is mine because I 
have stolen it and yet it is not mine because stolen. But of 
this there can be no doubt: theft does not confer but 
presupposes ownership. Hence, once more, the incoherence of 
Proudhon, who takes up the equivocation whilst simultaneously 
denying it. 
But what is it that accounts for the distinction between 
property as possession and property as right or justified 
possession? MacPherson takes enforceability to mark the 
distinction between property and what he calls 'mere momentary 
possession', where the former is an enforceable claim and the 
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latter not. 9 Property rights come about when a distinction is 
made between property and possession. Property is an 
enforceable claim, logically and historically, and, says 
MacPherson, the force necessary to guarantee the institution 
of property rights has been perennially justified either on 
the grounds that it is necessary to human fulfilment or that 
it is a natural right. 10 This does not mean the existing set of 
rights is necessarily endorsed. Theorists have 'often argued 
that the existing set of rights (enforceable claims) is not 
morally right, and that a different set of rights should be 
installed. In doing so they are simply arguing that a 
different set of claims ought to be made enforceable: they are 
not questioning that property consists of enforceable 
claims.' 11 MacPherson holds that only three propositions are 
true of property as such: that it is a right and not a thing, 
that it is an individual right, and that it is an enforceable 
claim created by the state .12 
Libertarians would happily agree to the first two 
propositions and to the enforceability of property rights. 
They would bitterly oppose any suggestion that property rights 
are state-created, or that they are institutional creations in 
any way at all. Most write in a manner indicating that the 
state post-dates society, that the state is instituted or 
evolves as a response to predations upon persons' lives, 
liberties and property. That the state is instituted is 
standard social contract theory, the evolved picture is 
Nozick's. Historical truth or not, they are making the point 
that property rights are conceptually prior to and justified 
independently of any method or institution of enforcement. 
One possible way of justifying the labour theory of 
appropriation might be to hold that any action sanctioned by a 
9 MacPherson, 'The Meaning of Property',p.3. 'Enforceable' as used here falls on the post-justificatory side of the wielding 
of force. Robber barons could and did enforce. Max stirner bettered Hobbes and denied the distinction in toto as only an 
outright egoist could. 'I derive all right and all warrant froD 11e; I aD entitled to everything that I have inDY 
power'. 'This is egoistic right: it is right for me, therefore it is right': The Ego and Its cwn,pp.l89&191. 
10 MacPherson, 'The Meaning of Property' ,p.3. 
11 b'd 3 I 1 . ,p •.
12 MacPherson, 'Liberal Deaocracy and Property',p.202. 
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moral-political theory that accords persons the status of 
f ree, rational agents permitted to voluntarily engage in all 
forms of activity and all types of relations not prohibited by 
the rights of others is ipso facto justified. Labouring with 
unowned resources and making them one's own is like this and 
hence is justified. Such might be a Millian liberal's stance. 
Sartorius takes this line, but sees it as sufficient to give 
title only to the 'value-added-on product of one's labors' and 
not in resources themselves that were originally common. 13 
Though in agreement, libertarians are unlikely to be 
satisfied, wanting as they do rights to the resources 
themselves and not only the value-added-on product. If this is 
all the Millian liberal could show it would not be enough. If 
it could show that by labouring one acquired a property in 
resources then well and good. Still, we would want to know how 
labouring establishes title, and so meet Spencer's challenge. 
The libertarian's desire seems understandable enough. If I 
cannot own a natural resource as such what do I own when I own 
a Beetle, for example? The right to use and dispose of it, the 
car, but not the iron it is largely made of? And what of the 
petrol in the tank which is irretrievably lost to the world as 
it is burned in the engine? If it is not mine to burn it is 
not obvious I am permitted to burn it. But if I am permitted 
to then someone, at some time, must have been permitted to 
pump the oil from beneath the land. If I do own the petrol-
refined-from-oil then someone must have owned the oil. 
In arguing in favour of the position that individuals or 
groups of individuals acting in concert may rightfully 
appropriate in the absence of social consent, I will avoid 
talk of self-ownership that has proved so popular with 
libertarians (and serves them so equivocally). I believe that 
I can get to muc~ the same substantive conclusion, to wit, 
that persons have a moral right to private property, without 
recourse to the device that persons own themselves. Besides 
13 Sartorius, 'Persons and Property',p.204. Sartorius takes the Huaean view that whichever systea of initial division works 
10st efficiently is the right one. 
67 
which, the right to be left well alone is the functional 
equivalent of the self-ownership precept~ The inviolability of 
persons (really, persons' bodies) is thus preserved. 
The labour theory of appropriation provides a defence of 
original title in natural resources themselves. The right to 
property acquired through labouring is a derivative prima 
facie right. That it is derivative, i.e. the product of 
specific actions or transactions which can be rightfully 
performed, entails that property can be unilaterally 
appropriated, say by Crusoe, which in turn implies that the 
right to property is a right to private property. The defence 
of property must be a defence of original appropriation as 
well as of transfer if libertarianism is to be theoretically 
credible. Nothing less would satisfy its historical theory of 
distributive justice. Without an explanation as to how mixing 
labour gives a person a right to a previously unowned resource 
there can be no compelling reason to accept the libertarian 
contention that it does, and thus no rebuttal of Spencer's 
challenge. Nor rebuttal of Sartorius's view that one cannot 
acquire resources themselves. The labour theory of 
appropriation has to show why and how in labouring I make the 
unowned mine, and why it is mine by right. 
Locke does not provide a definition of 'labouring', though 
his examples are indicative as well as commonsensical. They 
range from picking and gathering to breaking and felling, 14 
from the simple and easy to the more skilled and strenuous. 
A more or less workable criterion would be useful, for 
instance in demarcating the extent of appropriation. Locke 
thinks labour as the principium individuationis of right title 
leaves no doubt as to the largeness of possession, 15 but he 
seems to be relying more on intuition than anything more fine 
grained. Appropriation is acquisition from nature. To acquire 
from nature is to purposefully move, alter, transform, 
consume, etc., naturally situated resources. These actions are 
14 Locke, Second Treatise,pp.134&142. 
15 b'd I 1 .,p.146. 
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all ways of labouring with something in the act of using it or 
to make it useful. They are not exhaustive, only indicative. 
Using something involves incorporating it into purposeful 
activity, which may be done without labouring with that 
something, as happens when a mariner navigates by the stars. 
No-one has (yet) a property in the stars. When something is 
moved, altered, etc., in order that it be incorporated into 
purposeful activity then that something is appropriated. These 
activities are individually sufficient for appropriation, e.g. 
moving a stone three metres to the right makes it mine; 
altering the phenomenal properties of it by painting it yellow 
makes the stone my property. 
Labouring i s a bodily movement, or aggregate of bodily 
movements, directed towards unowned resources an agent 
performs in order to satisfy his purpose in acting. This does 
not mean there has to be a description 'acquiring a property 
in resource r' under which his labouring is intentional, only 
- less demandingly - that he labour with unowned resources and 
that there is some description under which his labouring is 
intentional. A man who intentionally staves off hunger pangs 
by trapping and eating a deer acquires a property in it. 
Locke's examples go through on this account. On Karl 
Olivecrona's they may not. Olivecrona holds that when one 
mixes one's labour one tends to do so with the intention of 
keeping. the object for oneself, and says that 'Picking up an 
acorn with the intention of keeping it for oneself must have 
been sufficient to make it one's own'.~ On the account I give, 
the labourer need not have had this self-centred intention, 
but only some or other intentional attitude towards the acorn 
which his labouring satisfies, e.g. picking it up to pass to 
the squirrel. A man appropriates only so much of naturally 
situated objects as he purposefully moves, alters, etc. This 
is why the proto-Inuit who first crosses the land bridge into 
Alaska does not get title to the whole of North America, 17 nor 
16 Olivecrona, 'Locke's Theory of Appropriation',p.227. 
17 Narveson, Tbe Libertarian Idea,p.85. 
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Neil Armstrong to the moon by walking on it. Neither does a 
man have a right to resources beneath the land he owns just 
because he owns the land above them , 18 nor does he make an 
ocean his by stirring water at the shore. 19 I do not want to 
say categorically that there are no problem or borderline 
cases. It does nonetheless seem that the majority of cases can 
be accommodated. 20 
The right to property is a prima facie right because all 
rights are, and because it is overridden by the foundational 
right to welfare. A foundational right trumps a derivative 
right, and the avoidance of moral catastrophe trumps 
foundational and derivative rights. The right to appropriate 
can, though it need not of necessity, be unilaterally 
exercised. The rule Quieta Non Movere a l l ows that a person be 
left so well alone as to be removed from all contact with 
others and yet he should still have property rights. Chapter V 
of the Second Treatise is devoted to showing just this. It 
represents Locke's quest to avoid a positivist or consensual 
theory of property. 21 Libertarians would allow that were 
persons to find themselves solitary they could, and would if 
they laboured, have property rights in resources. Crusoe can 
have property rights over things on the island in virtue of 
facts about what Crusoe has done. If his property is of easy 
change he may take back to England as much as he chooses. Just 
as the colour of one's eyes does not change when one re-enters 
civil society after many years in the wilderness, neither does 
one's relation to one's possessions. What is important is that 
the right to property is the kind of right that is logically 
or conceptually distinct from conventional or positive rights, 
that is from the kinds of rights that are not held 
independently of institutional arrangements. Finally, that 
18 Gauthier, lforals by Agree.~~ent, p. 279. 
19 Lyons, 'The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land',p.361. 
20 Becker thinks the issue by and large unproblematic. 'The extent of the land (or whatever) with which one's labor wmixes• 
is ••• quite naturally defined by the purposes for which one labors': 'The Labor Theory of Property Acquisition',p.654. 
21 The impossibility of getting universal consent made plain to Locke the absurdity of this position: 'If such a consent as 
that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.': Second Treatise,p.135. 
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property rights are private rights follows from their being 
unilaterally exercisable. Collective appropriation and 
ownership is frequently necessary, but it is not logically 
basic. Collective ownership arises where numerous individual 
rights consensually dovetail. If individuals do not have the 
right to unilaterally appropriate then couples, families, 
tribes or nations do not. Each must have a right to resources 
if collectively a group has a right to divide them in any way 
at all. Any individual not party to a collective venture has 
the same rights against the collective as the collective has 
against him. There are no new, emergent rights at the group 
level. 
The right to equal social freedom is the jumping-off point 
for the labour theory of appropriation. On the construal of 
the theory provided, it makes sense of Locke's fundamentally 
sound insight that property is an extension of the self (the 
morally safeguarded self, that is) and shows how property 
acquired is held as a matter of private right. Appropriation 
makes a moral difference. '[T]he appropriator', says Jeremy 
Waldron, 'acquires rights and powers, and everyone else 
duties, that they did not have before. So something that has 
been done must have made a big moral difference. What and 
how?' 22 Labouring is what makes the difference. How it does I 
go on to show. 
Samual Wheeler, arguing that private property rights are 
extensions of our bodies, arrives at a conclusion similar to 
the one I do. (His motivation is also similar, namely to 
provide a justification of property rights lacking in Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia. 23 ) Beginning with the natural right to move 
and use our bodies as we please, Wheeler wants to show how 
private property rights are extensions of this right. The 
right to move and use our bodies is a right we have 
independently of the contingent ways we stand to our bodies, 
and that our acquired property does not stand to us in any of 
22 Waldron, The Right to Private Property,p.l72. 
23 Wheeler, 'Natural Property Rights as Body Rights',p.l72. 
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the ways our bodies do is morally irrelevant. These irrelevant 
contingencies are the relative quality or efficacy of our 
bodies; the difficulty of removal and transfer of parts of our 
bodies, and, related to this, the nature of our bodies' 
material composition; attachment, sensation and agent-type 
control; and body surpluses. 24 Demonstrating that each of these 
is morally irrelevant is a valuable contribution in its own 
right for it helps clear intuitive obstacles to conceiving of 
property in things as someway an extension of one's self or 
body. For instance, stealing my attached flesh and blood leg 
may impair my efficacy more, and may be more difficult, than 
stealing my non-attached paper money, but what of it? If leg-
stealing was less difficult than picking pockets would that 
make a moral difference? Making it clear that these 
contingencies are morally irrelevant is preliminary to 
Wheeler's project of providing a justification of private 
property rights. He does not, however, deliver. 
Wheeler's argument commences with the right to move and use 
our body. This depends on a more basic right which entails it. 
What right is that? Ultimately, the right to exist. For this 
right Wheeler does not argue. Instead there is a shift from 
the conditional 'If persons have' to the categorical 'Persons 
do have'. 'If we have a right to exist, then we have a right 
not to have our agenthood terminated ... if we have a right 
not to have our agenthood terminated, then we must have a 
right to the exclusive use and movement of our bodies, natural 
and extended. '25 Shortly thereafter the shift is made. 'Since a 
person does have a right to be an agent ... a person has 
exclusive rights to all of his body. t26 And since your property 
is your body,n a person has exclusive rights to his property, 
his artificial body parts. Having in the previous chapter 
justified a right to the exclusive use of our bodies we can 
24 b'd I 1 .,pp.173-9. 
25 Ibid. ,p.l87 (emphasis added). 
26 Ibid.,p.l88 (emphasis added). 
27 b'd I 1 . ,p.184. 
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grant Wheeler his shift. It now has to be shown that property 
is, is an extension of, one's body or self. 
A deliberately imposed constraint on my body constitutes a 
violation of my right to liberty. My body is the vehicle of my 
agency, and its freedom from constraint is necessary to my 
effecting what it is I purpose to do. If Princip is to shoot 
the Archduke it is necessary that he raise his arm, contract 
his trigger-finger, and so on. I have to act similarly to move 
the stone three metres to the right. It is not permissible for 
someone to deliberately interfere by constraining my body. 
(Something frustrating my actions would constitute a lack of 
freedom in the broad sense. This is not of any concern here.) 
The principle of equal social liberty stipulates that no-one 
may purposefully restrict a person's liberty to do what is 
permissible, for to do so will violate his right to do as he 
pleases. It would be to not leave him well alone. 
How this connects with the labour theory of appropriation 
can now be developed. If resources in their virgin state are 
unowned, then by the principle of equal social liberty a man 
is free to mix his labour with them. A man is free to dive for 
a pearl, spear a fish, catch a pail of rainwater. I think this 
uncontroversially true. Labouring is an action the conditions 
of satisfaction of which involve the doing of certain things 
with one's body. The permissibility of my acting so as to 
move, alter, etc., resource r entails that this is not wrong. 
It is not wrong for me to move, alter, etc., rand it is wrong 
for someone to interfere with my acting on r. I am free, in a 
moral sense, to dive for pearls and no-one is free to prevent 
me. From the fact that I was free to dive for them it follows 
- so the labour theorist wants to maintain - that I have 
acquired a property right in the pearls. The libertarian, like 
Locke, says that by virtue of mixing his labour (diving, 
spearing, catching28 ) with resources a man appropriates them, 
makes them his property, from which he may exclude others. 
Clearly, this is a further step: labouring is not the same as 
28 These are actions which involve the aovinq, altering, transforainq, consuainq, etc., of resources. 
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appropriating. Spencer's challenge points to this. To say with 
Rothbard that by virtue of mixing his labour a man 'has 
naturally converted the land and its fruits into his property 
Any man's property is ipso facto what he produces, i.e. 
what he transforms into use by his own effort' , 29 is patently 
inadequate and scant more than to pretend 'labouring' and 
'appropriating' are synonyms. 
Can the performing of a morally permissible action provide 
libertarianism with the private property rights it needs? How 
does my moving, altering, etc., resources when incorporati ng 
them into my purposeful activity grant me a property in them? 
If I have not wrongfully removed r from its natural state, how 
does my not wrongfully removing it bring it about that r 
becomes my property? 
1. Persons have two foundational moral rights: the one to 
social liberty equal to the social liberty of one's fellows, 
and the other to welfare. 
2. The foundational right to liberty establishes a domain of 
permissible action, i.e. actions the rights of others do not 
preclude our performing. 
3. A permissible action is one a person has a right to perform 
and everyone else a duty not to deliberately prevent him from 
performing. 
4. A person is free to move, alter, etc., his body as he 
purposes, providing he respects the principle of equal social 
liberty. 
5. In moving, altering, etc., resources a person pursues his 
purposes in acting. 
6. Resources in their natural condition are unowned; no-one 
has any ab initio claim to them. 
7. In the absence of ab initio claims to resources a person 
has the right to move, alter, etc., naturally situated objects 
and everyone else has the duty not to deliberately prevent 
him. 
29 Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty,p.33. 
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8. In incorporating resources into purposeful activity a 
person is to be left well alone, as he is to be left alone in 
moving, altering, etc., his body. 
9. By parity of reasoning with 7 and 8, a person has a right 
to those resources he incorporates into his purposeful 
activity, and regarding these resources is to be left well 
alone. 
10. Therefore: a person has a right (an enforceable claim) to 
those resources he labours with (moves, alters, etc.) in 
accordance with his purposes. 
I have the right to move my body, and by parity of 
reasoning, in the absence of countervailing reasons I have the 
right to move, alter, etc., things in the world. This answers 
Spencer's challenge: why should a man have private, exclusive 
rights in the things he has mixed his labour with? Because he 
has a private, exclusive right to his body which he moves, 
alters, etc., and by parity of reasoning a right to things 
beyond the bounds of his body he has through labouring 
incorporated into his purposeful activity. The spirit of 
contractarianism is to grant rights to persons to pursue their 
purposes and, resources being usually required for this, 
grants a right to them also. 
The permissibility of labouring marks the right to 
appropriate as a Hohfeldian liberty-right. To have a liberty-
right to x is to not be under an obligation to not x. It seems 
plain that I am at liberty to mix my labour with unowned 
resources. Equally obviously on Hohfeld's rubric, a person's 
right in property justly acquired is a claim-right. That I 
have a claim-right to resource r entails respondents have a 
correlative duty either to let me have r or to give me r, 
depending on whether that right is a negative or positive 
right. Basically, negative rights enjoin respondents to 
forebear from acting in ways that violate these rights, whilst 
positive rights enjoin respondents to perform actions that 
stand to the rights as their fulfilment. 
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In incorporating resources into my purposeful activity I 
have to move my body. My purpose, I have said, need not be to 
acquire. If I inadvertently trample some strawberries when in 
pursuit of a deer I have not incorporated them into my 
purposes and so do not have a property in their pulped 
remains. I appropriate a resource providing I have some 
intentional attitude towards that resource and act upon it. 
Intentionality is the requisite link morally connecting a 
person's labouring and his coming to own, explaining how it is 
that he 'extends' or 'injects' or 'invests' 30 his self or 
personality into resources. It is the bridge connecting 
labouring with entitlement, the device through which resources 
are annexed to the already morally safeguarded self. 
This may all seem a little quick, but remember the 
background against which the labour theory has been set. 
Moving my body is something I have a right to do, not because 
it is my body, that I own it, but because it is necessary for 
the satisfaction of my preferences. The conditions of 
satisfaction usually also include the world's being, remaining 
or becoming a certain way. Princip does not want only to 
contract his finger, he wants to kill the Archduke. If it is 
permissible for me to move my body, so too, by parity of 
reasoning, must it be permissible for me to move external 
things in the absence of countervailing reasons. There are no 
such reasons. There are no ab initio claims to things which 
preclude my unilaterally acting on them. Neither does my 
acting on them violate anyone's rights. The moral right I have 
to my body spills over into the world beyond my fingertips. 
There is nothing irresolvably mysterious about construing 
property as an extension of the self. That property in things 
can be a non-contiguous part or extension of one's body in 
this morally significant way can be illustrated. 
30 Nozick talks of labour 'permeating' the unowned: Anarchy, State, and Utopia,p.174; Olivecrona of labour 'infusing 
one's personality' into unowned resources: 'Locke's Theory of Appropriation',p.226; Wheeler's choice is 'incorporation' : 
'Natural Property Rights as Body Rights',pp.184-185. 
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Long John Silver has a wooden leg. He has a wooden leg 
where you and I have a flesh and blood one. His wooden leg is 
as much under his control - and in much the same way - as your 
or my natural legs are. True, his leg does not stand 
phenomenologically to him as ours do to us, in the capacity to 
be painfully affected, for example. On the other hand, it 
suffers things our legs do not, such as woodworm and dry rot. 
To all intents and purposes Long John Silver's wooden leg is 
to him as our flesh and blood legs are to us. He walks using 
it, can balance on it and can kick with it. our legs can do 
things his wooden one cannot - test the temperature of the 
bathwater. His can do things ours cannot - be removed, sanded 
smooth and returned. As far as legs go Long John Silver 
probably has as extensive a repertoire of actions using his 
wooden leg as we have with our natural legs. There is no 
complete one-one matching or correlation of actions between 
his leg and ours but the repertoire is probably just as great. 
Are there any significant differences between his leg and 
ours? 
His leg is not natural. It is not the one he was born with, 
nor is it comprised of the usual messy substance. His leg is 
detachable where ours are not. Naturalness, though, makes no 
moral difference.31 To believe that it does is to make the 
mistake of supposing that the intrinsic nature of a thing is 
not independent of the manner of its genesis. That this is an 
error goes some way to showing that property, though quite 
different to a person's body in its origin and substance, can 
be on a moral par with someone's body. Neither does it make a 
moral difference that Long John Silver's leg, like property, 
is detachable, and replaceable. Kidneys, hearts and teeth are 
too, and it is a strong thesis that maintains that these are 
not morally protected. Though I do not own my body I have a 
right that it be free from interference. Even if you take a 
kidney from me whilst I sleep and without my knowing, you 
nonetheless aggress against me for you violate my moral right 
31 Wheeler, 'Natural Property Rights as Body Rights' ,p.175. 
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to be left well alone. If spare kidneys fell out periodically 
like teeth things might be different. Take the parallel case 
with property in things. If you take something of mine without 
my consent and without my knowledge you have stolen from me. 
I do not have to miss what you take to make your action theft. 
The kidneys in this body are mine to dispose of. And what is 
true of my kidneys is true of Long John Silver's wooden leg. 
We can go from kidneys to prosthetic limbs to motor vehicles. 
All can be incorporated into morally sanctioned purposeful 
activity. Indeed, familiarly, they are. 
Long John Silver's wooden leg, though in different ways, is 
as much a part of him as your and my legs are part of us. 
Accordingly, he has a moral right to his leg. Long John 
Silver's wooden leg illustrates how this relation between a 
person and property in external things can be understood. My 
car, my savings, the shirt on my back, a r e all related to me 
in ways analogous to the way that Silver's leg is related to 
him. Accordingly, I have a moral right to them. And this is a 
property right, a non-natural addition to my body or self 
protected by the moral right I have to that body or self. 
As with appropriation, so with holding property. The labour 
theory is a justification of the right persons have to make 
unowned resources theirs and of their right as owners to hold 
them. Ownership is an enforceable claim to exclude others from 
what one has acquired. Where interfering with permissible 
appropriation is wrong, so too is interfering in the holding 
or disposing of property. Because property is an extension of 
the body - in a moral sense - it would be as much wrong to 
frustrate my keeping or alienating my property as it would be 
to interfere in my acting in order to come into property i n 
the first place. The right to continued use follows from the 
right to incorporate into purposeful activity. Once I have 
established a right in resource r then I retain exclusive 
control of r until such time as I alienate it (defeasibility 
conditions excepted). Alienating r can be thought of as 
excluding it from any purposeful activity of mine. There is no 
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morally significant difference between a person's labouring to 
acquire unowned resources and his holding them. Typically, we 
continue to use our property. It is caught up in ongoing 
purposeful activity. Something ready-to-hand to use in doing 
something, though not at the moment being acted upon, is 
deemed to be in use, e.g. money in the bank. I cite the 
paradigm case, i.e. the case where the person intends to 
appropriate. Any non-episodic or dispositional attitude an 
owner has to his property is sufficient to keep it his, to the 
exclusion of others. Alienating property is of course subject 
to the constraints the rights of others impose on our freedom 
of action. I cannot dispose of my ammunition by shooting it 
into you - unless you are Gary Gilmore and I am in your firing 
squad. 
Sundering resources from purposeful activity explains 
transfer. I appropriate resource r by incorporating it into my 
ongoing purposeful activity. I freely transfer r to you by 
choosing to let your purposes determine what shall or shall 
not be done with r. I cede my exclusive control, gratis or for 
a price. What signifies transfer is settled by appeal to 
convention. Testaments are conventional indicators of 
transfer, as is signing cheques, tipping porters, presenting 
gifts and popping coins into charities' boxes and beggars' 
bowls. 
The moral status of one's body parts is different from, 
though functionally equivalent to, the moral status of 
acquired property. If you do own your body it is not in the 
same way you do your shirt. Whilst ownership of our bodies may 
be possible - maybe we just do own our bodies - self-ownership 
is not required to explain how we have rights over our bodies. 
I touched on this earlier. You do have the moral right to be 
free and this gives your body parts their moral, in effect 
proprietal, status. Because we are duty-bound to refrain from 
interfering we are obliged to leave each other's bodies well 
alone; to treat your body or body parts as a natural resource 
open to appropriation would be to aggress against you. We are 
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obliged to leave body parts where they fall. The arbitrary 
natural distribution of bodies and body parts is accordingly 
enforceable. One cannot take one of Smith's good eyes to give 
to blind Jones. 
So much, then, are the essentials of the labour theory of 
appropriation on the construal I give it. Including the 
holding of property may appear unnecessary. After all, it is a 
very strange right to property that grants it in acquisition 
but is silent on the issue of term. All I have wanted to show 
is that the theory itself is silent about limits of term. It 
justifies continued holding on the same grounds it does 
appropriation, and no upper bounds to acquisition have been 
touted. No consideration internal to the theory points to such 
limits. There is a limit of term all the same, i.e. the right 
to welfare, but external to the labour theory. It is as though 
the labour theory of appropriation legitimates a rectilinear 




PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC WELFARE 
Rights, Mill notes, 1 are something one ought to be 
protected in the possession of. We do not need to know if 
libertarian rights are defeasible or not to know that property 
rights should not be violated. This is just what it is to have 
a right. Rights are moral devices that put blocks upon some 
actions, 2 and that means that these actions ought not to be 
performed, and that means in turn that the rights blocking 
these actions ought not to be violated. This is definitionally 
true and follows simply from the concept of a right. Whether 
there are any rights that are absolute is a distinct, though 
connected, question. I am inclined to think there are not. All 
rights are, in the final analysis, defeasible. There is not 
and cannot be any right such that we ought to respect it no 
matter what the consequences of so doing are. Rights are not 
to be upheld whatever the consequences. 3 Spelling out and 
justifying the conditions of defeasibility for any right is 
not an easy task. The view that all rights have some or other 
defeasibility condition is to say something about the rights 
we have: not that they cannot be violated, for obviously they 
can and are, but that none are rights we can claim 
enforceability for in the face of any and all considerations 
about how the world will go if we do. Even the right to life 
that is an entailment of the principle of equal social 
1 Mill, Utilitarianis•,p.50. 
2 Including those that would promote the general interest: Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,p.l93. Rights are 'political 
trumps' :ibid, p. xi. 
3 See Bennett, ''Whatever the Consequences''. For a defence of absolute rights see Gewirth, 'Are There Any Absolute 
Rights?'. This is the usual form opposition between rights and consequences assUJies. Different moral theories face the 
same opposition from consequences in different forms. Anscombe maintains that we may do no evil however slight in order 
that good may come no matter how great: 'The Justice of the Present War Examined' ,p.79. smart, facing the problem of being 
unjust for the sake of maximising utility, somewhat disingenuously bites the problematic bullet on the side of absolutism. 
Hang the innocent man, says smart: 'An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics' ,p.71. 
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liberty, arguably the best candidate for absoluteness, is 
defeasible. Absolutism is not open to us. 
When they conflict, foundational rights take precedence 
over derivative rights. Property rights from approp~iation or 
voluntary transfer as derivative rights are defeated by the 
foundational right to welfare. I have said that the limit to 
this is that in fulfilling a person's right to welfare this be 
effected without causing another to press ~ same claim by 
the right he has to welfare, i.e. there should be a net 
decrease in the number of such rights to be fulfilled. 
Colloquially put, taking from Peter to give to Paul is 
warranted providing Peter is not thereby left in Paul's pre-
transfer situation. Not only would such redistribution be 
gratuitous but it would violate Peter's right in order to 
fulfil Paul's. 
The foundational rights to liber~y and welfare cannot 
conflict. Welfare conflicts with the derivative right to hold 
property, not with the right to acquire it. Each person has 
the right to perform only actions that are not prohibited by 
the rights of others, so ordinarily no-one has the right to 
either infringe someone's liberty in the name of welfare or 
infringe someone's welfare in the name of liberty. Your right 
to welfare cannot conflict with my right to liberty, only with 
my right to property. True, it leaves me unfree to dispose or 
use a portion of my property- but that is a derivative .right 
I have because I have property at all. It does not affect my 
foundational liberty .· to acquire property, nor to do anything 
else not circumscribed by the rights of others. The right to 
welfare, it might be said, puts constraints not on what 
persons may do per se but on what they may do with their 
property. And the right to do things with one's property is a 
derivative right. 
Meeting fundamental needs restricts ex post facto the 
liberty to use one's property, and hence welfare is 
conditional on the incidental production of sufficient 
property. Persons are not to be coerced in order to create a 
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surplus if the free pursuit of the satisfaction of their 
preferences will not. Surfers cannot be forced into tuna 
canneries in order earn money to give to the needy. 
I have not yet s aid anything about the content of the right 
to welfare, how extensive a right to property it actually is. 
In making the contractarian case for foundational rights the 
baseline for assent was that persons fare better in terms of 
their preferences than they envisage they would in the pre-
moral condition. Everyone ideally wishes to satisfy the named, 
dated preferences they have, but know they cannot. As with the 
outcome of the contract itself, the substantive content of the 
positive right will have to be neutral across preferences. It 
is to be expected that what can be agreed on will include the 
relatively concrete archetypal economic goods of food, shelter 
and clothing. 4 The intangibles of love, friendship, etc., are 
not goods that can be redistributed. The concreteness of these 
goods as the standard is attractive - it holds out the 
prospect of heading off interminable casuistry - and yet many 
will have strong intuitions that baulk against too narrow a 
construal of welfare. Dickensian images of working-houses and 
slum tenements are not far from mind. 
Charles Fried writes that the situation of our fellows 
supports an argument for positive rights, and that 'it is to 
the satisfaction of needs that we have a positive right'. 5 The 
concept of need is not tied to any hard and fast economic 
parameters but rather informed by our 'common humanity and the 
norms of our good functioning'. Fried lists as needs (with 
attendant positive rights) health care, education, legal 
assistance and a basic diet. 6 The problem with notions like 
common humanity are that they are no less, or only marginally 
less, vague than the idea of need. The parameters are as 
indeterminate as what they bracket. A needs-wants distinction 
shows there are some clear cases of needs and some clear 
4 Dahl & Lindblom, Politics, Econolics, and Welfare,p.l45. 
5 Fried, Right and Wrong,p.120. 
6 Ibid.,p.l20. 
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instances of wants, with much blurring between. Legal 
assistance and education are closer to wants than needs. They 
are unlikely to satisfy the neutrality condition. Health care 
directed towards the preservation and functioning of a person 
qua pursuer of preferences, and not qua pursuer of named, 
dated preferences, is a need. Intensive-care hospitalisation 
is a need, cosmetic surgery to win over one's as yet 
unrequited love is a want. 
Orthodox libertarians eschew Locke's proviso limiting the 
appropriation of natural resources. There are no limits at all 
to how much a person may acquire through appropriation and 
transfer. Nozick's position is different, and closer to 
Locke's (though not for that any more Lockean in the letter of 
what he says). Nozick maintains that acquisition is 
impermissible where it would mean a net worsening of the 
position of others, 7 e.g. as happens when one acquires all the 
water in the desert. Nozick gets round the enough and as good 
proviso by contending that even those who are not left enough 
and as good of a resource r are on balance better off than 
they otherwise would be had r remained unowned, and hence the 
proviso is not violated. Beyond this, and presumably until the 
moral catastrophe clause is invoked, Nozick would agree with 
the orthodox libertarians that all unowned resources a person 
mixes his labour with are 'his or his assigns in perpetuity'. 8 
Nozick's in-principle welfarism places restrictions, albeit 
he thinks weak ones, upon both appropriation and holding. His 
Lockean proviso limits the former, the moral catastrophe 
clause places defeasibility conditions on the latter. Lockean 
libertarianism of the kind defended here says that the only 
legitimate restrictions are upon holding. A person can 
appropriate all or the last of an important or essential 
resource, water say, but cannot exclude others dependent on 
that resource by denying them what they need of it. Those 
completely without have a right to have their fundamental 
I Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,pp. l78-82. 
8 Rothbard, lfan, Economy, and State,p.l48. 
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needs met. The propertied are obliged, i.e. duty-bound, to 
redistribute to those without on pain of moral wrongdoing. 
Where the distribution consequent to a process of repeated 
unilateral applications of labour to unowned resources has 
left some without resources or property sufficient for their 
needs, then property rights are overridden to the extent 
necessary to remedy this lack. This limit of term applies 
equally to original property and property acquired through 
transfer. Redistribution is blind to the difference. 
Any political theory that does not have as its underpinning 
a tenable moral theory is itself not tenable. Nothing is 
politically correct that is morally wrong. Any moral theory 
that did not make room, in dire circumstances, for 
consequences to be morally decisive is not a tenable theory. 
A theory of rights such as orthodox libertarianism is 
premissed on is one such theory. Regarding property rights, 
that a few should starve in the midst of plenty seems 
inexcusable, but it has this implication. Aiding others in 
emergencies is for them an act of goodwill. Rand says that 
helping others is not a moral duty, and talks of it being 
'good' and something that a person 'may' do, never that he 
'must' or is 'obliged' to.9 In fact, one tenet the orthodox do 
adhere to suggests they do - or should if they wish to be 
consistent - recognise an obligation to ensure no-one goes 
without at least as much as his fundamental needs require. 
That they do not recognise it suggests a grave inconsistency 
in their system. They want the best of both worlds, so to 
speak, and they cannot have it. 
The inconsistency arises from their equating property 
rights with human rights. Here is what they say. Beginning 
with the indefeasible right of ownership, Rothbard (here 
acting as spokesman for the orthodox) challenges that 
'liberals' 10 force a breach in the concept of property where 
none should be, that is, when the reality or the facts of the 
9 Rand, The Virtue of Se1fishness,pp.48-9. 
10 Whoever Rothbard has in mind by 'liberals' it includes Lockean libertarians. 
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matter do not warrant such separation. So-called liberals 
conceptually distinguish two kinds of property, namely in self 
and in things, and hold them to be only contingently 
connected. Rothbard believes this to be unwarranted and 
maintains to the contrary that property in one's person and 
property in things are inseparably connected. (If the 
liberals' point is t hat one can have a property in one's 
person without having property in things then they are surely 
right.) Consequently, so his objection runs, there can be no 
justification for the forced separation of a person from his 
property, which he has a right to. 'In short, the liberal 
attempts to uphold the individual's right to the ownership of 
his own body, but the n denies his right to "property," i.e., 
to the ownership of material objects. Hence, the typical 
liberal dichotomy between "human rights," which he upholds, 
and "property rights," which he rejects. Yet the two, 
according to the libertarian, are inextricably intertwined; 
they stand or fall together.'ll 
Rothbard does have a point, and a point that I believe is 
valid. Unfortunately, the point is not one Rothbard or his 
orthodox bedfellows can make without leading them into grave 
trouble. 'Property rights are human rights', Rothbard says, 
'and are essential to the human rights which liberals attempt 
to maintain. 112 Rand is committed to the same thesis. 'Remember 
that there is no such dichotomy as "human rights" versus 
"property rights." No human rights can exist without property 
rights. 113 Hospers says very much the same .14 That property 
rights are human rights is the valid point. The right to 
welfare is accorded to all persons qua hypothetical 
contractors. For orthodox libertarians to then conclude that 
all property in self and things is absolutely, indefeasibly 
sacrosanct, and the forcing of the breach morally unwarranted, 
is manifestly inconsistent with the assertion that property 
II Rothbard, For a New Liberty,pp.43-4. 
12 Ib 'd 5 1 • ,p.4 . 
13 Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness ,p.91. 
14 Hospers, Libertarianist,p.61. 
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rights are human rights. If it is a human right then the right 
to property would be a right held by every human by virtue of 
being human. 15 And because the right to property is a human 
right all humans, who already have a property in themselves, 
would have property rights in things. But we know they do not. 
Orthodox libertarianism allows that persons may not have 
rights over things. Barring original appropriation or 
acquisition through exchange they will not. Not only have the 
two kinds of property come apart conceptually but also in 
fact. Committed to the thesis that they are not conceptually 
distinct they are yet content to allow that persons need not 
have property rights in things. This looks to me like trying 
to have the best of two incompatible worlds. It cannot work. 
To say 'Property rights are human rights' is equivalent to 
saying 'There is a human right to property'. If human rights 
are universal - and how else are they to be understood? - then 
so too would property rights be. The inference to be drawn is 
that those who do not have property in things are without in 
spite of their human right to property. One remedy for this 
morally iniquitous situation is Tedistribution. Rothbard, Rand 
and Hospers are correct to affirm of property rights and human 
rights that if they are inextricably intertwined then they 
stand or fall together. To then assert that they do stand 
together is necessarily to make a commitment to the supposedly 
unwarranted breach between the two kinds of property that 
conceptually sanction redistribution. 
Rothbard is most certainly hoist with his own petard. He 
cannot in good faith maintain (1) that persons come into 
property either by mixing their labour or through voluntary 
exchange, and (2) that property rights and human rights are 
inseparable. Witness what he writes: 'If a man has the right 
to self-ownership, to the control of his life, then in the 
real world he must also have the right to sustain his life by 
grappling with and transforming resources; he must be able to 
own the ground and the resources on which he stands and which 
15 See MacFarlane, The Theory and Practice of Huaan Rights,pp.J-6. 
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he must use. In short, to sustain his "human right" - or his 
property rights in his own person - he must also have the 
property right in the material world, in the objects which he 
produces. Property rights are human rights, and are essent i al 
to the h uman rights which liberals attempt to maintain .... In 
fact, there are no human rights that are separable from 
property rights. , 16 
Taking the first two sentences literally, a reader who did 
not know any better might take Rothbard to be unqualifiedly 
advocating a positive right to resources, including land to 
grapple with and transform, as flowing from the right to self-
ownership. His use of 'must' reinforces this impression. If 
every man owns himself then he must own resources; every man 
does own himself; ergo, every man must own resources. A man's 
not owning resources would mean that he does not own himself, 
which is to deny the major premiss that Rothbard affirms, 
namely, that every man does indeed own himself. 
Why cannot Rothbard hold (1) and (2) together? For the 
simple reason that if property rights are human rights as he 
says, then persons who have not and perhaps cannot come into 
property - either by mixing their labour or by exchange - are 
in fact without their right to self-ownership supposedly 
inseparable from the right to property in things. 
Someone may counter that I am unfairly capitalising on an 
ambivalence in the phrase 'the right to sustain his life by 
grappling with and transforming resources'. Rothbard means 
only that persons ought not to be prevented from grappling 
with and transforming resources and not that they be provided 
with them. And that this is the correct reading is clinched by 
the phrase 'the objects he produces'. Persons' property rights 
therefore extend only to what they have produced and not to 
what others have. Even if this is conceded the challenge, I 
believe, remains. Rothbard cannot be read this way on the said 
ambivalence and simultaneously cleave to the inseparability 
thesis. The separability thesis recommends the opposed 
16 Rothbard, For a New Liberty,pp.44-5. 
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reading, namely the one with the redistributive implication. 
If redistribution is chosen then taxation f or redistribution, 
it would appear, is neither theft, 17 nor 'morally obscene'. 18 
Redistribution is one remedy for those without resources. 
Charity is another. 19 Leaving a portion of resources unowned 
would be a third. If redistribution is opted for then the 
result of turning one of their favoured arguments against them 
is to usher orthodox libertarians into embracing the positive 
right to property. The upshot is that orthodox libertarianism 
contains within itself an implicit defence of a theory of 
property rights providing far stronger limits to appropriation 
and holding than its defenders recognise. I have tried to make 
this implicit argument explicit. If the argument is corre c t 
the orthodox libertarian is left with one of two choices. He 
can surrender the absoluteness of property rights and accept 
they are defeasible under the specific conditions to be 
described, or he can drop the inseparability thesis. Choosing 
the first straightway leads to a further painful choice, this 
time between redistribution and leaving enough, if not as good 
as, remaining. Obviously, redistribution is the less painful. 20 
The price paid for yielding the inseparability thesis is the 
loss of an argument for orthodox libertarian property rights. 
There is no longer an inseparable connexion between labouring 
and owning. Having laboured on something is no longer a 
guarantee of owning it. Orthodox property rights now stand in 
need of justification. Owning one's self does not assure 
ownership of things one has transformed. Assuming that 
justification to be provided is none too helpful, for any 
justification of property rights will have at least one 
consistently describable condition of defeasibility, so 
absoluteness is anyway impossible. Redistribution is very much 
17 Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty,p.l62. 
18 Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal,p.30. 
19 Charity, touted with candour as the panacea for all poverty, is not an option. Justice is at issue here and charity falls 
outside the range of the enforceable. 
20 Here is a logical reason why it is: At t 1 we leave R resources unowned. At t 2 we need llore than R. Where is the extra 
to colle froll? Leaving resources unavailable also lleans that a person who needs them would deprive others of what they 
need if he appropriated them. These others are in the same predicament. No-one may appropriate. All must starve. 
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on the cards once more. When examined, the defeasibility 
conditions for an orthodox libertarian justification of 
property rights will be seen to coincide with the contractual 
positive right: the redistribution of goods or wealth stav es 
off impending moral catastrophe. 
That the indigent have a claim upon the propertied is not 
an ad hoc appendage to orthodox libertarianism. We have seen 
that theory impl i citly follows from premisses orthodox 
libertarians explicitly accept. The same can be said of 
Nozick. Nozick is a Lockean libertarian (of the second sort) 
and thinks that he is not. There are two reasons for this 
contention. one is a reading of his principle of compensation 
and the other takes its cue from his allowing teleological 
considerations to take over from deontological morality at 
some point. A non-question-begging interpretation of moral 
catastrophe that makes the clause sufficiently precise so as 
to be workable when transposed on other facets of Nozick's 
theory is seen to work in favour of welfarism. How these 
arguments work is detailed later. 
However justified, a right to the provision of welfare is 
going to fit into the broad framework of the Lockean 
libertarian defence of property in something like the 
following way (I give the whole framework). (i) Resources in 
their natural condition are unowned. (ii) These resources are 
ownable, and (iii) are finite. (iv) They are appropriated 
through a person mixing his labour with them and may be 
acquired thereafter by process of transfer. (v} Resources are, 
trivially, appropriable in this way only under conditions of 
availability. (vi) Where all resources are appropriated the 
indigent have a right to a share of property sufficient to 
meet their fundamental needs, which right (vii) cannot be 
categorical, given the finiteness of resources, i.e. there may 
be rights to more property than there is. (viii) Given the 
finiteness of resources, either the claims are satisfiable or 
they are not satisfiable. (ix) If they are not satisfiable 
then necessarily they remain unsatisfied, but (x) if they are 
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satisfiable then they ought to be satisfied. Coercion may be 
employed to ensure this. (xi) Once satisfied, either there is 
a surplus of resources or there is not. (xii) When there is no 
surplus then necessarily (near) equality of resources 
prevails, but (xiii) if there is a surplus then either (near) 
equality is enforced or differentials are tolerated according 
to the distribution effected in (iv). (xiv) Given the 
enforceable duty to fulfil rights as the only factor 
militating against the distribution effected by justice in 
appropriation and transfer, differentials ought to be 
tolerated. Subtract (x) from (iv) and property differentials 
remain. 
Salient features of this framework germane to this chapter 
are these. A formal universality of some level of property is 
secured for all. Redistribution is justified ex post facto, 
that is after and not prior to or during appropriation (or 
exchange). Hence it is a limit of term on the holding of 
property. It does not say 'You may not appropriate', but 
instead 'You are free to appropriate but not necessarily to 
keep'. Equality or inequality is the product of the supply of 
resources and the demand for them. Labouring in the presence 
of scarcity or abundance moves the distribution towards, or 
away from, equality respectively. Abundance tends to give rise 
to wealth differentials, scarcity to work against them. 
The doctrine that human rights are inseparable from 
property rights in fact justifies what orthodox libertarians 
explicitly deny, to wit the liberal dichotomy that makes room 
for the defeasing of property rights. Recognising the 
distinction between property in self and in things opens a 
window of opportunity for spelling out the conditions of 
defeasibility. Nozick's principle of compensation and his 
catastrophe clause create similar opportunities, and ones that 
can be pressed with greater confidence. Both show that Nozick 
is in the Lockean camp. Orthodox libertarian property rights 
cannot ride piggy-back on self-ownership, but Lockean 
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libertarianism does ride shotgun with both the principle of 
compensation and the moral catastrophe clause. 
Nozick (in)famously opens Anarchy, State, and Utopia with 
the straightforward assertion that 'Individuals have rights'. 
One of these purported rights is that to private property 
justly acquired either through original appropriation or 
through just transfer. Anyone in possession outside of these 
ways possesses illegitimately. They have gotten it by force or 
fraud. Once acquired a person's property can only be alienated 
by consent. Anything but a free exchange or gift is 
impermissible. If you hot-wire and joy-ride my Beetle without 
my consent then you are stealing, either the car, period, or 
some portion of the value of the car in the event it is found 
and returned to me. Using in this sense counts as a kind of 
stealing. It certainly violates my right of exclusive control. 
This is a standard enough conception. Many libertarians 
believe that redistribution is unjust because it fails to pass 
the test for a free exchange and hence is the equivalent of 
theft, and a highly institutionalised form of theft on a grand 
scale at that. They often liken taxation to highway robbery, 
or more accurately to the activities of Robin Hood. Taxation 
is not freely consented to and so fails to satisfy the 
condition laid down for justice in transfer, the third of the 
three theses definitive of orthodox libertarianism. Why 
libertarians think this rests, then, on their understanding of 
what makes an exchange a free exchange. For them, the essence 
of a free exchange is something like this: an ~xchange E is 
free if, and only if, the parties toE could, contrary to the 
facts, have not exchanged and thus remained in the status quo 
ante. E is unfree if the parties could not, counterfactually, 
have remained in the status quo ante. I think that this is 
what libertarians have in mind when talking of free exchange. 
It fits with their rejection of the Marxian criticism of 
capitalism that it is based on the wage slavery of the 
proletariat. Where Marx thought the proletariat selling their 
labour power was not a free exchange, libertarians think that 
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it is. 'Sell or starve' is still a free exchange if the choice 
situation is the consequence of non-coercive actions. 
In simple terms, the definition says that an exchange is 
free if, and only if, it is true of the parties to it that 
they could have kept what in fact they exchanged if they had 
chosen to do so, and none of the parties to it, nor any third 
party, e.g. government, would have penalised or brought 
sanctions against A or B or both for not exchanging. If they 
could not have kept what they did in fact exchange, despite 
their wanting to, then whatever was exchanged was not freely 
exchanged. Here are some examples: 
(a) A two-party exchange: A sells his car to B. Is it true of 
this exchange that A could have kept his car and B his cash if 
either had chosen? If 'yes' then the exchange was free. 
(b) A one-party exchange, say a bequest: A leaves B a princely 
sum. Is it true of this exchange that A or B could have 
returned to the status quo ante, say by A striking B from his 
will or by B refusing to accept A's filthy lucre? If the 
answer is in the affirmative then the exchange was a free 
exchange. 
(c) Now turn to the case of taxation: 20 per cent of A's 
income is attached by the government for redistributive 
purposes. If A does freely give this money then A must be able 
to keep it for himself, or to give to others as he chooses, if 
he chooses to. Is this true of A? 'Not at all', is the 
libertarian's reply. 'A would lose the 20% for sure, and in 
all likelihood more besides, in the form of a fine or prison 
term. Try withholding your taxes and see what happens.' 
So the libertarian concludes taxation is not a f ree 
exchange, and is equivalent to theft. Taxation does not comply 
with the Nozickean dictum encapsulating libertarian justice: 
'From each as they choose , to each as they are chosen. ' 21 
Redistribution, then, is 'a serious matter indeed, involving, 
as it does, the violation of people's rights.' 22 As Nozick 
21 Nozick, Anarchy 1 State 1 and Utopia, p, 160 (emphasis removed). 
22 b'd I 1 • ,p.l68. 
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later puts it, 'The central core of the notion of a property 
right in X, relative to which other parts of the notion are to 
be explained, is the right to determine what shall be done 
with X; the right to choose which of the constrained set of 
options concerning X shall be realized or attempted.' 23 If the 
constraints are as the libertarian says, then taxation is not 
a permissible option. This is the libertarian explanation of 
why and how redistribution violates property rights. To 
violate property rights is to commit an injustice. And out 
rolls the desired conclusion: redistribution is unjust. 
Before proceed i ng to criticise Nozick's defence of the 
injustice of redistribution, a few words need be said 
concerning his ideas of what our property rights are, how we 
come by them, and the limits of them. What our property rights 
are has been dealt with above. To have a property right in 
resource r is to have the right to determine the disposition 
of r within the constraints imposed by the rights of others. 
How do we come by our property rights? Nozick does not 
explicitly embrace the Lockean labour theory of appropriation 
though it is generally assumed that this is his argument for 
justice in original acquisition. A person comes to have a • 
right to determine the disposition of r, within libertarian 
constraints, by mixing his labour with r, thereby removing it 
from its unowned condition, or by a process of transfer from 
someone who had somewhere along the line originally acquired 
r. As to the limit Nozick imposes upon appropriation, he 
writes that the legitimacy of any act of appropriation depends 
upon 'whether appropriation of an unowned object worsens the 
situation of others.' 24 
Nozick gives two interpretations of this proviso, a 
stringent and a weak one, and opts for the latter. The weak 
interpretation says that a person is not made worse off by 
being no longer able to appropriate providing there remain 
23 b'd 7 I 1 .,p.ll. 
24 b'd I 1 .,p.175. 
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resources he can use. 25 Nozick holds that the enough and as 
good proviso is intended to ensure that the situation of 
others is not worsened, and later says 'I assume that any 
adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a 
proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed 
to Locke . ' 26 
Persons do not acquire permanent bequeathable property 
rights in previously unowned things if their appropriation 
worsens the situation of others. This is a reasonably flexible 
imposition and can be skirted through compensation. 'Someone 
whose appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso', says 
Nozick, 'still may appropriate provided he compensates the 
others so that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless 
he does compensate the others, his appropriation will violate 
the principle of justice in acquisition and will be an 
illegitimate one. 127 This, says Nozick, 'will handle correctly 
the cases (objections to the theory lacking the proviso) where 
someone appropriates the total supply of something necessary 
for life.' 28 The proviso also applies to justice in transfer, 
e.g. appropriating part and purchasing the remainder of 
something necessary for life. The proviso places stringent 
limits upon what a person may do with his property. Nozick's 
example is this: '[A]n owner's property right in the only 
island in an area does not allow him to order a castaway from 
a shipwreck off his island as a trespasser, for this would 
violate the Lockean proviso.'29 Nozick makes it clear that the 
rights held prior to the proviso's working are not 
overridden. 30 What this allows for is the reasserting of 
initial property rights once the circumstances that make the 
proviso operative have passed. My well returns to my exclusive 
control once the drought has passed, despite justice requiring 
25 b'd I 1 .,p.176. 
26 b'd I 1 .,p.m. 
27 b'd I 1 .,p.m. 
28 b'd I 1 .,p.l79. 
29 Ibid.,p.lSO. 
30 b'd I 1 • ,p.l80. 
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me to yield up my well to use by you, i.e. surrender exclusive 
control, for the duration of your waterlessness. At the end of 
his discussion of the proviso Nozick writes: 'I believe that 
the free operation of a market system will not actually run 
afoul of the Lockean proviso.' 31 If I understand Nozick's 
wielding of the proviso aright, he believes that under a free-
market economic system - wherein from each as they choose to 
each as they are chosen - the proviso will rarely, if ever, be 
invoked. People are not made worse off by the acquisitions the 
entitlement theory allows. 
Nozick is appealing to an attachment to the potency of the 
market. In common with others who share this belief that 
unrestrained markets hold out the prospect of economic 
optimality, we shall have to go along with libertarians in so 
far as they say that, whilst restrained markets do well, 
unrestrained markets do best. There is, if things are left 
well alone, a price that will clear the market of all 
commodities. Take unemployment. In a libertarian world there 
would be no unemployment because labour would find its price 
on the exchange-market and that price would be a price that 
cleared the market. 32 Now, restricting the labour market by 
imposing minimum wage levels, offering welfare to the 
unemployed, etc., distorts the market and creates 
unemployment. 
Whilst I have sympathy for market economics on grounds of 
both politics and efficiency, I see no good reason why we 
should swallow wholesale what libertarians say on these 
matters. Perhaps it would turn out as they say and everyone 
would have a job, even if not the job they would like to have. 
Then again, perhaps it would not. Maybe not everyone would 
have a job, let alone one they prefer. How many baskets woven 
in therapy can the market absorb? Maybe everyone does have a 
job but the market-clearing price of labour for some of them 
is so low that it is insufficient to ... to what? Let us say 
31 b'd I 1 .,p.l82. 
32 Narveson, The Libertarian Idea,p.266 is representative. 
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insufficient to meet their fundamental needs, the pretty 
concrete objectives of adequate food, shelter and clothing. 
The sceptical contention is that even in a libertarian 
world the appropriation of resources by some would leave 
others worse off, leaving them few or no resources at all. 
Sometimes the market fails to provide for all, not because 
there is not enough for all but because some are passed over 
in the process of distribution. And the cases of the retarded, 
the handicapped and the old provide obvious examples. Some 
will argue that it is precisely because unfettered markets 
left some worse off that restrictions were imposed in the 
first place. If the worse off are not compensated by those 
whose appropriation has made them worse off then such 
appropriations are unjust. And they are not compensated by 
those who have acquired. On balance, their position is worse 
than it would have been had the resources remained unowned. 
The appropriations of these persons in the absence of 
compensation are therefore unjust. They have appropriated not 
the total supply of something necessary for life but enough of 
it to leave that person worse off. Nozick writes only in terms 
of the total appropriation of something necessary for life, 
but this I contend should not make a difference. Should not 
for the reason that both readings are consonant with the 
objectives of the proviso, with what the proviso is intended 
to secure. And should not because of the moral catastrophe 
clause Nozick tolerates, which I argue plays an important but 
as yet unspecified role in his theory of property. 
The results of the proviso 'may be coextensive with some 
condition about catastrophe ... the question of the Lockean 
proviso being violated arises only in the case of catastrophe 
(or a desert-island situation).' 33 Notice we are dealing with a 
disjunction: there are at least two situations in which the 
proviso applies. What are they? Moral catastrophe is one, and 
I shall concern myself with it later. The other is the 
'desert-island' situation. Nozick employs this example to 
33 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,p.l81. 
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illustrate what action the performance of which the proviso 
puts a block upon. Here it is again: '[A]n owner's property 
right in the only island in an area does not allow him to 
order a castaway from a shipwreck off his island as a 
trespasser, for this would violate the Lockean proviso.' 
Is this a parallel case to Nozick's? You stumble, starving 
and wasted, to the door of my remote country seat and request 
food and shelter from me. 34 My turning you away is the same as 
the islander's casting you off his island is it not? It 
certainly seems so to my mind. Going a stage farther, what if 
instead of a remote rural home you are starving and wasted in 
an urban metropo l is and make the same request of me? Perhaps I 
can refuse you in this situation on the grounds that you can 
move on (next door even) and make the request of someone else. 
I am not the only island of resources in the area, as it were. 
No need therefore for me to meet your request when there are 
others nearby who might meet it. It seems, implicitly given 
the Nozickean example, that I need only give to you if you are 
worse off by my appropriation and if no-one else can. Others 
can, so I need not. The contingencies of time and place do not 
collude to make the urban-dwelling me the violator of the 
proviso, obliging me to compensate you. But this is true for 
all the other nearby urban-dwellers who can meet your request 
as well as I can. No need for any one of them to assist you. 
Each can reason as I have and conclude 'Sorry, try next door'. 
After fruitlessly knocking on a number of doors all answering 
the same you starve to death. Being dead you are certainly 
worse off - exactly what the inclusion of the proviso in 
Nozick's theory was meant to preclude. 
I see no way Nozick can avoid this conclusion. To be sure, 
he can say it is unlikely to arise in a libertarian economic 
order. But I am assuming, and I think not unrealistically, 
that it has arisen under just that order, or rather that even 
34 PresUDably, 'reDote' would cash out in tem like 'reDote enough so that, given the state of the petitioner, the chances 
of reaching the next island, country house or whatever, are slim indeed'. If the proviso did not read something close to 
this its inclusion would be pointless. · 
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the unfettered laissez-faire economic system libertarians 
favour is likely to face such a scenario. Your rejection at 
all the doors is a parallel of Nozick's reductio argument 
against the stringent interpretation of the proviso. 35 Either 
we embrace it despite its conflicting with the stipulations of 
the proviso or we tighten the proviso so as to rule it out as 
illegitimate, contrary to what Nozick says. The first response 
is equivalent to abandoning the proviso in toto. The second is 
equivalent to making assistance to the needy a requirement of 
justice which goes directly contrary to what Nozick says, 
namely, that there is no right to be in ·a particular material 
condition. 36 
If the urban-dwelling me is duty-bound to meet your request 
if I am able, then so are you, my urban-dwelling neighbour, 
and so is your neighbour, and so on. If this is correct then 
there are two ways this duty can be read: first, as the duty 
to respond to the situation of others only when one is 
requested to do so, i.e. the duty not to refuse charity when 
confronted; or secondly, as the duty to be charitable even 
when one is not specifically requested, i.e. the positive duty 
to do what one reasonably can charity-wise. 
The Lockean proviso is not an argument for the first. Why 
it is not has already been spelt out by Nozick: 'Someone whose 
appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso still may 
appropriate provided he compensates ... unless he does 
compensate ... his appropriation will violate the principle of 
justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate one.' 
A principle of just compensation is not of the order of the 
first reading which has the connotation that the duty to be 
charitable need not be enforced. If this person has been made 
worse off by appropriation then he must be compensated, and 
there are no two ways about it. 
But which acts of appropriation, by whom, have rendered 
this person worse off? In the desert-island situation that 
35 Kozick , Anarchy, State, and Utopia,p.l76. 
36 Ibid. ,p.238. 
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much is clear: the island owner, his acquiring the island. In 
the case of our representative or average urban dweller there 
is no clear answer. No single one of us has made this person 
worse off. We have all acquired a little bit and our 
acquisitions have collectively exhausted the supply of 
everything. No one person has appropriated the total supply o f 
something necessary for life. But a number of persons acting 
individually have done just this. The upshot is an unjust 
situation, A being worse off, which requires compensation for 
A from those who have made him worse off. The problem is, in 
the metropolis but not on the desert island, we cannot 
i dentify the one person responsible for A's being worse off, 
i.e. that person whose appropriation violated the proviso. 
Nonetheless A is worse off. If no one person made A worse off 
then some group or subset of all those who have appropriated 
must have done so. And which subset is that? 
I do not think that there is any coherent answer other than 
to say: 'All those who have appropriated have collectively 
made A worse off, quite unintentionally and perhaps 
unforeseeably'. We are all, then, bound to compensate A. In 
the absence of any acceptable method for divining whether some 
are responsible and others not, or some more responsible and 
others less, we have to presume that all are bound to 
compensate proportionally as much as each other. 
Compensating A is very much like redistributing wealth to 
A. It is certainly not the same as charity. Under the 
Nozickean schema of just compensation A would be said to have 
a right to compensation (redistribution). If A and others like 
him have a right to compensation then this right may be 
enforced. Compensation would entail taxation if owners were 
not disposed to compensate of their own volition. Taxation 
libertarians think to be not a free exchange. But compensation 
(redistribution) is just; compensation entails taxation; 
taxation is not a free exchange; therefore, justice entails at 
least one unfree exchpnge - contrary to what libertarians 
would have us believe. And whilst it remains true that the 
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function of the state is the protection of rights, if I am 
correct then one of the rights the state should protect, on 
grounds of Nozickean justice no less, is the right not to be 
starving and wasted. This would follow from what Nozick says, 
though clearly it is additional to (what he thinks is) his 
theory of justice. 
If this does not work, reconstruction of the moral 
catastrophe clause may. Nozick writes that the results of the 
proviso 'may be coextensive with some condition about 
catastrophe, since the baseline for comparison is so low as 
compared to the productiveness of a society with private 
appropriation that the question of the Lockean proviso being 
v iolated arises only in the case of catastrophe (or a desert-
i sland situation).' 37 What the moral catastrophe clause allows 
is the overriding of deontological morality for reasons 
teleological. 38 If an action that is permissible on the 
premisses of rights-based libertarianism will have 
consequences that are exceptionally grave then that action, 
though right, may not be performed. If some catastrophic state 
of affairs will eventuate unless some rights are overridden 
then they may be justifiably infringed. 
Most of us do acknowledge, even in our more deontological 
moments, and perhaps grudgingly, that the avoidance of very 
grave consequences that would otherwise ensue justifies 
overriding rights. 'Tis better to prevent Hume scratching his 
finger as he has a right to if the destruction of the world 
would follow Hume's doing so. It is not acceptable that if an 
action is right then that action is permissible no matter what 
the consequences. 
Can the invocation of moral catastrophe be used against 
Nozick (and libertarians generally)? The death of our starving 
and wasted individual A, as the outcome of otherwise 
permissible actions, we say would be a moral catastrophe. In 
31 b'd I 1 • ,p.l81. . 
38 Nozick writes of violating rights in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror: ibid.,p.30. I use the 
DOre familiar locution, passing over Nozick's reasons for preferring 'violate'. 
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order to avoid the otherwise impending death of A money or 
goods are redistributed to him in sufficient quantity to 
prevent the catastrophe of A's death. Once again an unfree 
exchange, taxation, looks justified in terms of Nozick's own 
theory. 
The issue that has to be dealt with before Nozick can be 
hoist with his own petard is this: what precisely has to 
threaten before rights can be overridden? Once clear about 
this we can determine whether the demise of A constitutes a 
moral catastrophe, and whether or not other deleterious 
consequences for A that fall short of At.s dying are 
catastrophic or not. 
Would A's death be a moral catastrophe? No doubt, A would 
protest it most certainly would. On the other hand, hard-nosed 
social-Darwinians of the turn of the century kind might think 
quite the contrary. Whilst I have not ready to hand a 
metaphysic of moral catastrophe a rough guide or rule of thumb 
can, I believe, be proffered, against which the demise of A 
may be adjudicated. This guide relies on a commonsensical idea 
of catastrophe and on general facts about A (people like A) 
and his situation vis-a-vis other people. 
When we dub an event a catastrophe we need not necessarily 
be passing judgement of the moral kind. Natural events can and 
do overtake human beings in catastrophic proportions. To be 
sure, they often have or give rise to a moral dimension but 
they are not for that moral catastrophes. The residents of San 
Francisco are threatened with catastrophe the next time there 
is a shift in the San Andreas fault, but it is not a moral 
catastrophe that threatens. 
The ordinary, everyday dictionary entry for 'catastrophe' 
defines it as a 'disastrous end, ruin; event subverting the 
system of things'. Herein lies the clue to understanding how 
catastrophe might be wielded in a moral-political setting. For 
an event to be catastrophic it has to be an event that is 
improbable or unlikely given general background knowledge of 
the laws governing the natural world. If the probability of 
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event e occurr i ng is high then e's occurring is not a 
cat astrophe , no matter what e is and no matter what its 
consequences are. It would be a rather vacuous headline that 
read 'S.S. Titanic catastrophe!' if the probability of the 
Titanic sinking on her maiden voyage was high. This might be 
because of special facts about the Titanic herself or more 
general facts about ships, e.g. that each and every time a 
ship leaves its berth and ventures onto the open sea there is 
a probability .5 that it sink. Event e's occurring when its 
probability of doing so is anything but very low is not a 
catastrophe but rather par for the course. When undesirable 
events occur with depressing regularity because the 
probability of their doing so is fair to middling to call them 
catastrophes is to plunder the concept of meaning. Jumbo jets 
full of happy tourists falling from the sky as rarely as they 
do are catastrophes. If the chances were fifty-fifty that 
every time a jumbo took off it would crash rather than land 
then I think 'catastrophe' would not be in order. 
So catastrophes are (1) low probability occurrences. What 
else? Usually, we think in terms of large numbers of people 
suffering the deleterious consequences of event e's 
occurrence. That is true of jumbo jets and not true of 
microlights assuming the probability of each's crashing is the 
same. We need to add to (1) a second clause (2): for something 
to be a catastrophe a sufficient number of people must be 
affected, that number being fixed by the incidence of low 
probability events each affecting large numbers of people. In 
a world where the only planes are microlights and Learjets an 
air-catastrophe is when the latter goes down, but not when the 
former does. In a world of these two and jumbo jets then the 
loss of a fully occupied Learjet is not a catastrophe, though 
the loss of a full jumbo is. The loss of a jumbo with flight 
crew only is not a catastrophe because the loss of a Learjet 
is not. The number of people is a function of general 
background knowledge again. If we add (2) to (1) the situation 
for A looks inauspicious if he happens to be the only person, 
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or one of relatively few people, in such distress. The low 
probability occurrence of one person starving is not a 
catastrophe. The low probability occurrence of one million 
people starving is. 
That seems standard enough. The prospect for his situation 
being classified a catastrophe looks bleak if A i s alone or 
one amongst a relative few in a society or situation where 
starvation is a low probability event for any member of that 
society, as libertarians think their society is. 
That is all well and good, (1) and (2) together, for 
understanding catastrophe. But moral catastrophe, though 
something very similar, is somewhat and importantly different. 
And it is this important difference that can resuscitate A's 
seemingly flagging fortunes. 
A moral catastrophe is not simply a catastrophe having a 
moral dimension. That is likely true of all catastrophes. For 
Nozick a moral catastrophe is an occurrence with catastrophic 
consequences that arises from persons behaving perfectly 
legitimately. It is the product of an invisible-hand process; 
the unforeseen and unintended grave consequences of foreseen 
and intended actions. In the example I have been using, we 
have a society of Nozickean-rights bearers freely contracting 
with one another to exchange goods. Only no-one exchanges 
anything with A, who is left to starve. Property rights may be 
held even in rubbish so that what is discarded by me belongs 
to someone else. I can transfer my rights in my rubbish to the 
recycling company, or to the orphanage which sells it to the 
recycling company. A's situation satisfies (1). Does his 
situation satisfy (2)? I think that indeed it does , given what 
libertarians themselves say about the productiveness of 
capitalism. However, in the case of moral catastrophe a third 
clause is required. That clause goes something like this: (3) 
though a moral catastrophe, to be moral, must arise from 
conditions of otherwise just interaction, it must also be 
relatively easily avoidable. If the burdens ·to others of 
preventing it are great then e is not a moral catastrophe. We 
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are back once more to sizing A's situation against general 
background considerations. If the costs to society are 
relatively high then A starves. If the costs are relatively 
low then A does not starve. 
Thus, to the people of famine-stricken Ethiopia the death 
through starvation of any one of their number is not a moral 
catastrophe because it is not easily preventable. To the 
people of the United States the auto-accident death of any one 
individual is not a moral catastrophe because not easily 
preventable. To the people of Libertarian-U.S.A., however, the 
death through starvation of any one of them is a moral 
catastrophe because easily preventable. A little 
redistribution is all that is needed to avert a low 
probability, easily avoidable and gravely deleterious 
consequence. 
Utilitarian considerations determine whether or not we are 
dealing with a moral catastrophe once it is established that 
the consequences of event e satisfy (1), (2) and (3). This is 
compatible with what Nozick has later written on the moral 
catastrophe clause. 39 When a person's situation meets all three 
conditions then we have to do our utility s ums. Providing that 
the harm to be avoided is ranked high and the cost of 
avoidance low then we are facing a situation which the clause 
deems to be one requiring action. In the case of A the 
requisite action was a redistributive transfer. In 
Libertarian-U.S.A. A will be put on welfare sufficient to keep 
him together 'body and soul'. The utility gain to A, less the 
utility costs to others of welfare contribution, remains high. 
In Libertarian-U.S.A. Donald Trump's business fortunes' turn 
for the worse are not going to see him receive public monies 
to keep or repurchase his airline. Here the utility gain to 
Trump less the utility costs to taxpayers is overall low. Were 
Trump to suffer the fate of A it would be a different matter. 
Once redistribution is admitted as just there remains a 
further, connected topic, namely whether the framework - and 
39 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations,p.495. 
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the way the right to welfare fits in with it - lends 
prescriptive import to the mechanics of redistribution itself. 
Are there moral restrictions to the complexion a system of 
redistr i bution may assume, besides its straightforwardly 
taking from some and distributing to others? It will be my 
contention that it has prescriptive import, and that the 
restrictions arise from the above-mentioned tension between 
the distribution effected by appropriation and justice in 
transfer and welfare rights necessitating redistribution. In 
short, if the labour theory of appropriation and justice in 
transfer legitimate any holdings then they legitimate all 
relevantly identical holdings, hence, also, if they legitimate 
any wealth differentials then they legitimate all relevantly 
identical wealth differentials. And the same goes for 
redistribution. If a right justifies redistribution then all 
relevantly similar rights justify redistribution. Tension 
arises because the labour and transfer theory legitimates 
holdings and differentials whilst the welfarist rule justifies 
redistributing holdings and reducing differentials. Such 
tension or uneasy coexistence between the two governs the 
complexion of the mechanics of redistribution. Tongue in 
cheek, we might call the overarching rule of Lockean welfarism 
maximin: maximise holdings, minimise redistribution. 
The consequences of permissible actions are sometimes so 
grave - sufficiently grave - that teleological considerations 
take over. At some point or other, and I have used fundamental 
needs as the benchmark, rights and their correlative duties 
peel apart from one another and duties attach themselves to 
consequentialist considerations. our obligations change from 
duties in fulfilment of rights to duties to prevent 
consequences that are deemed defeasing of our prior 
commitments. In terms of the schema of the tension put 
forward, our duties in service of consequentialism are always 
positive. They are duties to act so as to prevent moral 
catastrophe. 
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Maximising legitimate holdings in the face of claims to 
welfare and minimising the number and extent of these claims 
marks the tension prescriptively governing how any system of 
redistribution may operate. What the mechanics of any method 
of redistribution under a regime of Lockean libertarianism are 
to look like, normatively, will occupy the remainder of this 
chapter. The inclusion is justified only because of these 
normative implications. Redistribution is otherwise the 
mundane and philosophically uninteresting task of apportioning . 
means to allotted ends. In what follows 'wealth' is 
substituted for 'resources' in line with everyday usage. 
Reliance on the goodwill and charity of persons is not only 
patently over-optimistic but ruled out on grounds of justice. 
We do not reside in a world populated by saints and heroes, 
and cannot expect that people, charitable though many are, 
will give as much as might be demanded. Better then to presume 
that redistribution will necessitate coercion in the 
~h observance of the requirements of justice, and so some kind of 
apparatus with coercive powers whose task it is to identify 
bona fide recipients and transfer wealth to them will need to 
be established. 
Ordinarily in contemporary societies the execution of 
coercive redistribution is a function of government or the 
state. To say that in a libertarian society redistribution 
would be the responsibility of the state is to already choose 
~~ sides in the acrimonious debate within the ranks of 
libertarians over the virtues of anarchism versus statism. For 
the purposes of this discussion of the mechanics of welfare 
this issue is left undecided. I address it in a later chapter. 
Until the anarchism versus statism debate is resolved it must 
be noted only that the justice of coercive redistribution does 
not necessitate state- or government-enacted redistribution. 
It is possible that there should be coercive redistribution in 
a society without a state. 
Who should exercise the powers of redistribution is for the 
time being neither here nor there. What the redistributor will 
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have to have powers over are the two sides of the 
redistribution coin, namely welfare accumulation and welfare 
distribution. The former is the domain of contributive 
justice, and involves the identifying of those liable to 
contribute, deciding on a standard for contributions, 
assessing the level of contributions necessary to satisfy the 
genuine claims and then collecting, or rather exacting, them. 
Welfare distribution is simply the identifying of genuine 
recipients and ensuring that they receive their redistributive 
dues. Of all these processes only the formulation of a 
standard for contribution is contentious as only it is 
plausibly the arena for debate on questions of fairness, 
equity and the like. The others are no more than matters of 
suiting efficient means to an adopted end. Once the positive 
right is accepted these all come as a matter of course. 
Proportional taxation, i.e. being taxed a certain 
percentage of one's wealth or income is, I think, the standar d 
of contribution that best conforms with the maximin dictum 
governing redistribution. The desirability of proportional 
taxation over other standards, notably progressive rates, is 
evinced primarily by th.e fact that it does not discriminate 
against the wealthy on the grounds that they are wealthy. 
Recall that articles (iv) and (x) of the framework, i.e. 
ownership through labouring and transfer and the 
enforceability of the right to welfare provision, legitimated 
any wealth differentials. Proportional taxation does not 
conflict with (iv) and (x). Arguably, it is the only standard 
of taxation that does not. Friedrich Hayek asserts as a matter 
of historical fact that redistribution effected through 
progressive taxation, now almost universally accepted, was 
always intended by its supporters as a means for bringing 
about a more just distribution of income. 40 True or not, it is 
until otherwise shown only a matter of history. There is 
nothing self-evidently just about progressive taxation. 
Orthodox libertarians see all taxation as unjust, and though 
40 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty,pp.306-ll. 
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they are mistaken it is not because they deny the self-
evident. Lockean libertarianism says not that taxation is 
unjust, only that progressive taxation is. 
A standard of proportional contributions is not open to the 
objection - which is intuitively suggestive and which is 
levelled against another candidate formula, namely a per 
capita flat-rate contribution - that the more property 
individuals have not only the more they are able to pay but 
the more they ought to pay. Part of the suggestiveness of this 
objection derives from the adage that a penny to a poor man 
has greater utility than a penny from a rich man has 
disutility. Were this conceded, 41 it is hardly as it stands a 
case for the redistribution of pennies. Would marginal utility 
driven redistribution justify, in surely what are conceivable 
circumstances, redistributing from the exceptionally wealthy 
to the not quite so fabulously rich, say from the Sultan of 
Brunei to the Queen of England? 
The weight of this objection to proportionality revolves 
around an implicit notion of just compensation or something 
akin to it. Those who have more ought to contribute more for 
after all they are causally implicated to a greater degree in 
worsening the situation of others by leaving them without. If 
I am an impoverished crofter and you are my wealthy neighbour, 
lavishly attired, well-fed and wined, squire of many acres, is 
not my poverty more the consequence of your having as much as 
you do than it is the consequence of me and my fellow crofters 
having what little we have? And is this not proved in that if 
you had not acquired all you have we would have been better 
off by appropriating those things now yours for ourselves? 
I am quite sure this objection fails in this guise and am 
sceptical it can go through in any form at all. 42 It says I 
have less because my neighbour has more, and this is plain 
wrong. I could have more were I to help myself to what my 
neighbour has, as a thief does, but that he has more is not 
41 Hayek voices a dissenting opinion: ibid. ,p.309. 
42 Flew, Thinking About Social Thinking,p.l21. 
109 
because I make do with less. If my neighbour had never 
existed, indeed if no-one had ever existed but me, I should 
have far less than I now do. I could not have made my Beetle 
on my own. Were it to go through it may simply beg Hayek's 
charge of discrimination. Why ought anyone to pay more, 
proportionally, than anyone else? To answer along the lines o f 
the objection above is to treat the tension between just title 
through appropriation and free transfer and the welfare-based 
right to property as pulling preponderantly in favour of the 
latter, and hence towards greater equality. Answering instead, 
'Because they can afford it' most assuredly begs the 
discrimination charge. Since when did being legitimately 
wealthy and able to pay by itself justify disproportional 
contributions to public schemes? 'It is', surmises Hayek on 
progressive taxation, 'no more than a rejection of 
proportionality in favor of a discrimination against the 
wealthy without any criterion for limiting the extent of this 
discrimination.' 43 
Proportional taxation is the formula for contributive 
justice that dovetails most neatly with the injunction to 
maximise holdings. And the system which fits best with the 
counterpart injunction to minimise redistribution? Three types 
of response to the welfare issue have been catalogued, and all 
three represent distinct moral-political approaches to 
redistribution, as each one's defining characteristic shows. 
(The typology is useful for it enables us to match the 
mechanics of redistribution with known types of welfare 
state.) They are the positive state, the social security state 
and the social welfare state. The first places 'major emphasis 
on social insurance programmes' and does not 'guarantee 
surrogate forms of property for all citizens'. 44 The second 
type introduces 'the important objective of a guaranteed 
national minimum'. 45 The social welfare state goes further and 
43 Hayek, The Constitution of Li.berty,p.313. 
44 FUrniss & Tilton, The Case for the Welfare State,pp.15·16. 
45 Ibid. ,p.17. 
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seeks 'to achieve a gen.eral equality of living conditions'. 46 
Initially, it might seem that any claim of property for all 
would accord best with the social security state and the 
guaranteed minimum it secures. On the other hand, the 
injunction to minimise redistribution favours the positive 
state's emphasis on social insurance. A compromise over the 
· · two types results, and unsurprisingly given that the dictum 
pulls in two directions simultaneously. The private provision 
of welfare through social insurance programmes is adopted in 
concert with a guaranteed minimum safety net. The fanciful 
example following is intended in illustration of this 
compromise, and to show the bounds of coercion and the 
conditions appropriate to the provision of welfare. 
Two characters A and B are washed ashore a desert island 
from a shipwreck and both have justly acquired holdings, in 
the form of coins, in their pockets, only A has ten dollars 
and B has one. Washed ashore with them is the ship's automatic 
drink dispenser. The machine dispenses drinks at a price. The 
price of a drink is exactly two dollars, a fifth of A's 
holdings and twice B's total holdings. A necessary condition 
of subsistence is that both have a drink. Accordingly A must, 
is duty-bound, to redistribute to B one dollar of his holdings 
in order that B may purchase a drink. so much, from the point 
of view of Lockean libertarianism, is uncontentious. 
Now imagine that two unowned plants containing an equal 
number of seeds are washed ashore and our two characters each 
mix their labour with one. By a peculiar though fortunate 
quirk of fate the seeds work the drink dispenser, and A and B 
discover this. Is it reasonable for A to say to his island 
partner, 'You must, are duty-bound, as I am, to "invest" some 
of your seeds against future contingencies which but for your 
investing might or would impose a redistributive burden on 
me'? A has just shouldered the redistributive burden B 
presented prior to their discovery: cannot he now insure 
himself against having to do so again by coercing B to engage 
46 b'd I 1 .,p.20. 
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in the desert-island version of a social-insurance programme, 
i.e. 'coercion intended to forestall greater coercion of the 
individual in the interest of others 1 , 47 and 'justified not fo r 
his [B 1 s] own good but for the good of the rest of us 1 ? 48 
Coercing B in this manner need not be taken to excuse A 
from all future redistributive commitments to B. Circumstances 
may arise putting B in need of subsistence once again, if for 
example he cannot retrieve his invested seeds (the equivalent 
of the United States Savings & Loans debacle?). Still, it does 
not seem wrong for A to distance the prospect of future 
welfare contributions by having B insure himself from his own 
property. Nor does it seem wrong for payments to be in the 
form of dedicated non-transferrable cash vouchers. 49 That would 
restrict the opportunities for recipients to blow their 
welfare on wine, women and song whilst their children went 
hungry at home. Hayek captures the point quite succinctly when 
he warns that, 'We must also expect that the availability of 
this [public] assistance will induce some to neglect such 
provision against emergencies as they would have been able to 
make on their own. It seems only logical, then, that those who 
will have a claim to assistance in circums tances for which 
they could have made provision should be required to make such 
provision themselves ... [I]t seems an obvious corollary to 
compel them to insure (or otherwise provide) against those 
common hazards of life. 150 Amalgamating the two pillars of the 
47 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty , p. 286. 
48 Friedman, CapitalisJ and Freedom,p.l88. 
49 Contrary to popular belief Friedman was not the originator of the voucher system but Cardinal Bourne, in 1926: Lepage, 
To110rrcw, Capitalism,p.l44. Flew accords Mill the distinction: 'Selfishness and the Unintended Consequences of Intended 
Action' ,p.l99. Flew may be adverting to Mill: On Liberty,pp.l60-l. 
50 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty,pp.285-6. It is interesting to note Friedman's opposition to the compulsory (coercive) 
purchase of social insurance on the grounds that it restricts the liberty of Eany to spend a portion of their incolle as 
they wish, which of course it does. Friedman is, I believe, confused. On his account the greater the number of public 
charges dependant on the assistance of others and thereby restricting their liberty to dispose of their incolle as they 
see fit, the greater the impetus behind switching to the compulsory purchase of annuities: Capitalism and Freedo.11,p. l88 . 
Crude Jlajoritarianisll will decide. It is difficult to square Friedman's reasoning unless he is taken to be defending a 
'maximisation of liberty' thesis, namely that for any permissible action it is better that more rather than fewer be able 
to perform it. If it is objectionable for Jle to coerce you to insure yourself on the grounds that it denies you the 
liberty to dispose of a part of your income, why is it all well and good for you to deprive me of the same liberty 
through redistributive taxation? It will work as a Eaxillisation of liberty account but I cannot credit this to Friedman, 
particularly not in light of his saying that 'the believer in freedom has never counted noses': ibid. ,p.9. This is nose-
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positive and social-security states in one system satisfies 
the demands of Lockean libertarianism. A guaranteed minimum is 
assured (scarcity permitting) and insurance programmes work to 
minimise redistribution. There is, then, no rationale for 
movement to a more thoroughgoing welfare state. 
counting with a passion. Furthermore, Friedman 1aintains people Just be free to take mistakes, including profligacy now 
for penury later: ibid.,p.lBB, and this is manifestly not a position readily co~~ensurable with a maximisation of liberty 




LIBERTARIANISM AND EGALITARIANISM 
In his An Essay on the History of Civil Society Adam 
Ferguson wrote: 'Every step and every movement of the 
multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made 
with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon 
establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, 
but not the execution of any human des ign.' 1 Ferguson is here 
employing a form of explanation most commonly associated with 
the name of Adam Smith; the so-called invisible-hand 
explanation of the origin and causal development of certain 
patterns (institutions). 2 The invisible hand explains how a 
pattern or general result which seemingly manifests 
i ntentional design is brought about not by individuals' or 
groups' attempts to realise such a pattern but by other 
intentional behaviour of theirs. In short, such outcomes are 
the unintended consequences of intentional actions. The first 
of the two cocktail-party cases where my drinklessness is not 
deliberate is an example. 
A society of equal wealth might come about via the workings 
of an invisible hand. Imagine that over a period of time more 
and more persons take it upon themselves to raise the level of 
wealth of their less wealthy friends until such time as it is 
equal with their own, subsequently decreased, wealth. They and 
everyone else give from their just holdings to their friends 
until they and their friends' wealth-levels are equal. These 
recipient friends do likewise for their less well-off friends, 
1 Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society,p.l22. 
2 Smith wields the invisible hand in explanation of the unintended promotion of public welfare. Of the individual SDith 
wrote that 'he generally, indeed, neither intends to prowte the public interest nor knows how much he is pro10ting it ... 
[H]e intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to proJIOte an end 
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his 
own interest he frequently pro110tes that of the society 110re effectually than when he really intends to prowte it': An 
Enquiry into the Nature and causes of the Wealth of Rations,p.423. 
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who in turn do the same for their poorer friends. After a 
finite number of such bestowals - from each as they choose to 
each as they are chosen - the wealthy become less so and the 
poorer better off until all financial standings are equal. No-
one can bestow more because nobody has less than they or 
anyone else. To avoid closed groups of friends unintentionally 
producing local pockets of intra-group equality but inter-
group inequality we need to build into the example a principle 
of inter-group connexions. In this case the principle might be 
something like this: 'Every person has at least one friend who 
has a friend who is not a friend of his'. A has a friend B who 
has a friend c, where C is not a friend of A. So whatever the 
wealth of any person in that society, community or whatnot, 
no-one has more or less wealth than anyone else. 
The upshot is a society of equal wealth which was no part 
of any individual's intention. The intention of any one person 
was simply to raise the wealth of his friends until such time 
as it was the same as his own. Yet all have, together and as 
an unintended consequence of each's intentional actions, given 
rise to a society with an equal distribution of wealth. The 
example is fanciful because unlikely. All that I wished to 
show by it is that an equality of wealth could come about in a 
way that, first, does not incorporate unequal means in pursuit 
of the egalitarian end, 3 such as in powers of coercion, and 
secondly, could not be objected to by Lockean or orthodox 
libertarians. Each person has chosen for himself to dispose of 
wealth that is legitimately his in a particular manner. The 
first point obviates the need for a group, or class, 
intellectual and power elite to impose equality on a 
recalcitrant majority (replete with eradicable or surmountable 
inegalitarian tendencies?), whilst the second precludes the 
possibility of any libertarian objecting from the standpoint 
of invaded liberties. It was his money. He was not coerced. 
No-one's rights were violated. 
3 Flew, 'The Procrustean Ideal: Libertarians v. Egalitarians',pp.161-3. 
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'. 
What this is intended to show is that, though only some 
level of wealth equality is non-categorically guaranteed as a 
principle of justice, a thoroughgoing equality of wealth or 
outcome is quite compatible with the libertarian right to 
property, providing it is an equality brought about in a 
specific way. In the example under discussion, equality 
effected in consequence of manifold voluntary non-enforceable 
actions going above and beyond the call of moral duty. In 
essence, equality of this sort is what might be termed a 
supererogatory possibility. Of course, what is 
supererogatorily possible is practically unlikely, for 
supererogatory actions are the exception to the norm. All the 
same, libertarians could individually act in a way that has 
the effect of bringing about equality, or they could, more 
straightforwardly, individually plump for equality and work to 
that end. The point is this: equality of wealth is possible to 
a society of libertarian-rights bearers without anyone's 
rights being violated. If equality is to be an enforceable 
precept of justice this will require justification. The 
justification wi·ll have to be stronger than and so override 
wealth differentials we have seen the labour theory of 
appropriation and justice in transfer to legitimate. 4 
If everyone came to believe that equality was desirable and 
came to desire equality then an egalitarian society might 
ensue. But not everyone is possessed of an egalitarian frame 
of mind tending to such actions, and though some are 
indifferent to equality in the sense that it is not prominent 
amongst their preferences, others are anti-egalitarian. For 
them equality, or at least not equality of wealth, does not 
rank as a preference at all. Given a society of pro-, anti-
and indifferent-egalitarians commingling, there are at least 
two possibilities open to advocates of equality. They might 
educate persons as to the value and desirability of equality 
4 Equality is soaetimes presuaed to be the distributional 'stable state' and that deviations away from equality require 
justification. See Wollhei1, 'Equality',p.304. This presumption has not gone unnoticed: Letwin, 'The Case Against 
Equality' ,pp.6-8. Keither has it gone unchallenged: Hayek, ''lte Atavism of Social Justice'. 
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and through a non-indoctrinatory educative process lead people 
to want an egalitarian society and want to be part of it. 
Alternatively, they might impose or enforce equality in the 
name of justice. s 
A Millian liberal might advocate the former alone, 
contending that in the market of ideas equality must compete 
for allegiance on its own merits. It could not of course be 
guaranteed success. Arguably, this will strike as rather 
fanciful anyone sceptical as to the purity of the rational 
faculties of man and the ability of ideas to overturn vested 
self-interest, prejudice, and the like. So let equality be 
enforced in the name of justice. For us to do this we have to 
show how it is that equality (or justified inequality in the 
case of John Rawls, to which I turn later) is an article of 
justice, how it is that a just society entails an egalitarian 
one. Can equality be enforced in the name of justice? 
Bernard Williams has put forward three arguments in favour 
of equality as a political ideal, the first two of which, the 
arguments from 'common humanity' and 'moral capacity', are 
arguments for a form of equality far removed from equality of 
wealth. The first of these arguments maintains that there are 
'definable characteristics universal to humanity' such as the 
desire for self-respect and affection and susceptibility to 
pain, and that political and social arrangements should 
respond to these characteristics accordingly. Williams's 
second argument, that from moral capacity, makes use of the 
Kantian notion of persons as intrinsic moral agents to be 
treated with due and equal moral respect as ends in 
themselves, as equal members of the Kingdom of Ends. 
Most non-egalitarians would not, I think, be overly 
troubled by either argument. Equality of treatment called 
forth by these arguments can and does find a place in 
political theories that specifically eschew equality of wealth 
as a principle of justice, as a reading of Anarchy, state, and 
5 I should not want to rule out enforcing equality in the naae of justice at the same time as educating for it, but they are 
independent options nonetheless. The 'i1pose equality and to hell with justice' option is discounted. 
117 
Utopia for instance will make plain. Neither argument as it 
stands lends any weight to equality of wealth. I may take 
cognizance of your common humanity from the comfort of my 
Rolls Royce, and treat you as an end whilst yet having a 
thousand times as much wealth. As I am concerned only with 
equality of wealth I leave these two arguments and turn to the 
third argument. 
With this argument Williams calls into question the 
consistency of recognising the equivalence of some ground of 
distribution, say need, over two or more similar cases whilst 
treating these cases differently, i.e. unequally, when it 
comes to satisfying or meeting this ground. The grounds are 
the same and the reasons for meeting them are the same, yet 
they are not met equally. Schematically, Williams's argument 
is this (using his example): 
(1) The proper ground for receipt of medical care is ill-
health. '[T]his is a necessary truth'. 6 
(2) In some societies money is required in order to purchase 
medical attention. No money, no medical attention. Call these 
fee-societies. 
(3) Two people equally ill, and therefore equally in need of 
medical attention, are not treated equally, i.e. equally 
treated, because one cannot afford it. They are living in a 
fee-society. 
Williams concludes saying 'we have straightforwardly the 
situation of those whose needs are the same not receiving the 
same treatment, though the needs are the ground of the 
treatment. This is an irrational state of affairs.' 7 The 
import of the argument would seem to be that similar cases 
call for or should be accorded similar treatment, and clearly 
fee-societies do not treat similar cases similarly. Ill-health 
is the ground for distribution and receipt of medical 
attention, but in a fee-society only some, the wealthy, can 
secure that something all ill persons have a bona fide ground 
6 Williams, 'The Idea of Equality',p.l63. 
7 Ibid.,p.l63. 
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for claiming. And this, we are told, 'rings hollow to the 
point of cynicism'. 8 
The poor ill have the relevant reason for claiming medical 
attention, namely ill-health, but lack the 'operativeness of 
reasons' because without money they cannot secure medical 
attention. Expressed in another way, if everyone has in their 
ill-health the ground for receiving medical attention but some 
lack the causally requisite condition for securing it (money 
in this case), then Williams says we have 'a situation in 
which reasons are insufficiently operative; it is a situation 
insufficiently controlled by reasons - and hence by reason 
itself.' 9 
Williams's argument could work if one accepted a particular 
understanding of the nature of rights and what it is to have 
rights that the argument might trade on. Let us assume that 
Williams operates with just such an understanding. On this 
understanding, to have a right to something entails having 
also the right to the means or pre-conditions necessary and 
sufficient to satisfy or fulfil that right. If a person has 
the right to medical attention then he has also the right to 
whatever it is that fulfilling his right entails, such as 
money, the time and effort of doctors, etc. So construed, this 
right is a positive right. This is something we need not 
accept. Furthermore, we would do well to reject this 
understanding lest we land ourselves with an impracticable 
morality. 10 Why not rights 'all the way down', whereby the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of securing that to which 
one has a right (that which one is not prohibited from 
securing) is the having of prior rights, say in resources? 
'I am not prohibited from x-ing' entails, 'I have a right to 
x'. But from 'I have a right to x' it does not obviously 
follow that 'I have the right to whatever I need in order to 
x'. I may indeed have rights in or over whatever I need in 
8 b'd I 1 .,p.l64. 
g Ibid.,p.l64. 
10 Mackie, Etbics: Inventing Right and iirong,pp.l29-34. 
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order to x, but they could be rights I have independently of x 
or my x-ing. Rights over resources frequently are rights of 
this type. Maybe all talk of a right to medical attention is 
unwarranted in the first instance for in a fee-society there 
may well be no right to medical care as such. Instead, there 
is the freedom to exchange for goods and services offered by 
others, which may or may not include medical attention. 
Rather, then, we should say that one is free to purchase 
medical attention if it is offered at a price one can and is 
willing to meet. On this understanding there are no antecedent 
rights to anything, let alone to medical attention and the 
means to secure it. 
As to the charge of irrationality levelled against the fee-
society, it can be parried easily enough. By this criticism 
Williams seems to align himself with a system of rule equality 
whereby every constituent member of a class has an equal claim 
to that which has been accorded to the class as a whole, and 
other persons satisfying the conditions under which an 
individual or class has been accorded a claim to something 
constitute equal claimants. From this the charge of 
irrationality fails to carry, simply because there is not only 
; a single rule operating and being controverted. on the 
contrary, in the case of the fee-society it would seem that 
there are two rules operating, neither of which is sufficient 
but which are jointly necessary and sufficient for securing 
medical attention. These are the rule that one be ill - which 
all satisfy - and the other the rule the class of poor ill 
persons cannot satisfy but which the class of wealthy ill 
persons can, namely the financial rule. There is no 
inconsistency between these two rules, and whilst such a state 
of affairs may be undesirable it hardly seems irrational. 
Certain situations demand equality for the sake of 
consistency, but fee-societies can meet these demands without 
assuming rights to the means to secure other, equal, rights. 
'Treat equals equally' is an injunction of a vastly different 
order to the injunction 'Everyone to be equal', where the 
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latter expresses not the treatment to be accorded persons in 
lieu of relevant similarities shared by them, but the call for 
all persons to be made equal in as many respects as 
(technically, presumably?) possible, and to be treated equally 
in these respects. 
Let me turn now to a brief account of what sort of 
societies fee-societies are, and how wealth differentials are 
brought about, i.e. how it is that they are able to embody 
certain formal rule equalities according each and every 
individual rights to things whilst denying that this entails 
also the right to the means required to secure that thing, and 
how they are not irrational in denying this entailment. My 
concern will focus primarily on the manner in which wealth 
differentials eventuate in these societies, and though the 
portrayal is brief it captures the essence of the mechanics of 
unequal wealth generation.ll 
(i) Individuals are possessed of varying identifiable 
abilities, talents, gifts and capacities which they just have 
as a result of their natural and environmental circumstances. 
Call these their natural assets. I have a keen eye and a 
steady hand, you a strong voice and a passion for singing. 
(ii) In those societies where persons are at liberty to 
exercise or use their natural assets they may choose to do so. 
Assume that they do. I pursue a career in watch-repairing, you 
a career in opera. 
(iii) In those societies where persons are at liberty to 
dispose of their property they may elect to do so, under 
conditions of their own choosing. 
(iv) One way in which persons may dispose of their property is 
by transferring some or all of it to those exercising their 
natural assets. Assume that they do just this. 
(v) Those exercising their natural assets gain financially, 
and some gain more than others. I have a modest income working 
11 My example is similar to Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain example: Anarchy, State, and Utopia,pp.160-4. Nozick uses his 
example to illustrate a different point. 
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from home, you do very well from multiple appearances at La 
Scala. 
(vi) Differential wealth distributions are generated. 
It does not matter whether these differentials develop 
subsequent to an initial equal or an initial unequal 
distribution of wealth, for the latter allows for the creation 
of a new matrix of unequal distribution with different persons 
having more or less than they had prior to any exchanges. 
Neither is it proposed that (ii) presupposes (iii). The 
exercising of natural assets does not necessarily presume 
financial gain or the expectation of it. Not all natural 
assets are rewarded when exercised, and not all assets that 
are rewarded are rewarded equally well. What determines 
whether a talent is rewarded, and to the extent that it is, is 
a product of the decisions of individual persons made under 
(ii), (iii) and (iv). It is a product largely of the supply of 
the exercise of a natural asset and the demand for it. 
Societies like this are familiar enough, and despite tax 
measures that seek to limit inequalities wealth differentials, 
sometimes of vast proportions, are common to them. Fee-
societies are not obviously irrational in embodying a layer of 
rules, the prerequisites of which determine membership in a 
specific class and subsequent equal treatment of the members 
of that class. This still leaves the possibility that equality 
of wealth is demanded in the name of justice, and hence that 
wealth differentials ought not to be tolerated. A number of 
options are available to the egalitarian. If prevention is 
thought to be better than cure then certain natural assets, 
for example the more rare ones, could be nullified by the 
appliance of science. Persons' tastes could be altered by 
means of aversion therapy. Similar assets in others could be 
developed and released onto the market until it becomes 
saturated and differential gains from its exercise are not 
forthcoming. Alternatively, the exercise of some assets, or 
the differential rewarding of them, might be prohibited. We 
could 'tax back' to equality. I shall not examine these 
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options individually, only pause to say that some seem at 
present implausible, some wrong and some (to some people) too 
high a price to pay for equality. 
That equality of wealth might be a precept of justice is a 
conclusion reached by Rawls. He argues that all inequalities 
are to be justified, failing which justice demands equality, 
and that there is only a single justification for inequality. 
A systematic examination of Rawls's theory would be too large 
an undertaking, and so I prudently confine myself to the task 
of mooting possible - and it is hoped, not implausible -
objections to it. 
Justice begins with the original position. The original 
position is the pre-institutional gathering of moral selves 
behind the veil of ignorance, under which conditions the 
participants, who are taken to be rationally self-interested, 
must unanimously choose principles of justice which they are 
to abide by, even when it is not in their individual self-
interest to so abide. Behind the veil of ignorance these moral 
selves know nothing about what natural endowments they possess 
nor what place they shall occupy in society. These self-
interested but endowment-ignorant persons choose the 
substantive principles of justice that are to govern their 
post-original-position institutions. According to Rawls, they 
will reach agreement on two principles of justice. The first 
is that each is to have as much liberty as is co-possible with 
a like liberty for others, and the second that inequalities 
are justified only if they work to the advantage of the least 
well-off group in society. This second principle is Rawls's 
famous 'difference principle', which legislates that: 'All 
social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, 
and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally 
unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values 
is to everyone's advantage. '12 
12 Rawls, A Theory of Justice,p.62. These are the Rawlsean 'primary goods', goods that all persons want if they want 
anything at all. 
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Social institutions are to be structured in line with the 
principles of justice, for it is their function to serve and 
protect justice, and Rawls specifically says of the difference 
principle that it rules out justifying institutions on the 
utilitarian grounds that the hardships borne by some are 
offset by an aggregate greater good. 'It may be expedient but 
it is not just', Rawls writes, 'that some should have less in 
order that others may prosper. But there is no injustice in 
the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the 
situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved. , 13 
That institutions are derived from and subservient to moral 
theory Rawls makes abundantly clear, and the moral theory that 
grounds his difference principle is one that, in conjunction 
with the choice made in the original position, denies the 
legitimacy of any theory of distributive justice which 
connects holdings to the possession of morally (because 
naturally) arbitrary characteristics. 'There is no more 
reason', Rawls argues, 'to permit the distribution of income 
and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets 
than by historical and social fortune' , 14 and 'No-one deserves 
his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favourable 
starting place in society.'~ It is the function of the 
difference principle, as applied, to compensate those 
disadvantaged in the arbitrary lottery of natural fortune. 
Natural endowments are in a moral sense not properly deserved 
by the possessors of them and therefore neither can the 
benefits thereof be said to be properly deserved. He who 
deserves not the endowments deserves not the benefits that 
flow from them. Those who do well tend to do well because 
favoured, or not disadvantaged, by the natural lottery, and 
similarly those who do not do well tend to fare worse because 
less favoured, or positively disadvantaged, by the 
distribution of natural assets. (Of two disadvantaged persons 
13 b'd I 1 .,p.15. 
14 b'd I 1 .,p.74. 
15 b'd I 1 • ,p.102. 
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one can be less disadvantaged than the other. In the land o f 
the blind the one-eyed man is king.) The difference principle 
justifies redistributing from the well-to-do to the less well 
off. 
At present anyway talents, natural affinities, social 
fortune, and such like, cannot always be cancelled out or 
neutralised. Hereditary peerages can be abolished and 
inheritances confiscated, but it is considerably more 
problematic to efface a public school education once acquired, 
or a talent in biochemistry. Rawls is well aware of this , 
saying that 'it is not in general to the advantage of the less 
fortunate to propose policies which reduce the talents of 
others' . 16 All are made worse off for that. Rather, we ought to 
conceive of talents as social assets to be ut i lised in the 
service of the 'common advantage'. Accordingly, we treat the 
naturally well-endowed with due respect by 'arrangi ng 
inequalities for reciprocal advantage a nd by abstaining from 
the exploitation of the contingencies of nature and social 
circumstance within a framework of equal liberty. , 17 
Granted that endowments are arbitrarily, so amorally, 
distributed, and that it can be shown that the recipients of 
such good fortune have no claim to the benefits flowing from 
them, the assertion that they are rightly social assets and 
belong equally to one and all remains to be substantiated. 
Showing that individuals do not deserve 'their' assets is not 
automatically to show that society as a whole does deserve 
them. If moral arbitrariness does undermine desert, then by 
itself it fails to establish any alternative as to how assets 
are to be regarded and the benefits thereof distributed. The 
argument from arbitrariness is this, and as can be seen it 
proves too much: 18 
P People should be permitted to retain only what they deserve . 
Pl People have natural assets. 
16 b'd I 1 .,p.107. 
17 b'd I 1 .,p.l79. 
18 These syllogisms take their cue from Narveson's 'Equality vs. Liberty: Advantage, Liberty',pp.41-2. 
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P2 No person deserves their natural assets. 
Cl We should take all natural assets from all people. 
(Cl* Differential rewards flowing from natural assets should 
be taken from all people.) 
What Rawls does is advance the following argument: 
P' What a person does not deserve should be divided equally. 
Pl People have natural assets. 
P3 No person deserves any natural assets any more than any 
other person. 
C2 All natural assets should be distributed equally. 
(c2* Differential rewards flowing from natural assets should 
be distributed equally.) 
But conclusion C2(C2*) does not follow from P3 because P3 
follows from P2, and the conclusion of P2 is Cl(Cl*). From the 
supposition that no person deserves their natural assets it 
follows that no person deserves their natural assets any more 
than any other person. What is needed is a premiss to the 
effect that natural assets are deserved in some way by 
someone, but then, of course, no such premiss is compatible 
with P2. An argument with such a premiss would look something 
like this: 
P' What a person does not deserve should be divided equally. 
Pl People have natural assets. 
P2 No person deserves any natural assets any more than any 
other person, but some people do deserve their natural assets. 
C2 All natural assets should be distributed equally. 
(c2* Differential rewards flowing from natural assets should 
be distributed equally.) 
But if some people do deserve their natural assets then it 
follows that neither Cl(Cl*) nor C2(C2*) is true. Rawls cannot 
draw egalitarian conclusions from any argument that contains 
the essential premiss that no person deserves their natural 
assets, and if he yields this premiss then it follows that 
some people do deserve their natural assets and what flows 
from them. 
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Indeed, it may be that desert-based arguments favouring the 
Rawlsean conclusion are just not available. One reason for 
thinking this would be if the five bases of desert identified 
by Joel Feinberg are exhaustive. Only one of these bases is at 
all relevant here, that of 'compensation, reparation and 
liability' . 19 According to Feinberg's typology, we should view 
the difference principle as a maxim for compensation, where 
compensation applies to 'losses which are no-one's fault'. 
Natural assets, as the arbitrary product of the natural 
lottery, are losses of this type. Their very arbitrariness 
assures this. Though the better endowed (and presumably the 
better off) are not deserving neither, it would seem, are the 
less well-endowed (less well off) deserving - the basis upon 
which the difference principle compensates. Compensation for 
intentional harm is one thing, 'Compensation for harm which is 
no assignable person's fault is, however, a different 
matter'. 20 The less and the better endowed are equally 
undeserving; so what justifies compensating the former from 
the holdings of the latter? 
A second objection to the Rawlsean project arises with the 
threat of our losing sight of persons amongst the natural_ 
assets they bear but which are not part of them. Recall that 
the original position is that pre-institutional gathering of 
moral selves - denuded of all knowledge of their post-choice 
empirical characteristics and situation - wherein the two 
principles of justice are selected. Yet Rawls allows that what 
distinguishes individuals from one another are empirical 
characteristics, namely their wants, desires, aims, natural 
assets, etc. This suggests that persons are decomposable into 
two parts, the one the moral subject and the other the human 
being, so to speak. All that is me that is not a property or 
attribute of the moral self is ascribed to the human being. 
19 Feinberg, 'Justice and Desert' ,p. 75. ~e other four types are 'Awards of prizes; assign~ents of grades; rewards and 
punishment; praise, bla.e and other inforaal responses'. 
20 b'd I 1 • ,p.86. 
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In the original position I am only the former, and there the 
moral subject chooses the principles that are to govern the 
recombined whole. 21 
The moral self is the Kantian end in itself. 'Each person', 
writes Rawls, 'possesses an inviolability founded on justice 
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. 
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for 
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does 
not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed 
by the larger sum of advantages en joyed by many. '22 
The dichotomous self, as it might be styled, is integral to 
the Rawlsean project. But just how easy is it to make this 
division? Perhaps we want to say that any contingent asset 
cannot be an essential constituent of the self lest one's 
sense of identity be vulnerable to transformation by the least 
vagary of experience. Assets are 'mine', in the sense that 
they are located here under 'my' control, but not me. But 
perhaps we should not baulk at the suggestion that empirical 
features are constitutive of the self if we picture assets, 
desires, etc., as woven into the fabric of one's sense of 
identity, some of which are undoubtedly dispensable without 
affecting that sense, but others of which are not. In the film 
Whose Life Is It Anyway? Richard Dreyfuss plays a sculptor who 
loses his contingent ability to sculpt when paralysed. He may 
well remain the same moral self but he nonetheless experiences 
a loss of sense of identity, and a substantial loss at that. 
Kafka's metamorphic Gregor Samsa might have wished to say 
something much the same. 
The intention behind these examples is to illustrate the 
point that though some contingent features are certainly not 
constitutive of me others may well be. Legislating a priori 
seems not to settle the matter. And if there is any truth in 
21 Barry thinks Rawls's view that 11en are not owners of their natural abilities a 'curious view': On Classical Liberalis• 
and Libertarianisl,pp.l47-8. 
22 Rawls, A Theory of Justice,pp.J-4. 
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this we cannot so easily drive the required wedge between the 
me and the 'mine', in order to utilise the 'mine' without 
using me. I am not pressing for a radically situated subject, 
i.e. where the self is not separable at all from its ends, but 
wish only to cast doubt on the model of the easily divisible 
dichotomous self. 
Before proceeding to the final consideration contra 
Rawlsean justified inequality, another reflection on the 
argument from moral arbitrariness might serve to pump 
intuitions - if nothing else. Cases attesting to the 
transition from a deprived, socially disadvantageous natural 
lot to one of achievement and success are not unheard of. This 
outcome is itself morally arbitrary by the standards of the 
deep theory of endowments - the theory subsuming how we choose 
to exercise our assets - but it does stretch our intuitions to 
maintain that the rags to riches achiever does not in any way 
deserve at least a portion of his success and attendant 
benefits. Working long and hard against the odds, coming from 
nothing, making good, are all tied in with our everyday 
discourse and understanding of desert. Rawls is free of course 
to maintain that any and all morally arbitrary conditions that 
are relevant in such cases cannot be bases of desert, but our 
intuitions may suggest otherwise - and intuitions are not so 
easily hurdled. Being better off in spite of encumbrances 
bestowed by the natural lottery in endowments is not the same 
as being better off just because the natural lottery happened 
to favour one. Again, what our intuitions are possibly 
intimating is that we are in danger of losing sight of persons 
by putting all betterment down to the workings of that blind, 
impersonal force we know nature to be. 
In conclusion I moot one final consideration that has a 
bearing on Rawlsean equality. The argument is an empirical one 
and, further, one that conforms to an invisible-hand model in 
accounting for the unintentional generation of the greatest 
good via other intentional actions of individual agents. It is 
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an argument that is familiar enough, and as I am only 
concerned with the conclusion I shall not recount it here. 23 
Even if Rawls is right and those in the original position 
would choose his two principles of justice, they will, if they 
are concerned with the least well-off group, so this reasoning 
goes, be choosing what amounts to a laissez-faire system or a 
system of natural liberty of holdings and exchanges which 
tolerates all and any wealth differentials. What if, following 
Adam Smith, a laissez-faire system tolerating all wealth 
differentials resulted not only in a greater aggregate good 
but increased the well-being of all in the long term? Some 
groups may have their position improved more than others, and 
wealth differentials may widen, but all are made better off, 
even though the less well off could have done better in the 
short term under a different system, one that was broadly 
redistributive. Thus the reading of the dictum cited earlier 
would change to: 'It is expedient and it is just, or not 
unjust, that some have relatively less in order that all may 
prosper'. This is a possibility Rawls allows for, recognising 
as he does that 'in theory the difference principle permits 
indefinitely large inequalities in return for small gains to 
the less favoured.'M 
Acceptance of the difference principle does entail that 
some will have absolutely less in order that others may 
prosper because the better endowed are worse off than they 
would otherwise be under a system of natural liberty, for 
instance. Consider in this regard the difficulty for Rawls's 
anti-utilitarian proviso raised by the problem of finite 
resources and justice across generations. (Rawls does not 
discuss natural resources in this context, only capital.) 
That the difference principle justifies inequality only if 
it improves the lot of the least well-off group seems to allow 
for the consumption of all, or the greater part, of a fixed 
resource, oil say, at time t 1 by generation g 1 , thereby 
23 See Hayek, Tbe Constitution of Liberty,pp.39-53, for one variant of the arguaent. 
24 Rawls , A Theory of Justice,p.536. 
130 
leaving less for generation g 2 at time t 2 . But without an 
explanation of why g 1 at t 1 , even the least well-off group 
within g 1 , should prosper at the expense of g 2 at t 2 , the 
difference principle conflicts with Rawls's anti-utilitarian 
proviso, re it being expedient but not just that some should 
have less in order that others may prosper. How we might 
determine the shares of a fixed resource g 1 or g 2 are to 
receive, if any, can be brought out by turning to an argument 
of Samuel Scheffler's. 
Scheffler's argument purports to show that it is reasonable 
to introduce consequentialist considerations into 
deontological theories when there is no method for deciding 
between two or more courses of action that equally satisfy the 
conditions of the deontological theory in which they arise. 25 
With regard to the consumption of finite resources, however we 
choose some do gain at the expense of others. Some will have 
less, namely g 2 at t 2 , if finite resources are made available 
for consumption at t 1 , and g 1 will have less if they must 
forsake consumption in order that g 2 should benefit. Applying 
Scheffler's reasoning to the relation between fixed resources 
and the difference principle and the anti-utilitarian proviso 
together, we have the situation where we should violate the 
proviso disallowing consequentialism a role because the 
proviso is violated either way. If g1 uses some or all of a 
resource, thereby leaving less or none for g 2 , it prospers at 
the expense of g 2 • If g 2 are to be left resources that could 
have been used for the benefit of g 1 , then they prosper to the 
detriment of g 1 • Assuming that g 2 's consumption would yield 
greater utility over g1 's; or that the unavailability of the 
resource at t 2 would affect g 2 detrimentally to a greater 
extent than if unavailable to g 1 ; or that g 2 lose more than g 1 
would gain, then if we were to know this we will be lead to 
choose against g1 and in favour of g2 • It is an empirical 
matter, a question of how the utility sums turn out. 
25 Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentia1isl,pp.99-100. 
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Whatever happens some people gain at the expense of others, 
independently of how we choose, if we choose. Given this 
outcome, ought we not to aim at the greatest gain over the 
least loss? In this scenario the deontological theory cannot 
help us in choosing between the rival courses of action 
because each is equally impermissible from the point of view 
of that theory. Each is not, however, equally impermissible 
from the consequentialist standpoint, and so we reasonably 
adopt that point of view and allow such considerations to play 
the role of decision-maker in order to break the impasse. 
Putting the two strands toget her, if consequences do have a 
secondary role to play in deontological theories when an 
impasse is reached - as appears to be the case in the conflict 
between the difference principle and the anti-utilitarian 
proviso - and if the conclusion that laissez-faire works best 
is correct, then the difference principle becomes forthwith 
the justification for what is, effectively, a system of 
natural liberty. All inequalities of wealth do, as a point of 
fact, work to the advantage of all or to the greater good of a 
greater number and hence are justified. No other, more 
stringent equality is demanded in the name of Rawlsean 
justice. 
I want now to look at an argument advanced by Ernest 
Loevinsohn to the effect that 'from a purely libertarian point 
of view' government ought to coercively redistribute goods. 
One reason for examining this argument is that it is not 
really an argument for redistribution on libertarian grounds 
but rather because redistribution is believed to maximise the 
satisfaction of desires. Loevinsohn misconstrues the essential 
nature of libertarianism, and on this basis attempts to push 
through an argument against it. Appearances notwithstanding, 
the argument is a teleological one masquerading as 
deontological. Thus the argument is wide of the mark as an 
objection to libertarianism worked from within. This is the 
main thrust of my criticism. 
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Because of his misconstrual it is not at all transparent 
that Loevinsohn is objecting to libertarianism at all. He says 
that the coercive prevention of a person's pursuit of some or 
other course of action is the curtailment of his liberty. 26 
Preventing someone from pursuing a course of action is a 
constraint upon his freedom. In the broad sense of freedom 
this is certainly true. However, and as should be evident from 
the preceding pages, libertarians do not hold to the broad 
view carte blanche. For them, liberty is subordinate to 
rights; one is free to act - there ought not to be any 
constraints upon action - where that act, pursuing that course 
of action, does not involve violating persons' rights. One's 
liberty is the sum of those actions one is not precluded from 
performing by the rights of others. 
Furthermore, the argument proceeds to its conclusion only 
by virtue of the inclusion of a rather dubious assumption. 
Where this assumption does not hold the argument will not go 
through. Some promptings as to why we might doubt the veracity 
of this assumption are given. Whilst they do not constitute a 
knock-down refutation of the argument they do blunt its thrust 
somewhat. What they suggest is that whether government should 
redistribute according to Loevinsohn's justification is, i n 
the final analysis, and as befits a consequentialist account, 
an empirical matter. Finally, some possible ramifications of 
what Loevinsohn says are advanced with the primary purpose of 
showing that redistribution can go much further on his 
justification than he instances, and where this new territory 
is morally questionable. 
Is it better, from a purely libertarian stance, for 
government to coercively transfer property from some to 
others, or not? Loevinsohn argues that it is. Government would 
coercively transfer, without compensation, the ownership of 
goods from some citizens (the producers) to others (the 
recipients), and this would 'raise the overall l evel of 
satisfaction of wants. For the persons who would receive the 
26 Loevinsohn, 'Liberty and the Redistribution of Property' ,p.229. 
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goods in question ... are poorer than the producers, and they 
have a greater desire to use or consume the goods than do the 
producers.' 27 What Loevinsohn calls t he 'property rights view' 
says that such redistribution is contrary to liberty, and that 
government should therefore choose the non-redistributive 
alternative. {Whether or not this view includes an escape 
clause, e.g. 'a duty to satisfy extremely urgent needs', ~ 
i s neither here nor there.) 
Opposed to the property rights view is 'the view that 
insofar as the government is guided by considerations of 
l i berty, it should choose the redistributive alte r native.' 29 It 
i s Loevinsohn's purpose to show that the redistributive 
a l ternative best satisfies a commitment to the maximisation of 
liberty and is therefore preferable - on supposedly 
libertarian grounds - to the property rights view. The 
redistributive alternative entails curtailment of the liberty 
of producers to use and consume the goods they have produced. 
Does the non-redistributive alternative entail any curtailment 
of liberty? Loevinsohn maintains that it does: it curtails the 
l iberty of non-producers 'by the threat of legal penalties 
from using or consuming the goods'. 30 And it is precisely this 
that is taken to be definitive of the curtailment of liberty. 
Producers' ownership of goods means that others are 
excluded from using or consuming them without the owners' 
consent. Where they desire to use and consume them, and are 
coercively prevented from doing so, their liberty is 
curtailed. '[I]f we prevent someone from acting in the way she 
desires, we must be able to show cause why she should be 
prevented. Otherwise it is wrong to prevent her. Prima facie 
then, we are obligated to refrain from preventing anyone from 
acting in the way she desires to act. ' 31 
27 b'd I 1 . ,pp.226-7. 
28 b'd I1 . ,p.221. 
29 b'd I 1 .,p.227 . 
30 b'd I 1 .,p.229. 
31 b'd I 1 • ,p. 231 . 
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It is here, for the first time, that the consequentialist 
nature of Loevinsohn's critique of libertarianism becomes 
plain. It need only be asked, 'And what of the desires of the 
producers to act as they desire, presumably in ways that make 
exclusive use of goods they have produced?' Asking that 
question leads directly back to the initial assumption - the 
dubious empirical assumption - that to allow the satisfaction 
of the producers' desires would not raise the overall level of 
satisfaction of wants, and to be concerned with the 
satisfaction of wants is to be libertarian. And the refutation 
of this is: no libertarian, and especially not any of those I 
have cited, is concerned with so overtly utilitarian an 
outcome as the overall maximisation of the satisfaction of 
wants. 
Loevinsohn's disguised utilitarian commitment is revealed 
by the following question he poses. Both the redistributive 
and the non-redistributive alternatives entail the curtailment 
of liberty. The question is, which involves the greater 
curtailment? The latter, says Loevinsohn, his reasoning being 
that 'if the non-redistributive alternative is chosen, the 
recipients will be barred from the goods in question. This 
will frustrate certain of their desires. (Overall, however, 
there will be less frustration of people's desires if the 
redistributive alternative is chosen.)' 32 Person's desires are 
the variable in discerning the greater curtailments of freedom 
from the lesser. Curtailments of liberty are greater when the 
action the person is prevented from performing is of greater 
importance to him. The extent to which liberty is curtailed 
depends, ceteris paribus, on how important the course of 
action in question is to the agent. 33 This is Loevinsohn's 
'importance-to-the-agent' factor, which he believes provides a 
libertarian reason to choose the redistributive alternative. 
Loevinsohn illustrates how this factor operates. In case 
one, X is about to drink from a stream he has come across when 
32 Ibid.,p.235 (emphasis added). 
33 b'd I 1 .,p.232. 
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armed men appear and tell him that he cannot drink from that 
spot but will have to move one or two feet farther downstream. 
'However, it is not very important to X whether he drinks 
where he is, or two feet away.' 34 In case two the same happens 
toY, only Y is prevented from drinking at all from his 
favourite stream, and he was rather looking forward to 
drinking from this stream. For Y, drinking from this, his 
favourite stream, is quite important to him. Y has to drink 
from another stream. Case three sees z prevented from drinking 
at the stream 'when, as he knows, the nearest alternative 
source of water is so many miles away that he might collapse 
from thirst before he got there. So it is very, very important 
to Z to drink from the spring.' 35 'In sum, the more important 
the blocked course of action is to the person, the more the 
person's liberty is curtailed (other things being equal).' 36 
Applying the importance-to-the-agent factor to the 
redistributive and non-redistributive alternatives answers the 
question which of them most curtails liberty. The non-
redistributive alternative involves a greater curtailment of 
liberty because of the assumption that the recipients have a 
greater desire to use and consume the producers' goods than do 
the producers themselves. It is more-important-to-the-
recipients that they use and consume than it is important to 
the producers. 
Coming now to my criticisms of the argument, this looks 
very much like an underlying utilitarian argument for the 
redistribution of goods. Goods are to be redistributed because 
doing so means less liberty will be curtailed than otherwise 
would be, because those to whom the goods are redistributed 
have greater desires to use and consume them. It is more 
important to them. Loevinsohn denies his argument is 
underpinned by utilitarianism of some or other variety: '[T]he 
argument does not require that we be consequentialists with 
34 b'd I 1 .,p.m. 
35 b'd I 1 .,p.233. 
36 b'd I 1 .,p.233. 
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regard to liberty ... as I have tried to show, it [government] 
will be curtailing liberty less if it chooses the 
redistributive alternative.' 37 My objection is to the contrary 
conclusion. Where liberty is the only criterion, to favour 
less rather than more curtailment of liberty is precisely to 
be a consequentialist about liberty. The argument is no more 
than a misdirected critique of libertarianism on the mistaken 
grounds that to be a libertarian is to be wedded to the 
maximisation of personal liberty tout court. The slogan 
'Prohibiting prohibited' is not an epithet that does full 
justice to libertarianism. Despite his protestations to the 
contrary, Loevinsohn's importance-to-the-agent factor, reduced 
as it is to one of desire-satisfaction, cannot be anything but 
a consequentialism-about-liberty argument. It is an argument 
that has just the same form as does Friedman's argument 
against the compulsory purchase of social insurance 
encountered earlier. 
What Loevinsohn appears to be doing is something like this: 
1. Positing a maximisation of liberty account (though he 
himself denies this). 
2. Building into the account the assumption that recipients 
have stronger desires for the goods than do the producers of 
them. Call this Assumption 2. This may well be an erroneous 
assumption. 
3. Noting that Utility calculations follow a procedural 
formula, and that with this formula the outcome is completely 
a product of the variables factored in. 
4. Factoring in the essential variable that recipients' 
desires are stronger than producers', i.e. factoring in 
Assumption 2. A consequence of which is that redistribution 
satisfies more in terms of desires. 
5. Concluding that utility - liberty - therefore favours the 
redistributive alternative. 
n . Ibld.,pp.237-8. 
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But what if Assumption 2 is mistaken? I think that we have 
reason to believe that it in fact is. 38 If Assumption 2 is 
mistaken then a case can be made for the property rights view 
on grounds of satisfaction of desires that are important-to-
agents. Were this case to go through we would then have 
libertarian grounds, in so far as Loevinsohn understands them, 
for choosing the non-redistributive over the redistributive 
alternative. 
From the standpoint of liberty, and all other things being 
equal, it might well seem eminently rational for government to 
redistribute in the broad way Loevinsohn suggests. If the 
government is going to have to curtail liberty either·way (it 
is not a question of curtailing as opposed to allowing to be 
curtailed), then it is better that it curtail liberty less 
rather than more. But this serves only to muddy the waters and 
disguise the fact that Loevinsohn contends for a desire-
satisfaction justification of redistribution. Liberty is not 
what is important. What is important is the desire-
satisfaction that persons would otherwise not get because 
precluded, in the absence of government intervention, from the 
goods necessary to sate their desires. 
We can make good sense of our ranking our desires according 
to their strength, and seeking to satisfy those desires that 
have a higher ordering first. We have a rank-ordered utility 
structure. My desire to write this chapter is less than my 
desire to enjoy a nice cold beer in the garden of the local 
public house. That is just being honest. But both are less 
strong than my desire that I do what I believe is expected of 
me. And so I write the chapter and forego the beer. 
The comparison and weighting of desires is applicable 
interpersonally. Economists have perhaps devised methods for 
yielding interpersonal utility comparisons. They may determine 
them according to the price one is prepared to pay for a good 
under ideal conditions, or by how much immediate satisfaction 
38 One way of aeasuring the strength of desires is in terms of preparedness to produce. Presumably, recipients fail this 
test. 
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one is prepared to sacrifice for greater long-term gains. 
Whatever economists' methods, humans have been employing folk 
psychology in making such comparisons, though more crudely, 
for centuries. They have done this using general facts about 
human psychology and motivation: that A chooses vanilla ice-
cream over chocolate and chocolate over strawberry shows A's 
preference is for vanilla. B's choosing in the reverse order 
shows his preference ranking. In much the same way as we 
choose chocolate over vanilla ice-cream, though we desire 
both, so we choose to give to A rather than B a vanilla ice-
cream on the basis of the strength of A's desire. 
Let me turn now to the issue of producers and recipients. 
We want to know, of the goods Loevinsohn has in mind, whether 
the recipients have a greater desire to use or consume them. 
Loevinsohn assumes that they do, as indeed he must if his 
argument is to show that the redistributive alternative is 
preferable on grounds of 'liberty' (read 'desire 
satisfaction'). But if his argument is to be damaging to 
libertarianism it depends entirely on the truth of this 
dubious empirical assumption, which I have dubbed Assumption 
2. Are the recipients starving? Or is Loevinsohn's account 
premissed on diminishing marginal utilities? It can make a 
difference. Loevinsohn does not say. All we know is that the 
sort of desires that producers have, and that the 
redistributive alternative frustrates, are, unsurprisingly, 
the desires 'to bequeath the goods in question to their 
children ... or •.• that the benefits of their labor accrue to 
themselves.'39 Are we taking from the exceptionally rich to 
give to the horribly poor, or only from those who produce and 
have a little more? If it is a case of Getty-Rockefeller 
versus the starving, tired, poor, huddled masses, then 
possibly interpersonal utility comparisons are made easily 
enough. If not, then can we be sure our interpersonal 
comparisons are valid? 
39 Loevinsohn, 'Liberty and the Redistribution of Property' , p. 235. 
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A further likely real world complication is distinctions 
within the class of recipients itself, namely where there are 
better- and worse-off recipients, though all recipients are 
worse off than any producer. Redistribution from the producers 
may by-pass completely the upper echelons of the recipient 
class because there is simply not enough to go round. The less 
well-off recipients have their desires satisfied and the 
better-off recipients' desires remain unsatisfied, as of 
course do the desires of the producers. 
This means that overall, despite stronger desires on the 
part of less well-off recipients, more liberty is lost than is 
gained. And similar reasoning can be applied to any three- or 
multi-party interaction between producers and the two or more 
classes of recipients, where the outcome is that if only one 
class can be granted the liberty to use and consume the goods 
then liberty may not be served any more by giving the goods to 
one class than it would be by giving them to any of the 
others. Other considerations will have to be imported to 
decide which class is to be accorded the users-and-consumers 
liberty. The libertarian stance, as Loevinsohn understands it, 
will have proved incapable of deciding by itself. Once this is 
recognised then talk of the rights of producers, the property 
rights view, becomes a live option. 
Eschewing talk of producers and recipients for the moment 
because the notion of producers is too vague - are producers 
those who contribute in any way to the productive process and 
are rewarded for it? - and because it may suggest the 
exceptionally rich versus the horribly poor picture, I shall 
talk instead of 'wealthy' desires and 'poor' desires. Call 
them w-desires and p-desires, where w-desires are those 
desires that necessitate large or above-average amounts of 
money to satisfy, and p-desires are those that require only 
small or below-average amounts of money for their 
satisfaction. A typical w-desire would be 'To own a Porsche', 
a typical p-desire 'To cover the dashboard with nylon fur'. 
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w-desires include those desires of the non-wealthy that 
require extensive wealth for their satisfaction. w- and 
p-desires, then, cut across the classes of those with and 
those without wealth. The wealthy may desire to eat fish and 
chips, the poor to dine on Beluga and Bollinger. For the sake 
of simplicity, I shall attribute the w- and p-desires to the 
wealthy and poor respectively, ignoring any real life 
intermixing, and thus allow the wealthier and the poorer to 
represent, respectively, the producers and the recipients. 
Now, it is a moot point whether a person's w-desire to send 
his son to Eton is, ceteris paribus, less important to him 
(to-the-agent) than is another's p-desire to send his son to 
the local secondary modern to get the three R's. Perhaps, 
furthermore, the former's son himself has a w-desire to go to 
Eton in order that he become a c ivil service mandarin, whilst 
the latter's son would rather play soccer for the communi ty 
youth team. In t he first case both parent and son may desire 
that he, the son, become a civil service mandarin. Two strong 
w-desires may outweigh, in terms of desire satisfact i on, many 
p-desires that could be satisfied by a redistribution of goods 
from the wealthy to the poor. Crudely put, it may be better -
on Loevinsohn's own account, mind - that one son should go to 
Eton and many sons play soccer than that one son should not go 
to Eton and the others acquire proficiency in the three R's. 
If w-desires for the goods in question are as numerous and as 
strong, or stronger though slightly less numerous, than 
p-desires, then utility or 'liberty' or desire satisfaction 
will not be served by redistribut ing from the wealthier to the 
poorer. 
Loevinsohn's argument depends upon: (i) recipients having 
stronger desires to goods than producers. If they did not then 
his argument would turn out to be one for maintaining the 
maximising status quo; or (ii) recipients' desires being less 
strong but more numerous. Many weak desires outweigh fewer 
stronger ones. Many p-desires for a cup of tea outweigh a few 
w-desires to acquire a public school education; or (iii) there 
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being fewer recipients but with stronger, and hence 
outweighing, desires. 
Loevinsohn's argument is too quick, it proves too much. 
What is more, by parity of reasoning it leads to unacceptable, 
or at least morally dubious, conclusio~s. Admittedly, as with 
his own justification, whether we are obliged to accept these 
potential ramifications and act upon them depends on the 
facts, the facts about what persons want to do and how much 
they want to do it. A person's liberty is curtailed when he is 
coercively prevented from pursuing some course of action. This 
opens the redistributive floodgates. '[A] person who is 
prevented from doing something which is of some importance to 
him is suffering a greater curtailment of liberty than you are 
the degree to which his liberty is thereby curtailed 
depends (other things being equal) on how important the course 
of action in question is to him.'W 
If Loevinsohn is committed to the stance that property 
rights can be defeated by considerations of liberty 
maximisation, what might be the consequences? Here are a few 
conjectures: the redistribution of body parts; the 
redistribution of liberty itself for the sake of utility or 
desire satisfaction gains now or in the future; the transfer 
of the newborn across families. 
The redistribution of body parts seems ruled out. 
Loevinsohn talks of the producers of goods. Clearly I do not 
produce my kidneys. But the difference between the produced 
and the natural or naturally occurring is a morally irrelevant 
difference. Body parts can be transferred from person to 
person in much the same way that material goods can. Such 
transfer would be justified when the 'donor' Jones's liberty 
·- ·· is not affected at all, as happens when he goes under general 
anaesthetic to have a tooth pulled and whilst under has a 
kidney removed without his consent, plus perhaps a pint of 
blood and some bone marrow. Jones never knows of this and may 
never find out. His liberty in this regard is quite 
40 b'd I 1 .,p.232. 
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unaffected. It would be justified, too, when Jones's liberty 
is affected only slightly, as happens when he is informed that 
one of his kidneys is to be removed, though he does not 
consent to this. His liberty is only slightly curtailed; he 
has to spend a day or two in hospital recuperating. Regaining 
his mobility from a redistributed kidney is more-important-to-
Smith than the loss of one of his two kidneys is important-to-
Jones. 
In both of these cases liberty is increased overall. In the 
first there is a gain and no loss, though there may possibly 
be a loss later if Jones's remaining kidney fails, and in the 
second there is a small loss and a great gain. In both cases 
the gain is a direct consequence of the transfer. Does it make 
a difference that in the second case Jones knows? To be sure, 
this is something that needs to be reckoned into the loss-gain 
calculations, though only, if liberty is paramount, from the 
standpoint of whether it increases or decreases liberty. The 
unhappiness, insecurity, etc., Jones might feel upon 
discovering what has happened to him, or knowing that it is 
about to happen, is not factored into the calculations unless 
they somehow affect those calculations themselves. For 
instance, if upon discovering what has been done to him whilst 
under anaesthetic Jones becomes psychologically quite unable 
to act as he wishes, and prior to the operation was able to, 
his liberty has been curtailed. {If non-libertarian 
considerations are to be factored in then Loevinsohn's thesis 
is considerably muddied.) 
It seems that Loevinsohn would tolerate the redistribution 
of body parts on the grounds that this would raise the overall 
level of the satisfaction of wants. People want kidneys, eyes, 
legs and the like. Doctors want them to transplant, and 
patients want them transplanted. Friends and relatives of the 
recipient want the doctors to transplant them. All these 
people have all these various desires and they are desires 
that have distinct conditions of satisfaction. Dr. Barnard 
desires that his patient receive a new heart, and this desire 
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is not going to be satisfied by Dr. Frankenstein's patient 
receiving a transplanted brain. 
Is the transfer of babies across families justifiable? 
Certainly, adoption is partly or largely a matter of natural 
parents who have less strong desires towards their children 
giving them up to couples who have stronger desires. Normally 
it is voluntary, but utility may prompt us to coercively 
redistribute babies, from large families to sterile couples, 
for example. 
Does Loevinsohn's argument justify the redistribution of 
liberty itself? Does it condone slavery or the partial 
enslavement of some? Does it condone slavery or the partial 
enslavement of some at time t 1 in order that at a later time 
t 2 they should be emancipated, and where the good of their 
later emancipation, minus the hardships of enslavement, 
results in a net gain? Perhaps the satisfaction of the desire 
to be free at t 2 is sufficiently great to outweigh the 
hardships of slavery and the non-satisfaction of the desire to 
be free at t 1 . It seems it must. Loevinsohn himself writes 
that redistribution to diminish the liberty of some to effect 
thereby an increase in the liberty of others is acceptable, 
providing only that 'the transfer would decrease the extent to 
which those [recipients'] desires go unsatisfied, and decrease 
it sufficiently to outweigh any increase in unsatisfied desire 
resulting from the transfer.'il 
May we be coerced into surrendering our Saturday mornings 
to wheel elderly folk round supermarkets so that they might do 
a spot of shopping, the justification being that their liberty 
to shop once a week is of overriding value? May we be press-
ganged into the merchant marine so consumers can have cheap 
pepper at the table? Here I raise the well-worn theme of the 
spectre of intolerable interference, justified in these cases 
by too zealous an affinity for utility. 
41 Ibid.,p.227. 
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Loevinsohn will have government transfer from 'the citizens 
who produced the goods to other citizens'.42 In modern 
economies who produces? Labourers? owners of factories? Who? 
His account turns into a general argument for (greater) 
equality or welfarism turning on the use of utility-cum-
liberty as the determining consideration: to those who have 
less, are poorer, from those who have more, are richer, where 
the former have a greater desire to use or consume the goods 
than do the latter. 
If Loevinsohn is arguing only for a possibility, i.e. for 
possible conditions under which redistribution is required, 
t hen we may discount it given what we know of the world. The 
possibility is but slight. Suppose we restrict the argument on 
Loevinsohn's behalf and have it apply only to the 
redistribution of goods and money. The looming totalitarian 
·ramifications are then headed off: press-ganging and the like 
are to be discounted. Does this help? Not as much as might be 
thought, due to the dubious empirical nature of Assumption 2. 
Loevinsohn's is an argument for contingent conditions under 
which coercive redistribution is justified. If the facts are 
thus-and-so then redistribution is to proceed, but if the 
facts are otherwise then not. Given what we know of the world 
we might discount the prospect of redistribution and the 
threat to the property rights view from this quarter as by no 
means alarming. 
The property rights view could prove to be the stance that 
maximises liberty, in the sense of freedom from the coercive 
powers of government - which is the model of liberty 
Loevinsohn seems in places to be operating with. The property 
rights view would maximise liberty on the assumption that it 
granted, not unreasonably for an account of its kind, property 
rights to persons over their body parts. Being a l l owed to keep 
one's kidneys, eyes and so on, is a legitimate invocation of 
the term liberty. It would maximise liberty because producers 
and recipients would have rights and protection of those 
42 b'd I 1 .,p.226. 
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rights over things that are important to them. Under the 
redistributive alternative this need not happen; the only gain 
would be in recipients' liberty to use and consume goods 
previously reserved to the producers, less their liberty to 
use for themselves their body parts if others desired them 
more than they. 
Nothing about the redistributive alternative says that the 
redistributive traffic needs be one-way. There may be two-way 
traffic, with goods moving from producers to recipients and 
body parts moving the other way. Ceteris paribus, if producers 
get greater desire satisfaction from body parts than do 
recipients-'donors', and recipients get greater desire 
satisfaction from goods than do producers , then the 
redistributive outcome is clear: producers are to get the body 
parts and recipients-'donors' the goods. What happens, though, 
if, ceteris paribus, producers get less desire satisfaction 
from body-parts-but-not-goods and recipients less desire 
satisfaction from goods-but-not-body-parts? Is the coercive 
transfer still to go through? Nothing in what Loevinsohn 
writes stipulates it must. And nothing stipulates it must not. 
Here the property rights view has the advantage. Granting 
p r ivate property rights in goods and body parts would 
certainly allow the producers to keep their goods and 
recipients to keep their body parts. If the facts are as I 
have suggested they well might be, then the libertarian 
property rights view is vindicated by the very argument 




ANARCHY. STATE. AND THE INVISIBLE HAND 
Stepping into a morality of rights and duties is stepping 
into a morality of enforceable obligations. Coercion is 
justified when wielded in order to prevent violations of 
rights. That a person has the right to the provision of 
welfare sufficient to meet his fundamental needs entails some 
others have the enforceable duty to provide. Crusoe must, if 
he is able, provide for Friday's needs if Friday is not able 
to provide for himself, and vice versa. Friday is free to use 
coercion to have Crusoe fulfil his duty. And, as one of the 
normative implications of the tension between property and 
welfare rights, crusoe may justly coerce Friday into making 
provision for himself where Friday is able to, and vice versa. 
In a world where persons know their duties and cheerfully 
go about the business of fulfilling them, coercion, though 
justified if wielded, is not needed. The simple world of 
Crusoe-Friday interaction can be like this. such is not true 
of our immeasurably more intricate world of interpersonal 
interaction. In this world persons all too often - sometimes 
unintentionally and sometimes wilfully - deny they have duties 
they do have, or take themselves to have rights they do not, 
or both, or know themselves to have duties but fail to fulfil 
them, or all three. The problem of incomplete moral knowledge 
is pervasive, the problem of moral backsliding rife. Coercion 
is going to be a common enough feature of this world. 
As for the question of who is to wield the needed powers of 
coercion - libertarians are all agreed coercion is needed, and 
justified, in the protection and enforcement of rights - in 
the fourth chapter I left it unanswered, noting there only 
that coercion for the purpose of redistribution need not be 
state-enacted coercion. We know government or the state can 
effect coercive redistribution: most do it a good deal of the 
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time. Can a society without a state coercively redistribute as 
a matter of justice? Non-coercive redistribution not enacted 
by the state, i.e. private charity, is familiar enough, but is 
not the state necessary if there is to be coercive 
redistribution? This is a question posed in the context of a 
dispute that cleaves libertarians into two broad, opposing 
groups. Stephen Newman calls it the 'great rift in libertarian 
ranks', between those who favour a return to the minimal or 
night-watchman state - the minarchists - and those more 
radical libertarians who advocate the abolition of the state. 1 
The anarchist pursues the libertarian's anti-statist sentiment 
to its logical conclusion. (The noun anarchist is to be taken 
in the sense of the absence of government and not the absence 
of law. 2) Thomas Paine remarked that a man would only submit 
to government providing he did not stand to lose more than he 
had a hope to gain3 - and the anarchist's contention is that 
under monopolistic government or the state we are net losers. 
The anarchist's claim merits attention. Note at this juncture 
only that should a Lockean libertarian look to be an anarchist 
he will have to account for how redistribution can be worked 
in the absence of state coercion. There is no analogous 
problem for the minarchist. Before examining the anarchist-
minarchist controversy a few preliminaries will help avoid any 
misunderstanding. I will accept the standard libertarian (in 
fact Weberean) definition of the state as that political body 
which in any given area has at least a de facto monopoly over 
the exercise of the means of coercion, immediate self-defence 
excepted. 4 The anarchist contends that the state is not 
necessary for the protection of rights, and persons would be 
better off (or at least less badly off) without the state. 
That the state performs necessary functions does not show that 
only the state can perform them. An explanation purporting to 
1 Newan, Liberalist at iiits' End,p.92. 
2 Auspitz criticises Nozick for his vision of libertarianism without law: 'Libertarianism Without Law',pp.82-3. 
3 Paine, The Rights of Man,p.55. 
4 Hospers, Libertarianisa,p.419; Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,p.23; Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness,p.l07; Narveson, 
The Libertarian Idea,p.208. 
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demonstrate the necessity of the state will have to do three 
things. First, it will have to identify what function or 
functions the state serves or performs. Secondly, demonstrate 
that these functions are indispensable, which will most likely 
entail viewing the state as a pre-condition for or guarantor 
of the attaining of certain goals and the preservation of 
certain states of affairs. And thirdly, argue that these 
functions cannot, or cannot satisfactorily, be performed by 
anything but the state. 
The libertarian programme is ably captured by Paine. Man, 
said Paine, 'finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his 
property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and 
this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every 
other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least. 
Wherefore, security being the true design and end of 
government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof 
appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expence 
and greatest benefit, is preferable to all others.' 5 Paine 
will have us choose from amongst forms of government, and 
though government is at best a necessary evil, some forms are 
more preferable, because less evil, than others. The 
anarchist's complaint is that on Paine's criteria anarchism is 
the least of the evils, and neither Paine - nor the latter-day 
minarchists - have shown it is not. 6 Anarchism is not refuted, 
rather it is ignored. 
In most if not all societies which redistribute for reasons 
of distributive justice, welfare contributors and their 
respective contributions are identified, and redistribution 
enacted, by the state. This much is simply common knowledge. 
If the Lockean libertarian is to be an anarchist he will have 
to show that his alternative hypothesis for the enforcement of 
rights, namely by private protection associations operating on 
the competitive market, is compatible with enforcement of the 
right to welfare. In the account that follows, welfarism is 
5 Paine, Co110n Sense,pp.65-6. 
6 Rothbard e~phatically reJiarks that goverllllent rule is 'the reverse of objective necessity': For a New Liberty,p.ll. 
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twinned with anarchism. Even where coercive redistribution is 
morally demanded it is neither necessary, nor inevitable, nor 
obviously desirable that it be enacted by the state. The 
anarchist component of this account draws on, and in many 
respects modifies and expands upon, Rothbard's defence of 
anarchist libertarianism. Rothbard is the only orthodox 
libertarian favouring the anarchist, or as I shall henceforth 
title it the stateless, society. Rand and Hospers are both 
minarchists. The account I give modifies the Rothbardean 
scenario owing to the failure of the orthodox property rights 
thesis Rothbard subscribes to, and it expands on it because 
Rothbard's argument for the stateless society is in many 
respects inadequate. When I turn to consider Nozick's 
invisible-hand derivation of the minimal state my attention 
moves away from the viability of redistribution withi n a 
stateless society to the viability of the minimal state 
itself. 
Rothbard's depiction of the stateless society is presented 
first because it is at once more radical than the notion of a 
de facto (yet just) monopoly protection association or the 
minimal state, and more importantly because only with the 
failure of the Rothbardean thesis can Nozick's derivation 
proceed at all. Nozick's derivation begins where Rothbard's 
ends. Where the stateless society hypothesis defaults, if 
indeed it does, the de facto monopoly to the minimal state 
explanation can proceed. 
In his overview of Anarchy, State, and Utopia Bernard 
Williams supposes it is reasonable to think that there are no 
'real candidates' for alternatives to the state. 7 But Williams 
expounds not on what a real alternative candidate should be 
like, what an alternative must encompass in order to be 
accepted as real. Presumably, it would have to perform the 
bona fide functions now discharged by the state, as well as or 
better than the state discharges them. It is not important 
what Williams takes these functions to be, nor what his 
1 Williams, 'The Minimal State' ,p.27. 
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criteria of efficient discharge are. They may be the same as 
Paine's, or they may be different. All we need to know is what 
libertarians take them to be, and here there is consensus: the 
sword is to be wielded only in protection of libertarian 
rights. 8 The criterion of efficient performance is that in 
wielding the sword authority does not violate libertarian 
rights and that we surrender as small a part of our property 
as is commensurate with acquiring the protection we want. Both 
the Rothbardean and Nozickean alternatives attempt to 
establish themselves as serious options, and though Williams 
believes 'Mr. Nozick is not an optimistic idiot' 9, I am not so 
sure he would not apply the epithet to Mr. Rothbard. lO I hope 
to show that the stateless society scenario is not unduly 
optimistic (nor naive nor inconsistent) and is a valuable 
alternative worth examining on its own merits, and also 
because of the close connexion between it and the derivation 
of the minimal state given by Nozick. The temptation to class 
Rothbard from the outset as a myopic libertarian supplementing 
the ranks of cranky left-anarchists and hopelessly utopian 
communists should be resisted. 
The situation where each and every individual protects 
himself is not a real, in the sense of viable, alternative. 
Individuals have the right to exercise the enforcement of 
their own rights. Crusoe and Friday have no choice in this 
matter. The considerable problem with and limitations to self-
protection expose its fundamental inadequacies. The problem is 
that inordinate and excessive retribution by victims is 
undesirable, not just on grounds of justice but because the 
prospect of retaliation on the part of the punished for what 
they perceive to be inordinate and excessive punishment leads 
to escalating conflict. As Hospers remarks apropos the 
victim's proneness to vengeance: 'He may consider death-by-a-
thousand-cuts to be the appropriate punishment for someone who 
8 Rand , Tbe Virtue of Selfisbness,p.llO; Hospers, LibertarianisJ,p.418; Narveson, Tbe Libertarian Idea,p.49. 
9 Williams, 'The Minimal State' ,p.33. 
10 Rand probably would. She calls the private protection association scenario a 'weird absurdity': Tbe Virtue of 
Self isbness, p .112. 
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stepped on his toe.' 11 Vendettas and blood feuds should be 
avoided. Locke is fully aware of the tendency to escalation 
endemic to self-protection, and views government as ordained 
'to restrain the partiality and violence of men'.12 Says Locke 
of the private enforcement of one's right to punish 
transgressors of the natural law: 'I doubt not but it will be 
objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their 
own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves 
and their friends, and, on the other side, that ill-nature, 
passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing 
others, and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will 
follow.' 13 (Locke cannot deny that individuals have the right 
of self-enforcement without thereby refusing it to civil 
authorities who take up the surrendered exercise of it.) 
The limitation is the time-consuming and frequently 
dangerous nature of self-protection, which disadvantages the 
elderly, weak, etc. I am not talking of immediate self-defence 
here. How is an ordinary individual to solve the common crime 
of the thef t of his car, for instance? This limitation is 
aggravated by insufficient means of pursuing restitution, such 
as information and finance. Some idle rich may choose to 
protect themselves, but it is unreasonable to expect others 
not to circumvent the limitations and exploit the benefits of 
the division of labour by contracting out for protection, 
particularly when (as will be shown below) once one person has 
protection then all others are subsequently disadvantaged 
relative to that person. Once I have a willing Rottweiler and 
a high-powered lawyer and you do not, you are disadvantaged -
whether you are an apprehensive potential victim or would-be 
violator. 
As an aside, the anarchist can help himself to this last 
consideration to boost his case. If one person is 
disadvantaged vis-a-vis another when one has protection then 
11 Hospers, Libertarianism, p. 440. 
12 Locke, Second Treatise,p.127. See also Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia,p.ll; Rand, The Virtue of Se1fishness,p.l09. 
13 Locke, Second Treatise,p.l27. 
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how much more disadvantaged are everyday citizens vis-a-vis 
the state. Recall Hobbes's claim that the differences between 
men are not so great that one may claim a benefit another may 
not as well. Appreciating this fact, persons know they can 
only fare badly in holding to the right they have to 
everything, and so are motivated to be moral. The state is 
significantly different to any ordinary citizen. What 
motivation has it to act within the bounds of morality? Should 
we not expect it, 'that great LEVIATHAN ... that mortal god' , 14 
to be tempted to 'defect' from co-operating, believing its 
chances of being worse off are minimal? I may have a dog and a 
lawyer, but the state has dogs and lawyers and much more 
besides. Rothbard likens relying on government to protect 
property rights to putting the fox to guard the chickens. 15 
Rothbard postulates that the enforcement of rights by 
private associations can overcome the limitations of self-
protection through the calculated, dispassionate, business 
oriented and procedurally rigorous pursuit of justice; through 
the use of trained and experienced protectors with time, 
information and other resources at their disposal; and by 
providing protection for all. This is no more than the 
beginning of an answer, which in the course of this chapter 
will be more fully considered. I am not concerned in this 
chapter with the details of which laws to enforce, only with 
protecting rights. 'No government' does not mean 'no law'. 
Hospers is inclined to think that it does, 16 but Rothbard is 
clear that all would have to abide by the basic law code, and 
instances Anglo-Saxon common law, admiralty law, and merchant 
law as laws arising from custom independently of government. 17 
Just as there can be security without government, so the 
anarchist says there can be law without government. 
Rothbard's depiction of the non-monopolistic provision of 
protection derives partly from his acceptance of the orthodox 
14 Hobbes, Leviathan, p .112. 
15 Rothbard, 'Justice and Property Rights',p.105. 
16 Hospers, Libertarianist,pp.447&449. 
17 Rothbard, 'Society Without a State',pp.205-6. 
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libertarian equation of taxation with theft. Government exacts 
taxes, and because taxation is involuntary it violates rights. 
Lockean libertarianism shows that taxation can be 
distinguished from robbery when it serves to fulfil a right. 
A just transfer coercively effected is a just transfer. 
Otherwise, Rothbard's justification for other-protection 
derives from every individual having the right to defend his 
property as an entailment of his right to that property 
itself. And a proprietor may enlist the help of others in this 
endeavour. 18 The modification of the anarchist scheme commences 
once it is taken that Lockean libertarianism entails the right 
of those without sufficient resources to enforce their claim 
to a redistributive share and to accept, or exchange to get, 
assistance in enforcement. The Lockean libertarian stateless 
society thesis begins from a standpoint different to 
Rothbard's, i.e. one allowing redistribution, but incorporates 
taxation . for redistribution with a society where persons and 
property are protected by private protection associations. 
Rothbard's principled opposition to the state is based on 
its violating rights by taxing to fund itself. Be that as it 
may, it is a mistake to believe that because states do tax it 
follows that states have to tax. Rand is a minarchist and 
wedded in her orthodoxy to the 'taxation is theft' equation. 
She would have government financed by lottery and by the 
government-supplied service of the enforcement of contracts.l9 
These she believes will provide sufficient revenue. Will they? 
And is government to have the exclusive right to run lotteries 
and supply enforcement on contracts? If not, then it is not 
transparently clear there would be a monopoly. Competing 
bodies might offer both of more for less. And if these 
services are exclusively government's, on what grounds does it 
reserve this monopoly to itself? Perhaps it just exercises 
this power because it can, and chooses to. What checks are 
18 Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty,p.77. 
19 Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness,pp.ll6-7. 
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there to the state's arrogating to itself more and more 
power?~ 
The major thrust of Rothbard's critique is empirical in 
nature: the market provision of protection accords more and 
better protection than the state can give for less than the 
state will charge. If the criteria are Paine's, then anarchy 
is our best bet. 'Competition', he says, 'insures efficiency, 
low price, and high quality, and there is no reason to assume 
a priori, as many people do, that there is something divinely 
-- ordained about having only one police agency in a given 
geographical area.'21 It is better that protection be provided 
on the competitive market for just these obvious advantages, 
and the belief that nothing but the state can provide 
protection should be resisted. The connexion with Lockean 
libertarianism is as follows. An efficient, high quality and 
low cost provision of protection is manifestly commensurable 
with the maximisation of private property holdings and, though 
less manifest l y, with the minimisation of redistribution. 
Redistribution is minimised because low-cost protection 
enables the less well-off to allocate more of their scarce 
resources to the purchase of other goods, thereby postponing 
if not preventing their recourse to welfare. These are, then, 
the immediate and palpable advantages of the competitive 
provision of protection over its monopolistic provision. Other 
advantages are less direct, stemming more from the end of 
disadvantageous state protection than from the competitive 
provision of it. 
The free market is born of the voluntary exchange of 
private property, and optimal economic functioning is, 
arguably, best assured by voluntary private property 
exchanges. It is the a priorist perception of the state as 
20 Barry lists this as one of four arguments levelled by the anarchist against the state. The other three are that the state 
exercises powers not available to the individual, that state personnel consume without producing, and that the state's 
exclusive control of certain goods and services means it can charge more for them than would be charged on the market: On 
Classical Liberalis• and Libertarianis1, pp.l64-5. Narveson gives four different reasons why the state's enforcement of 
rights is 'disturbing': Tbe Libertarian Idea,p.210. 
21 Rothbard, For a New Liberty,p.223. 
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necessary that Rothbard wishes to upset - to 'demystify' and 
'desanctify' the state as an object of unreflective 
allegiance. If Rothbard is successful in overcoming this 
perception, then how is redistribution to operate in a society 
where people purchase the services of an association with the 
protection of their property in mind, and where protection can 
be protection against the predations of contributory justice? 
Is moral backsliding not likely to lead to associations which 
protect their clients' attempts to evade the requirements of 
justice? A sceptic might say that for precisely this reason 
the anarchist's project fails at the first objection raised. 
Competition in protection would involve - and reasonably 
enough the sceptic would wish to say - competition in 
redistribution-avoidance as another aspect of the protection 
of property. And might not an association be more marketable 
the better it protects property from the impositions of 
contributory justice? The assumption that a person subscribes 
to an association with the protection of his property in mind, 
and then meekly allows a portion of that property to be taken 
for redistributive purposes is either naive or inconsistent or 
both. 
The modified Rothbardean scenario can be showp to be 
neither naive nor inconsistent. I will illustrate in what 
follows that the tendency to protect property, including 
avoiding redistributive burdens, in a society where protection 
is a privately purchasable market commodity, need not have 
built into it any optimistic assumptions regarding a person's 
proclivity to be responsive to the demands of justice. The 
~arket in protection itself grows out of non-optimistic 
assumptions about good neighbourliness. Enforcement of the 
right to welfare is premisse d on the same. It is not naive as 
it rejects straightforwardly reconciling people to paying 
their just contribution. It is not inconsistent because the 
tendency to protect property, even in the face of just claims 
to it, can be satisfactorily incorporated into this account. 
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'On the free market, protection would be supplied in 
proportion and in whatever way that the consumers wish to pay 
for it' . 22 Those who cannot afford protection Rothbard says 
would be supplied by private charity.23 Perhaps charitable 
dispositions would suffice to provide the needy with 
prote ction, but we need not - optimistically - assume this to 
be the case. Working with the supposition of selfishness-
contra-justice, three arguments can be adduced to show why the 
resort to charity, weak as it is, need not be made in the case 
of enforcing a right to welfare. The first two I think are 
unsatisfactory. The first because it trades on a notion of 
rights that should be rejected, and the second because it 
relies on persons voluntarily paying for the protection of 
those unable to pay for themselves in order to best serve 
their - the payers' - interests. This leads straight back to 
the initial query raised against the charitable supply of 
protection: will it be provided? (The somewhat cynical 
argument for public assistance Hayek relates, i.e. that it is 
necessary 'in the interests of those who require protection 
against acts of desperation of the needy' ,24 is not included on 
the grounds that it fails to show why it is desirable that the 
needy should be protected.) 
Before relating the three arguments, it is useful to 
enumerate the relations between the violator of a right and 
the victim of the violation. There are four possible 
relations, which include the attempts of protected individuals 
to prevent others from acquiring protection. 
(1) Neither violator nor victim is a member of a protection 
association. 
(2) The violator is not a member of a protection association 
but the victim is. 
(3) The violator is a member of a protection association but 
the victim is not. 
22 b'd I 1 .,p.220. 
23 b'd I 1 • ,p.224. 
24 Hayek, Tbe Constitution of Liberty,p.285. 
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(4) Both violator and victim are members. 
In relation (1) both parties are equally poorly protected, 
that is, by themselves. The violator from retaliation by the 
victim, and the victim from the initial as well as further 
violations. With relation (2) the violator is not protected 
against retaliation by the victim and his association, and 
whilst he retains the ability to protect himself and his 
property he is in a weaker position than his victim, 
handicapped as he is by the limitations of self-protection 
listed earlier. In relation (3) this position is reversed. 
Here the violator is protected against the retaliatory 
measures of the victim, which are less sure than would be the 
case were the latter protected. Finally, in relation (4) the 
situation is the opposite of (1), where now both parties are 
equally well-protected. 
Relations (2) and (3), and to a lesser extent (1) -even 
when no right has been violated - furnish clear motivation to 
purchase protection. The attempt by protected individuals to 
prevent others from acquiring protection is subsumable under 
either (2) or (3). (Would it more likely be a case of (3), the 
sceptic's choice?) Regarding (1), the state of nature in 
Locke's and Nozick's analyses, when one individual purchases 
protection all others are placed in the relation of either (2 ) 
or (3) until they too acquire protection and remedy their 
disadvantaged status. Either violation becomes less easy or 
accessible, etc., and the probability of detection, etc., 
increases, or the violator assures himself of some protection 
against retaliation or, as would likely be the case, both. 
What this means in actual cases of the violation of the 
right to welfare, i.e. when the demands of contributory 
justice are refused, can be illustrated by imposing this class 
of infringement upon the four relations. In a case of type (2 ) 
the victim has an improved prospect over (1) of enforcing his 
claim, and in a (3) situation this prospect is reversed as the 
violator's association restricts the room to manoeuvre for 
welfare on the part of the victim. The state of nature, 
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relation (1), is unlikely to last long in a world of fallible 
yet rational beings, for protection in such a condition is an 
undoubted good, and persons will acquire protection in order 
to be more successful if and when they need to press their 
claim - or prevent further violations of their right - to 
welfare. (Note I do not say they purchase protection. They may 
never pay for protection and yet be protected.) This effects a 
movement to (2), wherein some are at a relative disadvantage, 
and leads to the movement to (4). Even violators have an 
interest in ensuring they do not suffer unduly at the hands of 
their victim or their victim's association. How protection 
might be provided for all, without resort to charity, can now 
be shown. 
The first of the three arguments is one for universal, tax-
funded protection based on the grounds that protection is 
necessary to the enforcement of the right to welfare. There is 
to be public provision of the means to enforce the right to 
welfare. We need not accept the notion of what it is to have a 
right this argument trades on. To have a right to x is not to 
have a right to the necessary and sufficient means to assure 
one of x. It would be strange were the positive right to 
welfare to generate a right to the provision of the means to 
:~ · enforce it when none of the host of negative rights a person 
has do so. The right to life generates the right to act in 
self-defence, but not the right to the public supply of the 
wherewithal for it. Positive rights entail respondents acting 
in specified ways on pain of wrongdoing or injustice, and not 
that the bearers of positive rights have rights over the means 
required to ensure respondents do act thus. This argument 
should be rejected. 
The second argument will have protection included as a 
facet of redistribution, on the grounds that it may well lead 
to the overall minimisation of redistribution. Once 
redistributed, the sum of resources now in the hands of the 
less well off requires protection from would-be violators. 
Stealing from them may reduce recipients to once again laying 
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claim to welfare, and may initiate a new round of 
redistribution. Protection as an accompaniment to welfare may 
therefore be the most prudent policy to adopt financially. In 
the light of this it might be tempting to say that this i s a 
further prescriptive import of the mechanics of welfarism and 
should be compulsory in just the same way social insurance is. 
There is, however, a significant difference between the two. 
Compulsory social insurance is legitimated in terms of 
adherence to redistribution minimisation, and this is the 
rationale behind the current suggestion. But such insurance is 
the compelling of others to insure themselves from their own 
money, not with monies supplied by the wealthier and justified 
on the grounds that it is in the long-term financial interest 
of the wealthier. As it is not morally required of persons 
that they pursue their best interests, there is no 
justification for coercing the wealthier to pay more now so 
that they might pay less later. Prudence is not enforceable. 
Where a person's right to welfare is not fulfilled he is 
free to enforce his right against those morally obliged to 
redistribute. (Relations (2) and (4) need not concern us here 
for they apply to those victims who already have protection.) 
In relations (1) and (3) the person whose right has been 
violated subscribes, or has already subscribed, to a 
protection association, even though he cannot presently afford 
to pay, as the best method of enforcing his right should the 
need arise. He takes out a 'dormant' subscription. His 
association accordingly sets about enforcing his right and 
takes its payment from the monies it i s successful in 
redistributing to him. on top of the amount required to assure 
its client's right to welfare the association levies from the 
violator an extra sum to pay its costs. Such protection, then , 
is financed on a principle of awards where the cost of 
enforcement is borne by those who have violated that right and 
rendered the extra cost necessary. This principle is enshrined 
in some legal systems today where costs are awarded against 
the guilty party. There is, furthermore, a formal neatness 
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when the cost of the enforcement of justice is met through 
awards, in that it fits well with the workings of a free 
market: the association acquires new custom and income, and 
though the selfishness-contra-justice assumption ostensibly 
rules it out, ethical prestige for the association could be a 
motivating factor. Most importantly, the violator pays the 
costs, not the public. 
Protection acquired in this manner is, of course, only 
possible when resources are withheld, and thus the third 
argument appears to contain a major flaw. Withholding wealth 
and meeting the association's attempts at enforcement 
successfully might be - and when unsuccessful probably would 
be - more expensive than contributing one's dues when one is 
supposed to. Defence costs are involved in successful 
withholdings, and in unsuccessful withholdings there are award 
costs to boot. What is due to you from me may be less than the 
expected costs incurred by my trying to avoid paying my dues. 
Such an argument works least well where there are large wealth 
differentials between a wealthy few and an indigent multitude, 
i.e. where what is due to them from me would be more than 
would be incurred in my resisting paying it. In the more 
homogeneous societies closer to the libertarian's heart this 
is not the case, and it remains in my best interest to pay my 
dues. And, the argument concludes, if we do pay our dues how 
do the less well off get protection? 
Were associations to exact costs (and maybe a little 
profit) from violators then the solution lies with dormant 
subscriptions. Those who are so poor that they cannot afford 
protection for themselves take out dormant subscriptions. 
A dormant subscription is a 'protect now, pay later' model 
policy. A person signs up with an association and is 
henceforth its client, albeit a non-paying one. If and when he 
requires his association's services it is informed, his case 
is assessed if needs be, and the association goes to work. If 
successful in prosecuting its client's case the association 
claims costs from the violator as payment. Should it be 
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unsuccessful the association will have incurred a loss, but as 
assessor of its client's case this was a reasonable 
presumption of risk voluntarily undertaken. For most crimes of 
properby, and many others besides, such a scheme is workable. 
Admittedly, protection of the poor is not guaranteed. What 
goods and services prove marketable cannot be known in 
advance. What I think has been shown, though, is that the 
market's great flexibility, and the range of options a market 
in protective services could offer, renders the situation 
where there are completely unprotected individuals a marginal 
possibility. 
Even if the above argument, in conjunction with dormant 
subscriptio ns, fails - and supposing charity cannot make up 
any shortfall - failure here does not militate against the 
practical viability of the stateless society scenario. What 
the argument shows in the case of protection is the 
compatibility of what is right with everyday notions of what 
is good. It is not wrong that some people are less well off 
than others in any number of ways if their being so is not the 
consequence of any rights violations, and yet we might think 
such a state of affairs undesirable and wish to remedy it 
without ourselves violating any rights. The argument shows how 
this might be done, minus appeal to charity. 
Protection can be provided to the less well off. And this , 
it is hoped, will allay the suspicion some may entertain of an 
unscrupulous group, namely the protected, preying Viking-like 
on an unprotected group. But it is the workings of a free 
market in protection when explicated that must make the 
greater impression in refuting any argumentum ad terrorum 
directed against the stateless society hypothesis. '[A]ny 
alternative to the existing State', Rothbard notes, 'is 
encased in an aura of fear. Neglecting its own monopoly of 
theft and predation, the State raises the spectre among its 
subjects of the chaos that would supposedly ensue if the State 
should disappear.' 25 Whilst we cannot give an exact account of 
25 Rothbard, For a New Li.berty,p.63. 
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a market that exists as an hypothesis only, Rothbard does 
believe broad guidelines and perspectives on the shape of a 
projected stateless society can be offered. 26 Indeed, such 
guidelines have to be supplied if the spectre of chaos is to 
be dispelled and the stateless society shown to be a real 
alternative to the state (and Mr. Rothbard shown not to be an 
optimistic idiot.) The rationale and motivation for, and the 
justness of, the anarchist scenario have been mooted. What is 
required now is the operational blueprint attesting to the 
viability of a free market in protection. 
The major question mark against the operational 
plausibility of libertarian anarchism is what Rothbard dubs 
the 'final nightmare' for privately subscribed protection, 
usually considered decisive in rejecting such a scenario. 
'Wouldn't the agencies always be clashing? Wouldn't "anarchy" 
break out, with perpetual conflicts between police forces as 
one person calls in "his" police while a rival calls in 
"his"?' 27 Conflict over the occurrence of a violation happens 
when A, a client of association X, and B, a subscriber to 
another association Y, are in honest disagreement. Either A or 
B is seeking punishment of, and restitution from, the other, 
and either A or B is seeking protection from punishment and 
restitution, and A turns to X and B to Y to help them. 
A(X) and B(Y) attempt to resolve their differences through 
interaction in a court of law - if it proceeds this far - A(X) 
through his court and B(Y) through his, where associations X 
and Y are not affiliated to the same court. Call the two 
c ourts Xc and Yc, respectively. (If A(X) and B(Y) were 
affiliated to the same court then A and B would have a prima 
facie obligation to abide by that court's decision. If they 
subscribed to the same protection association they would 
likely be affiliated to the same court.) If the two clients 
(associations) reach an agreement the difference is settled at 
this stage. But is this particularly likely when X and Y each 
26 Rothbard, 'Society Without a state',p.l96. 
27 Rothbard, For a Netr Liberty, p. 225. 
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have a vested business interest in protecting their clients to 
the best of their ability, and where there seems no compulsion 
for either to try its client? Why should X even bother to 
defend A, guilty or innocent, in court against B(Y) when there 
seems no palpable pressure to do so? And if one court 
pronounces a verdict of guilt and the other a verdict of 
innocence, what then? When schematised, the blueprint has this 
form: 
(i) Dispute between A(X) and B(Y) leads to; 
(ii) A(X) and B(Y) seeking resolution in the courts of Xc for 
A(X), and Yc for B(Y). 
(iii) Either there is a cross-court resolution of the dispute, 
that is both Xc and Yc find the same party innocent or guilty, 
or the dispute impasse is displaced from A(X)-B(Y) to A(X,Xc)-
B(Y,Yc). If the latter this leads to; 
(iv) A(X,Xc) and B(Y,Yc) seeking resolution at a neutral court 
of arbitration, court z. 
(v) Court z passes binding judgement on the A-B dispute. 
This judgement is binding on all parties. 
According to Rothbard, it is only as far as stage (iv) and 
the judgement at stage (v) that any dispute will progress. 
'The appeals judge would make his decision and the result ... 
would be treated as binding on the guilty 1 , 28 for the reason 
that 'a decision arrived at by any two courts shall be 
binding. 1 29 
Why is there ever a movement from stage (iii) to stage 
(iv) 1 or even from stage (i) to (ii)? The reasons for the 
latter movement are those which show the advantages of 
protection. If you have access to legal channels and I do not 
I am at a relative disadvantage in any dispute with you. To 
equalise my situation I acquire protection. Of the 
displacement from (iii) to (iv), economic pressure is likely 
to be the key. If either A(X) or B(Y) refuse to participate in 
seeking a resolution the ensuing protracted honest 
28 b'd I 1 .,p.233. 
29 Ibid., p. 234 ( e11phasis rmved). 
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disagreement - fuelled naturally by the desire of A and B to 
protect themselves through X andY, and compounded by X's and 
Y's motivation to serve their clients - will prove financially 
costly. Increased costs will be passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher subscription premiums, and demand for the 
services of X and Y will fall as clients transfer their 
patronage to other associations. Of course, if protection is 
so desirable then we should assume that the demand for it will 
be ine l astic and will not fall off as the price increases. 
Accordingly, though we may be able to explain the movement to 
courtroom resolution we cannot explain the movement to 
arbitration at court Z. An impasse at the level of A(X)-B(Y) 
may not hurt business. Would not strong protection by non-
participation in the legal system, a retreat into the inner 
sanctum of the protection association as it were, be 
attractive to clients and prove marketable? There are reasons 
for thinking not. 
For a start, inelastic demand for protection is not the 
same as inelastic demand for the protection rendered by 
associations X andY. Other associations which had adopted 
methods to work round any impasse could attract the clients of 
X andY. Any two or more associations which prearrange a 
method for resolving honest disagreements between them and 
their clients would be highly marketable, more so than those 
bereft of such procedures. It only pays to be a subscriber to 
an association that does not co-operate if it wins and it 
passes the benefits on to its clients. Clients desire 
resolution, and any inter-association agreement to this effect 
will be attractive to them. Thus associations will agree in 
advance to procedures for resolving disputes, that is at the 
(X,Xc)-(Y,Yc) level, plus a procedure for binding arbitration 
at a neutral court. Clients would, when subscribing to either 
X or Y, commit themselves contractually to these arrangements 
and be bound by whatever decision is reached. Arbitration 
procedures would be written into contracts. 'The parties to a 
contract would indicate in writing that in case of a dispute, 
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a certain arbitration agency would be agreed upon by them to 
hear the case', and 'There could be a hierarchy of such 
agencies ... written into the contract, up to the final court 
of appeal. ' 30 
Considerable pressure can be brought to bear against an 
association to participate in conflict resolution - as the 
analysis of the rogue association will show - and so the 
blueprint for workability can proceed. A(X) and B(Y) seek 
agreement and might find it without either admitting guilt but 
nevertheless accepting the verdict of the courts. However, the 
real problem arises when there is a conflict i g verdict. For a 
conflicting verdict there must be a tenable depiction of an 
appeals procedure A and B and their respective associations 
would have recourse to, and where the verdict would be 
accepted by the involved parties. 
If the arbitrator's decision proves unsatisfactory to one 
of the parties why should he accept the verdict as binding? 
One reason is that it ends the impasse. There is also a non-
prudential reason why he should. A and B, and their 
associations, had agreed to move to arbitration and accept the 
decision arrived at there as mutually binding. Arbitration, as 
a contractual undertaking, should be adhered to for moral as 
well as prudential reasons, and therefore not just for 
Rothbard's reason that a two-court decision should be binding 
simply because reached by two courts.31 Both A and B agree in 
advance to arbitration in a neutral court in order to overcome 
the impasse at stage (iv), and are bound by their agreement. 
Associations not incorporating dispute-resolution channels in 
their contracts would not be serving the interests of their 
clients. Victims want protection and punishment and 
restitution, and violators want protection from punishment and 
restitution. An A(X)-B(Y) or A(X,Xc)-B(Y,Yc) stand-off 
constitutes an unsatisfactory, and perhaps expensive, position 
30 Hospers, Li.bertarianist,p.432. 
31 Rothbard later writes that 11'1Wo" is not an arbitrary figure, for it reflects the fact that there are two parties, the 
plaintiff and the defendant, to any alleged crime or contract dispute': 'Society Without a State',p.203. 
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for both A and B. Neither has what he desires, and what he 
subscribed to X or Y for. 
A stronger challenge comes in the guise of the rogue 
association. 'We have shown how a libertarian legal and 
judicial system could work on the purely free market, assuming 
honest differences of opinion - but what if one or more police 
or courts should become, in effect, outlaws? What then?'32 
Rothbard alleges that the free market would minimise any 
tendency for associations to become dishonest, and isolate and 
extinguish by market means - primarily boycott and ostracism -
any association or court which did become 'venal or crooked'. 
Unfortunately, Rothbard is less than expansive. Of the courts 
he writes: 'The very life of the court, the very livelihood of 
a judge, will depend on his reputation for integrity, fair-
mindedness, objectivity, and the quest for truth in every 
case.'33 Of any rogue association, he says that it is faced by 
'other police forces who could use their weapons to band 
together to put down the aggressors against their clientele' 34 
- a thought more at home in the Wild West than in modern 
cities, Beirut excepted. Thirdly, Rothbard suggests that there 
could be no sense of legitimacy attached to associations that 
abused their moral raison d'etre, and popular support could 
never be forthcoming. 35 
It is difficult to know quite what to make of these 
reasons. To be sure, they are possessed of a certain 
plausibility. Exactly how much it is not easy to judge. 
Reputation does count in business, and there is little reason 
to think the business of private associations and courts an 
exception. The fact that rogue associations could be put down 
might be a threat sufficient to keep them from surfacing. 
These are all empirical matters and cannot be decided a 
priori. Consider this though: where there is a monopoly on a 
~ good or service - as the state currently has on the powers of 
32 Rothbard, For a Nev Li.berty,p.243. 
33 Ib'd 1 .,p.244. 
34 b'd I 1 .,p.246. 
35 b'd I 1 .,p.246-7. 
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coercion - and no prospect, or but very slight prospect, of 
termination of it - for government once established is not so 
easily disestablished - are there any in-principle checks to 
corruption, venality, etc.? The libertarian anarchist's case 
may come to this: a free market in protection may not be 
better, but it will not be worse than its monopolistic 
provision. And it distances the prospect of authoritarianism. 
Other ways in which the activities of rogue associations 
might be curtailed are passed over in Rothbard's work. There 
may be a movement away from the abusive police force and court 
by its own clientele of their own, possibly moral, choice. 
Clients might move away due to the increased costs incurred by 
the association in its antagonisms with the rights-respecting 
associations (a similar possibility I later raise against 
Nozick's minimal state). Indeed, in such a situation these 
latter associations would do well to lower their subscription 
rates as an incentive for clients to switch from the rogue 
association. If a rights-respecting association or court is 
particularly subject to the predations of a rogue association, 
for instance if the majority of its clients reside in an area 
where the incidence of improper activity is high, the long-
term interests of other respectable associations are arguably 
best served by helping with the financial burden this 
association has unwittingly shouldered on its own. There is, 
after all, strength in numbers, there is the possibility of 
reciprocation, and the possible avoidance of potential 
conflict with the rogue association at a later date. 
Dishonesty may lead to a boycott effectively isolating the 
rogue association. It would be excluded from inter-association 
dispute resolution. Lastly, as long as individuals sought 
protection there would be reason to provide a worthwhile 
supply. A rogue association would be an economic as well as a 
moral aberration. 
The Nozickean derivation, I have said, can only proceed on 
default of the Rothbardean hypothetical market in protective 
services. Only if there is a breakdown of the Rothbardean 
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scenario is there a movement, or as Nozick depicts it a 
progression, to the minimal state. Nozick's express purpose is 
'to demonstrate that a minimal state will qualify as morally 
legitimate, a demonstration that is specifically aimed at 
undermining the opposing claims of the libertarian anarchists 
(notably Murray Rothbard) . ' 36 And of the market provision of 
protection, James Buchanan remarks that 'Nozick accepts this 
paradigm, but he recognises the inherent instability of the 
system'. 37 Nozick's derivation is as follows, with each stage 
following the previous ones: (i) the state of nature, wherein 
rights are sometimes violated; (ii) the evolution of private 
protection associations to protect against violations 
occurring in the state of nature; (iii) one association 
becomes the dominant protection association; (iv) the dominant 
association evolves into the ultraminimal state exercising a 
monopoly on coercion and protecting only those who pay for its 
services, and from this evolves into; (v) the minimal state 
which 'redistributes' protection from paying clients to non-
paying clients (independents) as compensation for its 
prohibition of their risky self-enforcement of their rights. 
Is the Rothbardean hypothesis inherently unstable? I have 
endeavoured to show that if it is then it is not obviously 
unstable, for there are features that lend coherence to that 
hypothesis within the framework of free choice and exchange. 
Including the right to welfare does not materially affect the 
question of viability. The enforceability of this right is no 
more problematic than enforcing the right to the return of my 
stolen property. A brief recapitulation of Nozick's invisible-
:''· hand derivation of the de facto monopoly protection 
association will lend support to the anarchist by showing that 
the free-market scenario is not obviously unstable. I then 
press the instability objection against the minimal state. The 
purported instability Nozick attributes to the anarchist 
conception is this: protection is a good which has only 
36 Buchanan, Fneedo1 in Constitutional Contract,p.51. 
37 b'd I 1 • ,p.51. 
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relative worth, and is not the sort of good competition can 
maximally supply. A market in protection is not the stable 
order Rothbard thinks but, on the contrary, ensures the 
emergence of geographically discrete areas wherein one 
association resembling the minimal state predominates. If the 
rot - the slide into statism - is to be stopped, the anarchist 
would do well to head off the minimal statist here. 
Beginning with the anarchist's vision of different 
protection associations offering their services in the same 
geographical area, Nozick asks what will occur when clients 
from different associations conflict? He discerns three 
possible developments from such a (recurring) situation. 
(a) One association always wins conflicts. The disadvantages 
of being a client of a losing association force clients to do 
business with the winner. 
(b) People gravitate towards the a s sociation which is the 
strongest in their area where protection is likely to be 
better. 
(In both (a) and (b) only a single protective association 
operates over a given geographical area.) Thirdly, Nozick 
surmises how the Rothbardean arbitration-regulated scheme 
produces a monopoly in a given area: 
(c) The associations win and lose an equal number of disputes , 
and 'to avoid frequent, costly, and wasteful battles the two 
agencies, perhaps through their executives, agree to resolve 
peacefully those cases about which they reach differing 
judgments. They agree to set up, and abide by the decisions 
of, some third judge or court to which they can turn when 
their respective judgments differ .•.. Though different 
agencies operate, there is one unified federal judicial system 
of which they all are components. ,38 
Nozick's (c) looks to me to be the kind of model the 
anarchist has in mind, and Nozick does not think this model 
statist. Nozick writes that in (c), as in (a) and (b), there 
is 'some common system that judges between their [persons'] 
38 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,p.l6. 
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competing claims and enforces their rights'. 39 This can go one 
of two ways. Either the common judge is the common enforcer or 
the common judge hands down a decision for the associations to 
enforce. If judge and enforcer are one then the associations 
are either entirely superfluous or at best delegate agents of 
the higher authority, and so not d i fferent to it or to one 
another. If the common judge is not also enforcer - as I think 
the anarchist's arbitrator is not - then the associations are 
genuine market rivals adhering to a common code of conflict 
resolution. In that case, anarchism is still with us. 
Nozick might reply that anarchism cannot work because, 
granted this reading of (c), neither (a) nor (b) is refuted. 
Each of them is sufficient to initiate the move to the minimal 
state. What is the anarchist to make of this? Because the 
second reading of (c), where there is a common judge but 
different enforcers, is the anarchist's model he would surely 
reply that in this situation it need not be true that one 
association always wins. After all, one insurance company does 
not have all the accident-free drivers, nor is there a 
monopoly l aw firm. And if no one association always wins there 
is less if any reason to suppose that people gravitate· towards 
the association strongest in their area. There may be no 
identifiable strongest association anyway, and the package of 
protection people are interested in is likely to vary in 
content and cost. It is not obvious that what Nozick says 
about the kind of good protection is makes enough difference 
to undermine these responses. Should this be so - and it is 
the scenario I take Rothbard to advocate - anarchism is still 
with us. It remains moot whether there is default at the level 
:. of the law-governed, arbitration-regulated unified judicial 
system, where private associations co-exist and do not have, 
or pretend to, a monopoly of the use of coercion. They cannot, 
then, be ultraminimal states - and we may wonder if the 
ultraminimal state will develop from the market in protection. 
39 Ib 'd 1 • ,p.l6. 
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Let us assume there is default from the stateless society, 
and that the ultraminimal state does evolve via the dominant 
protection association. According to Nozick's derivation, this 
stage in turn leads to the evolution of the minimal state. The 
mechanism for the evolution from the ultraminimal state to the 
minimal state is Nozick's principle of compensation. The 
monopoly of the ultraminimal state is morally impermissible 
unless everyone is protected by it, including those who have 
not voluntarily joined. When all are protected the 
ultraminimal state has become the minimal state. 'The 
operators of the ultraminimal state are morally obligated to 
produce the minimal state.' 40 The principle of compensation 
'requires those who act in self-protection in order to 
increase their own security to compensate those they prohibit 
from doing risky acts which might actually have turned out to 
be harmless for the disadvantages imposed upon them.'41 
Individuals or groups enforcing their rights sometimes leads 
to further rights violations, or increases the likelihood of 
them, for the reasons noted earlier, e.g. ignorance, 
partiality, over-zealousness. Such enforcement imposes risks 
on others, and will be perceived as imposing risks, and this 
raises the question 'Why cannot others protect themselves 
against risky and fear-imposing acts by prohibiting them?' 
Nozick thinks they can providing they compensate. Adopting a 
principle of compensation leads to the following dilemma. 
Either I enforce my rights in a risky and fear-imposing manner 
and compensate others for any violations of their rights 
committed by me, or others prohibit my risky rights 
enforcement and compensate me for doing so. In the former case 
your rights are violated and you are compensated, in the 
latter my right of enforcement is prohibited and I am 
compensated. Now we will, or should, choose the second horn of 
the dilemma for one of the reasons Nozick cites, namely that 
40 b'd I 1 .,p.52. 
41 Ibid.,p.ll4. 
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some rights simply cannot be compensated for if and when 
violated, for example, the right to life. 
From a market of competing associations Nozick contends 
that a movement will be effected, through either of the three 
routes, to a monopoly situation of one association dominant in 
any given area, which association becomes an ultraminimal 
state for it 'maintains a monopoly over all use of force 
but it provides protection and enforcement services only to 
those who purchase its protection and enforcement policies'. 42 
The paying of compensation signals the arrival of the minimal 
state, which possesses a monopoly on coercion and compensates 
those it prohibits from enforcing their rights for themselves. 
This compensation (in voucher form) 'can be used only for 
their purchase of a protection policy from the ultraminimal 
state' . 43 
Associations are allowed to prohibit those who enforce 
protection in a risky or perceived-to-be-risky manner 
providing compensation is forthcoming. They may be justly 
prohibited because of the fear and apprehension their risky 
enforcement causes in others and which gives rise to these 
others defending themselves against it. 'The principle', says 
Nozick, 'is that a person may resist, in self-defense, if 
others try to apply to him an unreliable or unfair procedure 
of justice. In applying this principle, an individual will 
resist those systems which after all conscientious 
consideration he finds to be unfair or unreliable. 144 
Unreliable procedures of enforcement impose risks, and 
therefore an association 'may treat the unreliable enforcer of 
justice as it treats any performer of a risky action'. 45 For 
Nozick, some acts must be prohibited. Others cannot be allowed 
even if compensation is paid. Belonging to the first class are 
uncompensatable acts such as murder. To the second class 
belong those goods that would be reallocated to those willing 
42 b'd I 1 • ,p.26. 
43 b'd I 1 .,p.27. 
44 b'd I 1 .,p.l02. 
45 b'd I 1 .,p.l05. 
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to pay compensation; compensatable acts which are fear 
inducing but where the fear cannot be compensated; and acts 
which cause public fear but where only victims of rights 
violations can receive compensation. Risky self-enforcement 
falls under the second, third and fourth types, and possibly 
under the first if self-enforcement were such a desired good 
that its practitioners were willing to pay for it by 
compensating for the fear t hey impose, and thereby have this 
good reallocated predominantly to their jurisdiction. Such 
people would be the idle rich I mentioned earlier. This is 
Nozick's non-free market argument against self-enforcers, such 
as the idle rich. It is not that self-enforcement is 
impractical or less likely to be successful (though this is 
true), rather that it is just not legitimate. 
Nozick states that by virtue of its power a dominant 
protection association occupies a unique position: it can 
prohibit not only private individuals but other associations 
as well. When enforcing justice and prohibiting risky and 
unreliable procedures of enforcement 'it enforces its will, 
which, from the inside, it thinks is correct'." Only the 
dominant protection association can do this continually and 
consistently, for only it has the requisite power and 
financial muscle against the sporadic, inconsistent and 
relative to it ineffectual, self-enforcement of their own 
rights by independents and the enforcement of competing 
associations. Hence the dominant protection association does 
occupy a de facto monopoly position in the protection market, 
and one that once acquired is seemingly unassailable. 'The 
dominant agency', as Nozick puts it, 'can offer its customers 
a guarantee that no other agencies can match: "Only those 
procedures we deem appropriate will be used on our 
customers". ' 47 The de facto monopoly is rendered a de jure 
monopoly, and the dominant protection association becomes the 
minimal state, when independents are compensated - in the form 
46 b'd I 1 • ,p.l09. 
47 b'd I 1 .,p.l09. 
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of protective services - 'to cover those situations of 
conflict with the paying customers of the protective agency'. 48 
Independents are co-opted into the minimal state which pays a 
money price for its co-opting activities. 
Robert Holmes raises an objection to the dominant 
protection association's guarantee. Nozick contends that for 
the dominant association to be justified it must adhere to 
what he calls the Epistemic Principle of Border crossing. This 
is defined as: 'If doing act A would violate Q's rights unless 
condition c obtained, then someone who does not know that c 
obtains may not do A. ,49 This is the stricter definition of the 
Principle. The weaker version has the qualification that a 
person 'may not do A if he has not ascertained that c obtains 
through being in the best feasible position for ascertaining 
this. ,so 
Holmes asks who determines whether condition c obtains, or 
who is in the best feasible position for determining this? 
Obviously, it is the dominant protection association itself. 
The Principle threatens to collapse into a question-begging 
exercise. Who decides that it is the dominant protection 
association that is best located? Answer, the dominant 
protection association. Now, Nozick admits that everyone has 
the right to punish violators of the Principle. Any person 
'who attempts to punish someone without first having 
ascertained their guilt by a procedure of justice of proven 
reliability' can be punished by anybody. 51 What the dominant 
protection association deems appropriate and the criteria of 
justice Nozick espouses may well differ. Put more poignantly, 
and a good deal more sceptically, the dominant association may 
prohibit if, and only if, it observes the Principle. But if 
the dominant association sets the criteria for the Principle 
how are we going to see the criteria set? How likely is it to 
48 b'd I 1 . ,p.110. 
49 b'd I1 .,p.106. 
50 b'd I 1 .,p.107. 
51 Hollles, 'Kozick on AnarchiSJ' ,p.63. Hollles llaintains that the tinillal state is unjust because no c011pensation is paid at 
the stage of the ultra.ini.al state: ibid.,p.61. 
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institute a set of antecedent conditions it may later be 
unable or unwilling to fulfil? Furthermore, if the strongest 
association decides what constitutes a threat then what 
restraint is there to its prohibiting activities? This brings 
to mind the anarchist's complaint met with earlier: what is 
there to prevent the dominant association from arrogating to 
itself ever-increasing authority, this on the pretext of 
justly prohibiting risky activities? Holmes's criticism 
reduces the de facto monopoly association to the status of, to 
use Peter Danielson's term, an economic firm: [T]he dominant 
protective agency is merely an economic firm dealing in the 
protection of rights', 52 and a firm that may violate the rights 
of some in protecting the rights of its clients as business 
deems worthwhile, without the constraints - weak or otherwise 
- the free market placed on associations in Rothbard's 
scenario. 
The derivation of the minimal state proceeds when, and only 
if, the free market in protection defaults. My arguments have 
done something to bolster the anarchist's case that we may 
never make the progression. Were the market to default, as we 
are assuming it will, and the minimal state to evolve, the 
anarchist's ammunition is not yet all shot off. There are 
grounds for believing that the monopoly position of the 
minimal state will not last. The minimal state's position is 
not unassailable, and there may be a return to a market of 
competing associations. 
The argument I am going to develop is directed against the 
minimal state, and only it. It is fair to cast it as one 
indirectly favouring the Rothbardean anarchist scenario, and 
only it: the dominant protection association and the 
ultraminimal state are not alternatives to anarchy on the one 
hand and the minimal state on the other. 
The major ground for believing in the instability of the 
minimal state - if arrived at - is intricately connected with 
the free-rider problem. The principle of compensation is 
52 Danielson, 'Taking AnarchiSJ Seriously',p.l42. 
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liable to give rise to free-riders through unproductive acts 
of exchange. Moreover, there are two (critical-number) points 
through which the minimal state is threatened with collapse. 
These two points need not arise, but given what Nozick says 
about why and how people seek protection it is conceivable 
that they should. The argument does not suppose that pecuniary 
reward is all or even primarily what individuals are motivated 
by, only that when a sufficient number defect from the minimal 
state and receive compensation - and whose defection is made 
possible by an appropriate number who abide by the minimal 
state and pay compensation - the state may collapse. To coin a 
phrase, the minimal state may contain within itself the seed 
of its own dissolution. 
Compensating prohibited risky acts of self-enforcement 
leads to unproductive exchanges, 53 and to a possible breakdown 
of the minimal state. The principle of compensation allows us 
to prohibit risky acts which we would otherwise not be able to 
prevent through our purchasing the abstention from such acts 
from would-be risk-imposers. However, as Nozick stresses, we 
might be securing 'relief from something that would not 
threaten if not for the possibility of an exchange to get 
relief from it.' 54 Paying Danegeld is an unproductive act of 
exchange. So why not be a prohibited-and-compensated 
independent enforcer of one's rights? (It is one way for the 
poor to secure for themselves the protection they could not 
afford if they were to pay for it.) 
Why not receive protection at less or no monetary cost to 
oneself? Here is an opportunity to free-ride in the strong 
sense. Someone free-rides in this sense when he acquires at 
less or no monetary cost the same or a comparable good which 
others pay to acquire. In the weak sense someone free-rides 
when he benefits non-comparably relative to the purchaser of 
the good. A protection free-rider in the weak sense benefits 
53 In unproductive acts of exchange, after purchasing abstention, the buyer is left no better off than he would have been if 
the seller did not exist or had nothing to do with him. 
54 Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia,p.85. 
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to the extent that someone else pays to put criminals away, 
though he is himself without protection. In the strong sense a 
free-rider stands to gain, for less cost, protection 
comparable to those who pay the full price for it. 'If there 
is potential money in it, individuals will find it to their 
advantage to be recalcitrant, not because this expresses their 
internal private preference but because it promises to yield 
valued returns.' 55 Independence promises valued returns. 
Essentially, my contention is this: that the principle of 
compensation of prohibited risky self-enforcers of rights, as 
provided by Nozick, may generate free-riders, Nozickean 
independents. The generation of independents threatens the 
minimal state with collapse. The collapse of the minimal state 
would, given its derivation, be no more and no less than a 
lapse back into anarchism. 
The problem for Nozick's derivation as I see it is this. 
The existence of present, or the generation of future, 
independents threatens the minimal state in two, respective, 
ways. They may prevent the minimal state from coming into 
being, i.e. halt the evolution from the state of nature 
through to the minimal state, or they may bring about the 
collapse of the minimal state once derived. And they may do 
either quite unintentionally. The invisible hand may prove to 
be the undoing of the minimal state. For the former 
possibility I shall henceforth refer to the independents as 
'abstainers', and for the latter as 'defectors'. Either of 
these two are, I believe, individually possible, and I will 
deal with them separately. Most likely is a composite scenario 
of abstainers and defectors interacting. The possibility that 
the minimal state may fail to arise is arguably the less 
serious, and so I shall only present the briefest depiction of 
the problem. 
Abstainers threaten the movement to the minimal state 
through their numbers vis-a-vis paid-up members of the 
dominant protection association. Once one association has 
55 Buchanan, The Li.Jits of Li.berty,p.4. 
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become dominant in any given territory or area it exercises 
its dominance by prohibiting the abstainers from pursuing 
their own rights enforcement in what it deems to be a risky 
manner. The prohibited abstainers are compensated. The 
principle of compensation, as previously seen, 'requires those 
who act in self-protection in order to increase their own 
security to compensate those they prohibit from doing risky 
acts which might actually have turned out to be harmless for 
the disadvantages imposed upon them.' 
The question for any abstainer is clear. Why not be a 
prohibited-and-compensated enforcer of one's rights? The 
attractions of abstention are the attractions of free-riding. 
You can get something for nothing or at very little cost to 
yourself. Abstainers who ask themselves this question will 
appreciate the gains available to them from their continued 
independence, and will value their being prohibited-and-
compensated at the expense of others. 
Too many abstainers to too few paying clients of the 
dominant association will present too heavy a burden on the 
association's members, and the economic viability of the 
association will be undermined. (The costs of prohibiting 
abstention are liable to encourage defection by those who are 
paid-up members of the association. And the greater the costs 
the more defections there are liable to be. This is the 
interactive scenario.) Whatever else might happen as a 
consequence of this, one eventuality is the failure to 
progress from the dominant protection association through to 
the minimal state. In this scenario there is not so much a 
lapse back into anarchism as the failure of Nozick's invisible 
hand to guide us out of it. 
Perhaps an objection would be to query the value of 
abstention. 'Perhaps abstention brings certain gains to its 
practitioners, but at what price? The price they pay is a 
period of time during which they are inadequately protected, 
namely by themselves. Relative to the protection others secure 
by paying others to protect them, the situation of the 
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abstainer during this period is not in the least enviable and, 
on balance, abstention is not worth it.' Whilst agreeing that 
self-protection is both less efficacious than being other-
protected and surrounded with its own peculiar perils, the 
force of this rejoinder may be blunted were the dominant 
association to prohibit-and-compensate promptly, as arguably 
it should. The danger posed by abstention would be lessened. 
However, whatever may be said contra abstention I leave aside 
because I am more concerned with the problem that defectors 
pose for the min i mal state once derived. 
This second scenario is more difficult for Nozick, though 
it has a similar form to the first. Let it be granted that the 
minimal state comes about in the manner Nozick's invisible 
hand says it will. The dominant protection association becomes 
the ultraminimal state becomes the minimal state. Now, why 
should not paid-up members of the minimal state renounce their 
membership - defect - in order to become prohibited-and-
compensated independents? Instead of prudent abstainers the 
minimal state is now faced with equally prudent defectors who, 
if their number is sufficient, threaten the minimal state with 
collapse and the lapse back into anarchism. 
As the number of those who opt to become free-riders and 
defect increases, so revenue to the minimal state decreases. 
In consequence, membership fees have to go up, thereby 
encouraging more to defect. As it becomes increasingly 
worthwhile financially to be prohibited-and-compensated 
(savings are made on inflating premiums) and more and more 
defect, the minimal state is jeopardized. Some determinate 
number of defectors will bring about the collapse of the 
minimal state some time after its establishment. There will be 
some moment between defectors d 1 , d 2 ... dn when the minimal 
state ceases to be economically viable. 
Expressed monetarily the scenario is as follows, where m 
represents the revenue lost to the minimal state with each 
defector d, and dn represents the client whose defection is 
the last defection from the minimal state before its collapse. 
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The minimal state is economically viable at or above a certain 
threshold T; only at or above T does its revenue equal or 
exceed its expenditure. Threshold T is determined by the 
proportion of clients (revenue) to disputes and defectors 
(expenditure). Suppose the minimal state is at or beyond T. 
Defectors d 1 , d 2 ... dn take with them their monies m1 , m2 ••• 
mn, and are prohibited-and-compensated. The withdrawal of m1 , 
m2 ••• mn and the cost of compensation means the minimal state 
falling below T. Below T the minimal state is no longer 
economically viable and will have to raise further revenue, 
which will take the form of an increased cost to members for 
protection. In other words, the monetary value represented by 
m increases. This is liable to motivate further prudent 
defections amongst those who have not already made the 
decision to become defecting free-riders. So more d's withdraw 
with their increased m's, and the spiral of decline continues 
anew at an accelerating pace. 
Briefly, some defect and are prohibited-and-compensated. 
They are compensated by the remaining members of the minimal 
state. As the price of membership of the minimal state 
increases the demand for membership decreases as it becomes a 
more attractive proposition to defect. More then defect. The 
price of membership increases. This serves to further depress 
demand, and so on. The minimal state lapses. 
Nozick contends that self-help enforcers (independents) may 
be legitimately prohibited on the grounds of the risk their 
self-help activity imposes on an association's clients, but 
that clients must - morally must - compensate independents for 
disadvantages imposed upon them by being prohibited. The 
likely least expensive method of compensation is the supplying 
of protective services to them. Nozick then turns to look at 
his principle of compensation, asking 'Must the members of the 
protective agency pay for protective services (vis-a-vis its 
clients) for the independents? Can they insist that the 
independents purchase the services themselves? After all, 
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using self-help procedures would not have been without costs 
for the independent.'~ 
The principle of compensation lays down that prohibitors 
must pay an amount sufficient to compensate for the 
disadvantages of prohibition, less the cost the prohibited 
party would have borne supplying his own protection. If the 
prohibitor pays compensation to an amount covering the 
disadvantages imposed, minus the cost of the activity were it 
permitted, this amount may not be enough to enable the 
prohibited party to overcome the disadvantages. Accordingly, 
the principle stipulates that 'The prohibitor must completely 
supply enough, in money or in kind, to overcome the 
disadvantages.' 57 In short, 'As the only effective supplier, 
the dominant protective agency must offer in compensation the 
difference between its own fee and monetary costs to this 
p rohibited party of self-help enforcement.'58 'No compensation 
need be provided to someone who would not be disadvantaged by 
buying protection for himself.'~ 
In the light of this principle, an example, very much 
simplified, might be this. I am an independent (either 
abstaining or having defected) and the monetary cost to me of 
self-help enforcement of my rights is $50 per annum (the cost 
of a revolver over its lifetime, say). The cheapest policy 
offered by the dominant association has a premium price tag of 
$100. Were I to be prohibited from enforcing my rights I must 
be compensated to the tune of $50. And it does not seem that 
the principle of compensation cares whether I have a luxury 
yacht and a fortune in the bank. 
At the end of his setting out of the principle comes the 
point where Nozick appears to recognise the prospect of the 
sort I am raising, for he asks, 'If the dominant protection 
agency provides protective services in this way for 
independents, won't this lead people to leave the agency in 
56 Nozick 1 Anarchy 1 State 1 and Utopia 1 p .111. 
57 b'd I 1 • 1p.ll2. 
58 b'd I 1 •1p.ll2. 
59 b'd 12 I 1 • 1p.l . 
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order to receive its services without paying?' 60 Nozick answers 
in the negative, and he cites three reasons. One, that 
compensation is paid only to those who would be disadvantaged 
by purchasing protection for themselves. Two, that 
compensation is paid only in an amount 'that will equal the 
cost of an unfancy policy when added to the sum of the 
monetary costs of self-help protection plus whatever amount 
the person comfortably could pay.' hl And, thirdly, the more 
free-riders there are the more desirable it is 'to be a client 
always protected by the agency'. 62 
Taking these in reverse order, my objection to the third 
reason, that the desirability of free-riding diminishes the 
more free-riders there are, is its complete dependence on 
there being a time lapse between when one is prohibited and 
when one is compensated, or between when one defects and when 
one is prohibited-and-compensated. Why should or need there be 
any significant, i.e. deterring, time lapse between them? Why 
not say that when one is prohibited one is simultaneously or 
nearly so co-opted into the dominant association, ultraminimal 
or minimal state, whichever it is, and protected by it? It 
might all boil down to so much data changes in computers 
followed by official notification and compensatory voucher 
(for $50). 
As to Nozick's second reason, what is wrong with the 
unfancy policy offered? Is it the sort of policy nobody would 
want to have? If so, is the association or state justified in 
compensating only in kind with this policy or only in an 
amount sufficient for this policy to be purchased? Maybe an 
unfancy policy, despite its cost, is no better or only 
marginally so than self-protection. 
My reply to the first line of reasoning is that if the 
principle of compensation allows for the compensating of only 
those 'disadvantaged' we need to know how we are to understand 
60 b'd I 1 .,p.l13. 
61 b'd I 1 • ,p.l13. 
62 b'd I 1 .,p.l13. 
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what is meant by this. Nozick offers something of a clue when 
he writes that 'Only those disadvantaged by the prohibition 
would be compensated: namely those who lack other resources 
they can shift (without disadvantaging sacrifice)'. 63 My 
response then is that this looks to me like discrimination 
against the better off, those who can without disadvantaging 
sacrifice pay the $50 difference between a revolver and a 
policy. And if so, what is Nozick's justification for it? It 
seems to run counter to the spirit - if not the very letter -
of Nozickean libertarianism. What, for Nozick, is wrong with 
my being a yacht-owning millionaire and choosing independence 
because I want to be compensated to the tune of $50? Why does 
my having greater just holdings than most preclude me from 
being prohibited-and-compensated? Can it be, simply, that I 
have enough - and that there are other limits to acquisition 
hidden in Anarchy, State, and Utopia besides moral catastrophe 
and the Lockean proviso? 




As free agents we are able to pursue the satisfaction of 
our preferences. And the unrestrained pursuit of our 
pre ferences generates particular interactional problems, 
namely of conflict and the difficulty of mutually beneficial 
co-operation. Even should we want to we cannot all retire, 
Thoreau-like, to our respective Walden Ponds. For one thing, 
there are not enough ponds. Because we are free we can choose 
to abide by a moral contract, and in choosing morality we are 
more likely to be successful in satisfying our preferences. 
Utility maximisers, whatever their preferences, have to choose 
either to enter into the moral enterprise (by contracting to 
undertake duties in order to gain rights) or to remain in the 
pre-moral condition. The price of rights is paid in the coin 
of correlative duties. I have argued that, faced with the 
choice between remaining in the pre-moral condition - where 
natural and social freedom are undifferentiated - and 
contracting into a morality of rights and duties, contractors 
who are rational will follow their enlightened self-interest 
and elect to be moral. 
The rationale for contracting is each person's envisaging 
his being better off, in terms of his subjective utility 
structure (his preferences), if he exercises constraint. The 
success of the contract is judged in terms of each person 
being better off in the long term. Given the universal 
background of relevant facts about utility maximising agents 
and their shared environment, persons are better off for 
constraining themselves. Conflict is lessened and co-operation 
made possible. 
Contractors agree on two rules to constrain their natural 
freedom. The first rule is consistent with Hobbes: persons, 
whatever their preferences, surrender their pre-moral freedom 
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to do all they will and have a power to. Each constrains 
himself from deliberately interfering in the purposes of 
others in exchange for the same consideration from them. This 
rule I called Quieta Non Movere. It establishes the right to 
equal social liberty. Instead of each being naturally free to 
do all he wills and has a power to, each is now socially free 
to do all he wills and has a power to - just as long as he 
does not deliberately seek to curtail the equivalent freedom 
of his fellows. The second rule all contractors accept 
generates for each the positive right to welfare, to having 
his fundamental needs met by others when unable to meet them 
himself - on condition, though, that what is laid claim to in 
the name of welfare is the incidental product of the free 
pursuit of preferences. Persons would be rational to agree to 
both rules. The right to equal social liberty justified in the 
second chapter provides for libertarianism the basic moral 
foundation it needs. 
Alone, the right to equal social liberty does not establish 
libertarianism. Only once the regime of rights is transformed 
into a regime of property rights is that achieved. The 
progression to libertarianism is effected when the labour 
theory of appropriation is justified. With the defence of the 
contention that labouring grants the labourer a title to what 
he has laboured with the central tenet of the libertarian 
programme is in place. The right to equal social liberty is 
the key to the labour theory. Because a person has the social 
freedom, the right, to move his body as he purposes in ways 
that do not violate the social freedom of others - and any 
property rights they may have - he has the liberty to 
incorporate into his rights-respecting purposeful activity 
naturally situated objects. In so incorporating unowned 
resources he acquires a property right in them. 
In the introductory chapter libertarianism was divided into 
three distinct types, namely orthodox libertarianism and two 
variants of Lockean libertarianism. orthodox libertarianism 
says that property rights are absolute, and that the claim of 
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exclusion is relinquishable only by the free consent of the 
owner. The first of the two variants of Lockean libertarianism 
holds property rights to be prima facie and not absolute, and 
property therefore liable in principle to coercive transfer. 
The exact conditions under which property may be coercively 
transferred are not specified. However, overriding (or 
violating as Nozick will have it) rights is a serious matter 
and only justifiable in the more exceptional cases. Nozick 
acknowledges he is a Lockean libertarian of this weak sort. My 
contention is that he is a Lockean of the second and 
considerably stronger variety, i.e of the sort which agrees 
that the right to property is prima facie and not absolute, 
but says in addition that there is a positive right to 
welfare. Though his reasons are not the same as mine, and 
despite his avowals to the contrary, Nozick implicitly 
endorses a libertarianism of this sort. 
To deny categorically that the avoidance of gravely 
deleterious consequences never overrides r ights is a simple 
moral mistake. Absolutism in matters moral is to be rejected, 
and Nozick is correct to appreciate this. An argument from 
moral catastrophe will succeed against any and all moral 
theories, and therefore against any and all moral-political 
theories. The construction of moral catastrophe given in the 
fourth chapter succeeds against orthodox libertarianism and 
Lockean libertarianism of the weak kind. What that argument 
justifies is the very redistribution they so assiduously 
eschew. Where the contract method generated a moral right to 
be in a particular material condition, the injunction to avert 
moral catastrophe concludes that persons have a just claim to 
have their basic welfare provided for. If just for this 
reason, the only tenable libertarianism is one committed to 
meeting person's fundamental needs. 
Lockean libertarianism has normative policy implications, 
two of which were mentioned. Both are ways of best adhering to 
the maximin dictum governing redistribution. The first is that 
taxation be proportional. That two people, equally entitled to 
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their radically unequal respective holdings, are equally 
obliged to contribute towards the welfare of a third puts a 
bar to any standard of contribution except proportional 
taxation. The second implication is that persons may be justly 
compelled to purchase social insurance when they are able to. 
Persons are duty-bound to make provision for themselves 
against the contingencies of life. This obligation is 
enforceable against them. 
On the matter of the distribution of property, Lockean 
libertarianism is not anti-egalitarian. Rather, it i s 
indifferent to equality. Were equality brought about as a 
consequence of redistribution to meet needs or through free 
exchange it would be a just equal distribution. There is, 
however, no justification for bringing about a movement to 
equality or greater equality. If equality comes about either 
by transfer to meet needs or by a rights-respecting invisible-
hand process no-one has cause for redress. Beyond this, 
equality is not, pace Rawls et al, required in the name of 
justice. To think with Loevinsohn that libertarianism requires 
the redistribution of goods to those whose use and consumption 
of them is more important to them than it is important to the 
current holders is to mistake libertarianism for something 
else. It is, I have suggested in the fifth chapter, to mistake 
it for a rather crude aggregative utilitarianism. 
Persons have the right to liberty and property. In a world 
of imperfect moral beings these rights will need enforcing. 
I could choose to be my own rights enforcer, but this is 
highly impractical: it is better that a specialist enforce my 
rights on my behalf. Is it better, though, that the specialist 
be one of many competing for my patronage on the market, or 
not? Is anarchism to be preferred to statism? If the market 
hypothesis is to be plausible the protection associations will 
have to protect the rights of persons the state currently does 
at least as well as the state currently protects them. In the 
sixth chapter I showed how persons' rights, including the 
right to welfare, could be enforced in the absence of a 
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monopoly on coercive powers. Anarchism and redistribution are 
not incompatible. Shoring up his case, I defended the 
anarchist libertarian against Nozick's invisible-hand 
derivation of the minimal state premissed on the failure of 
the market in protective services to prove stable. It is far 
from certain that the default from anarchism will occur. What 
is more, were the minimal state to evolve its continued 
existence is not assured. The principle of compensation which 
features so prominently in the Nozickean derivation may 
undermine the minimal state by creating a demand for free or 
subsidised state (paying-member) protection. In the final 
analysis it looks to be an empirical matter, and if so the 
wisest conclusion to draw is no hard and fast conclusion 
either way. We may have anarchy, we might get a state. All we 
may be certain of is that whichever would fulfil the function 
of protecting our rights best is to be preferred. 
All libertarians maintain that property is a moral right 
and uphold labouring as the basis of original property in 
things. My primary intention in this dissertation has been to 
show that on both counts they are right. Another has been to 
show that those libertarians are wrong who hold that only by 
mixing his labour or by being party to a free, uncoerced 
exchange can a person come into property. Orthodox 
libertarianism is, then, inadequate. Nozick's libertarianism, 
premissed on defeasible rights, is closer to the mark. In 
common both with Locke's First and Second Treatise, the 
version of libertarianism defended here countenances coercive 
transfers. Each has a claim to so much out of another's plenty 
-- as will keep him from extreme want. Accordingly, I have called 
it Lockean libertarianism. Because I do not think it necessary 
for libertarianism that it be absolutist about rights, nor 
that it disavow all redistribution, the theory defended here 
may properly be called libertarian. It is a robust rights-
based moral-political theory. What is more it is a property-
centred theory of liberty, and that - to my mind - is 
sufficient to warrant the epithet libertarian. 
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My concerns in this dissertation have been somewhat 
localised, restricted to articulating and defending the basis 
of a libertarian moral-political theory I think correct. The 
more precise details are absent, and many issues of interest 
and importance are not dealt with. Perhaps the most important 
of these is the issue of the rectification of injustice. 
Rothbard has addressed this question. He says that if we know 
that resource r was unjustly acquired and we can find the 
victim or his heirs, r reverts to them - less any property p 
added by those who were not the actual aggressors. 1 Rothbard 
insists that the separability of p added to r by those who 
were the aggressors is a condition of their keeping it. If it 
is not separable they lose p to the just owner of r. We need 
not accept this condition. If p really does belong to whoever 
added it, then it belongs to him even if it is inseparable. 
I think that matters are more complex than Rothbard supposes, 
?nd that, accordingly, the issue of the rectification of 
injustice is considerably more intractable. There are many 
others. I should have liked to include them. Their omission is 
warranted on the grounds that the task of addressing them is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. And besides, if the 
broader foundations are unsound, no addition of detail will 
help. 
If it is yours by your honest labour, or by free transfer 
from someone who first had it by his honest labour, it is 
yours to keep - just so long as no-one else needs it. 
1 Rothbard, Tbe Ethics of Liberty,pp.57-58. 
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